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The aim of this dissertation is to discern and explain why states established the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) with an independent Prosecutor with the aid of 
theories of international relations.  The theories utilized were neorealism, neoliberal 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism, constructivism and liberal-pluralism.  In order 
to complete the above-stated task, two supplemental questions were asked: first, how is 
one be able to explain policy formulation in regards to the ICC; and second, what 
accounts for the victory of the supporters?   The comparative case study method of the 
‘method of agreement’ was employed.  Canada and the United Kingdom – from among 
the supporters of the institutionalization of the independent Prosecutor – and the United 
States and Japan – from among the opponents of the initiative – were selected for the 
study at hand.  Elite interviews and declassified diplomatic documents were consulted 
and supplemented by analyses of secondary sources documents such as negotiating 
transcripts and transcripts of parliamentary debates.  In the final analysis, constructivism 
and its liberal variant – liberal constructivism – in tandem with liberal-pluralism seem the 
best able to explain the establishment of the Court with an independent Prosecutor 
because these two theories are best able to account for the role of ideas and interests of 
key actors during the process of establishing the Court.  In addition, and given that the 
establishment of the Court is a substantial departure from its institutional predecessors, 
liberal constructivism and liberal-pluralism are also able to account for this revolutionary 
change in the establishment of international institutions.  The study at hand highlights the 
role of domestic political actors in the acceptance of international treaties as well.  
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Therefore, this study underpins the need for further scholarship in regards to under what 
conditions do states allow themselves to be bound by international legal mechanisms.             
Key Words:  
International Criminal Court, Prosecutor, Rome Statute, neorealism, neoliberal 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism, constructivism, liberal-pluralism, Canada, the 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court is one of the most 
important international accomplishments of the post-Cold War era.  It raises the world 
community to a higher level of civilization (Comments by the Honourable Douglas 
Roche, member of the Canadian Senate, during the third reading of Bill C-19 on 
Wednesday, June 28th, 2000). 
 
The creation of a permanent international criminal court is a historic task.  It will be a 
major organ that will play a crucial role on the world stage for many decades to come 
(Remarks by Lord Whitty in the House of Lords of the United Kingdom and Northern 
Ireland, June 9th, 1998).  
 
The problem is not in the principle, but in the modalities of establishing the court (Allan 
Kessel, member of the Canadian delegation at the Rome Conference in 1998).   
 
The International Criminal Court (ICC), the first permanent international criminal court, 
was established on July 1st, 2002, by the time 60 states ratified its foundational document, 
the Rome Statute (RS) of the Court.  The permanent Court is seen as a crowning 
achievement of an effort, more than a century in the making, by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) as well as states to bring to justice those who have committed the 
most heinous crimes in the history of intra-state and inter-state warfare.   As Michael 
Struett states, “the ICC represents the most substantial effort in human history to 
institutionalize individual criminal responsibilities for atrocities committed by states’ 
leaders during interstate warfare or civil conflicts” (Struett, 12). Although the ICC was 
preceded by a number of ad hoc and hybrid tribunals which were tasked with bringing 
war criminals to justice, the Court is markedly different from these institutions in two key 
respects.  First, it is a permanent institution.  The Court does not have a set territorial or 
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temporal1 mandate; there are no limitations as to which conflicts it should address, and 
within which time periods.  Second, it is an independent Court, meaning that it does not 
fall under the jurisdiction of any state or set of states, not even the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC).   The ICC does originate from within the United Nations (UN) 
system, and the Court does exhibit the same operational rules and procedures used within 
the UN system.  However, the Court is only accountable to its own Assembly of State 
Parties (ASP), composed of states which have signed and ratified the Statute. 
   Advocates of a permanent international criminal court trace their efforts to 
establish such an institution to the founder of the International Red Cross / Red Crescent, 
Gustav Moinier, and the war-ravaged years of the late 19th century.  The World Federalist 
Movement, in turn, had also supported the creation of the Court since the movement’s 
establishment in 1947.2 However, it was not until almost 100 years later, in 1989, that the 
issue attracted official legal and political attention.   In 1989, the former Prime Minister 
of Trinidad and Tobago, A.N. Robinson, proposed in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
the establishment of an international criminal court to prosecute and deter narcotics 
traffickers and trafficking in the Caribbean.  Following a mere four-year process, the 
Court’s foundational document, the Rome Statute (RS) – named after the 1998 
conference in Rome where the statute was accepted by 120 out of the 160 participating 
states – established the legal as well as political foundations for the creation of the Court.    
 The statute of the Court was accepted with the support and advocacy of the so-
called ‘like-minded states’, but also with the help of numerous non-state actors.  In a 
                                                     
1
 The Court’s jurisdiction is only bound by its non-retroactivity, meaning that the Court’s jurisdiction is not applicable 
to the relevant crimes committed prior to July 1st, 2002, the date when the Rome Statute came into force.   
2
 Pace, Willam.  Skype Interview.  01 Aug. 2011. 
3 
 
matter of four years, between 1998 and 2002, 104 states signed the Statute3 and at least 
60 states ratified it.  Given the gravity of the crimes for which the Court is responsible, 
and its potential impact on state sovereignty, it is quite puzzling why states would cede 
their sovereignty to such an institution.  What is further puzzling – and what directly 
concerns the subject matter of this dissertation – is why states would endow the Court 
with an independent Prosecutor with the ability to unilaterally initiate investigations 
without state restraint?  Given the liberty of the Prosecutor to pursue leads, the Office of 
the Prosecutor (OTP), more than any other design feature of the ICC, challenges most 
concretely the sovereignty of states in a very direct manner. 
The particular role bestowed on the Prosecutor in the RS was unprecedented, 
unexpected, and yet crucial for a functioning Court. As Morten Bergsmo and Jelena Pejic 
explain, at Rome “it came as a surprise for many that States were willing to accept an 
independent international prosecutor who can freely conduct preliminary examination of 
allegations of core international crimes and make public statements about such activities” 
(Bergsmo and Pejic in Triffterer, 585).    Yet, as Sylvia DeGurmendi – a judge at the 
Court, and a former diplomat representing Argentina at Rome – explains, “the majority of 
States participating in the Rome Conference considered that the proprio motu role of the 
Prosecutor was an indispensable feature of an independent and effective Criminal Court” 
(DeGurmendi in Politi and Nesi, 55). More important, this role bestowed on the 
Prosecutor was not only a function of Prosecutorial independence alone, but it was a 
crucial role bestowed on the Court as a whole.4 
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 Signing the Statute is the first step in joining the Court, but at this stage states are not legally bound by it.  For that to 
take place a state must formally ratify the RS, or make it a part of its domestic laws.   
4
 Talamanca, Niccolo-Figa.  Skype Interview. 06 Sept. 2011.  
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Within international relations scholarship, the independent role ascribed to the 
Prosecutor – and the ICC as a whole – has not been put under the rigorous and substantial 
analytical examination it deserves.  As many astute observers and scholars of the ICC 
posit, “thus far few social scientists have given this innovative institution close scrutiny.” 
(Simmons and Danner, 226)  At the same time, the existing literature discussing the role 
of the Prosecutor tends to be located within the legal literature.  International relations 
and comparative politics scholars have yet to take a committed step towards attempting to 
explain this very interesting and important design feature of the first permanent 
international criminal court.   
The aim of this work then is to provide an explanation – with the aid of five 
international relations theories, including neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, 
historical institutionalism, constructivism and liberal pluralism – as to why states agreed 
to establish an independent prosecutor for the ICC.  In order to attempt such analysis, the 
proposed work will shed light on two further sub-questions intimately related to the 
central research question.  First, which states supported and which opposed the 
establishment of an independent Prosecutor, and why? Second, why and how did the 
supporters of an independent Prosecutor win?  It will be argued that, given the role of 
domestic ideas and interests as well as the activism, effort and skill of individual political 
actors during the pre-Rome process, in Rome, and during the post-Rome ratification 
phase of joining the Court, theories such as liberal pluralism and liberal constructivism 
provide the most appropriate explanation.  These theories are most suitable as they are 
able to account for the causal relevance of, not only state-level actors prior to and during 
the negotiations, but also for the effort and principled convictions of domestic-level 
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actors as well. More importantly, these theories – as opposed to their systemic and 
institutionalist alternates – are better able to account for political change.  The 
establishment of the ICC with an independent Prosecutor is a revolutionary phenomenon, 
and a large scale departure from other, prior institutional arrangements.  Therefore only 
theories which are able to account for political change are best suited for the ensuing 
analysis.       
 Through the application of qualitative and case study methods this study will 
show that it was mainly liberal and social democratic states which advocated for the 
establishment of the independent Prosecutor.  In particular, the case studies of Canada 
and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and the cases of the United States and Japan, 
on the other, will show that particular interest groups and political parties from within the 
domestic political arena of these states advocated either for, or against, the establishment 
of the independent Prosecutor.  In these regimes, the domestic political groups occupying 
key foreign policy-making positions, and the general consensus regarding the issue of the 
ICC and the independent Prosecutor, provide the answer as to why these regimes 
supported or opposed the establishment of the ICC and the independent Prosecutor.  It 
was therefore domestic interest groups, and their successful framing of the national 
interest in such a way that the independent Prosecutor was seen as either not a threat to 
state sovereignty – or directly not jeopardizing state sovereignty – that are responsible for 
the establishment of the ICC with an independent Prosecutor.  The domestic interests 
resonated with the general sentiment in the mid-1990s that certain societies were 
‘unwilling or unable’ to bring war criminals to justice.  To paraphrase the late 
Christopher Keith Hall, the then-Legal Counsel of Amnesty International, and Rolf Einar 
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Fife, the Direction of Legal Affairs of the Foreign Ministry of Norway, neither the ICC, 
nor the independent Prosecutor, would have been established in any other temporal and 
historical contexts.5 
The International Criminal Court: A Primer 
At the outset, it is worth looking more closely at the ICC, the international context it was 
developed in, and what its particular design features are in order to lay the groundwork 
for the forthcoming chapters. Taking a step back, one of the most discussed international 
issues of the 1990s was the phenomenon of an increasing number of intra-state conflicts 
as opposed to inter-state conflicts.  Quite naturally this new dynamic was attributed to the 
end of the Cold War, and the end of the bipolar material and ideological ‘standoff’ 
between the United States of America and the Soviet Union.  At this time there was also a 
rise in the number of so-called ‘failing’ or ‘failed’ states where the central authority of a 
government has not only been challenged but also diminished in certain respects.  In 
parallel with this phenomenon, more attention was paid to human rights violations within 
states.  Leaders and individuals who were responsible for mass violations of human rights 
were publicly identified and acknowledged across the globe as well as within particular 
sovereign states.  It became clear that certain states and their leadership either could not 
hold certain individuals accountable for crimes committed during war, or were not 
willing to do so.  The civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were glaring 
examples of this need for the international community to ‘step in and step up’ in bringing 
individuals to justice who would otherwise walk free (Ibid). 
                                                     
5
 Fyfe, Rolf Einar. Telephone Interview. 11 July 2011.; Hall, Christopher Keith. Telephone Interview. 11 




Also, at this juncture in time, the notions of humanitarian intervention and human 
security gained conceptual and practical relevance.  What these proposals signaled, 
however, was a certain ‘diminishing of the state’, or at the very least a challenge to the 
deeply ingrained concept of state sovereignty and with it the capacity of states to deal 
with the most heinous crimes against humanity.  Overall, states as well as the United 
Nations were more often than not confronted with situations in which the apparent 
remedy necessarily challenged age-old practices underpinned by the sanctity of state 
sovereignty.  
Organizationally, the ICC is comprised of four main organs: the Presidency, the 
judiciary, the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry.  The Office of the Presidency is 
entrusted with the overall administration of the Court, except for the Office of the 
Prosecutor.  The Presidency is headed by three judges who are elected by their fellow 
jurists at the Court for a term of three years.  The presiding judge of the Court is assisted 
by a first Vice-President and a second Vice-President.  The Judiciary consists of the 
judges of the Court – eighteen in total – who serve in one of three judicial divisions: Pre-
Trial, Trial and Appeals Division.  The assignment of judges to the different divisions is 
based on the ‘function’ of the different division as well as the ‘qualifications and 
expertise’ of the judges.  In terms of qualification, it is ascertained that the personnel 
have ‘expertise in criminal law and procedure and international law.’  The Office of the 
Registry “is responsible for the non-judicial aspects of the administration and servicing of 
the Court.”  This organ is headed by a Registrar who is under the supervision of the 
President of the Court.  The Registrar is elected by the judges of the Court for a five- year 
term.  Lastly, the Court also contains three other so-called ‘semi-autonomous’ offices 
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which fall under the administration of the Registry, though these offices operate 
autonomously.  These are the Office of Public Counsel for Victims, the Office of Public 
Counsel for Defence, and the Trust Funds Office.  The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is 
an autonomous and independent organ of the Court.  It is administered neither by the 
Presidency of the Court nor by any other international organ, including the United 
Nations or the United Nations Security Council.  The OTP is headed by the Prosecutor. 
The Prosecutor is elected for a non-renewable nine years by the Assembly of State 
Parties.  He or she is assisted by the Deputy Prosecutor who is in charge of the three sub-
divisions within the OTP: the Prosecution Division, the Jurisdiction, Complementarity 
and Cooperation Division, and the Investigation Division.  The latter two divisions are 
headed by a Director and a Head respectively. 
The Prosecutor may initiate investigations based on two types of modalities: a) 
referrals from state parties to the Rome Statute or the UNSC; and b) communications 
from individuals who are referring to one of the three crimes – genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes – under the jurisdiction of the Court.  Thus far, there are eight 
states from which cases are being heard at the Court.  These cases deal with the situations 
in Northern Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Sudan, Kenya, Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mali.  The situations in Uganda, 
Cote d’Ivoire, CAR and the DRC have been referred to the Court by state parties.  The 
cases of Libya and Sudan have been referred to the Court by the UNSC.  At the present 
time, the Prosecutor has been granted authorization to “investigate proprio motu” (‘on 
his/her accord’) the situation in Kenya.  In addition to the active cases and investigations 
described above, the Prosecutor is also involved with the “preliminary analysis” of 
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developments in Afghanistan, Colombia, Comoros, Georgia, Nigeria, Guinea, Honduras, 
Iraq and Ukraine.6  
Among the different design features of the ICC, the OTP stands out as the feature 
that potentially has the most significant impact on the sovereignty not only of the states 
which signed the Rome Statute, but also on the so-called ‘third-party states’ that have not 
signed nor ratified the Statute.  Even though there are numerous works within the 
international relations literature theorizing why and in what circumstances states would 
cede their sovereignty to international institutions, this particular design feature of the 
ICC is undertheorized.  This circumstance is what this work will attempt to remedy.  
Why would states - 120 at that, which signed and ratified the statute, including states that 
are members of the UNSC such as the United Kingdom and the France in particular – do 
so?  And, of particular importance to this work, why would states establish an 
independent prosecutor whose ability to bring indictments against individuals goes 
unchecked by any other, outside organ?    
Methodology and Data Gathering   
This dissertation employs the ‘method of agreement’ (or ‘most different’) comparative 
case study method in order to isolate causal variables.  It also employs process-tracing 
within cases to identify specific causal mechanisms.  Data for these cases were gathered 
through textual analysis, elite interviews, participant observation, as well as descriptive 
statistics.  The aim in this section then is to provide an outline of the method and 
methodologies, and the utility of the cases for the arguments at hand.  Some attention will 
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also be paid to possible cases which could have been selected but were left out of the 
discussion.     
From the strictly methodological point of view of comparative case analysis, the 
four cases selected fit very well with the ‘method of agreement’ research design, which 
espouses that “cases should differ in every respect except for the variables being studied” 
(Hopkin, 268).  Apart from representatives of all four states used as case studies 
continually participating in the debates about the Prosecutor and the Court in general, the 
four cases show substantial difference in their foreign policies, governmental structures, 
and party politics.  With respect to foreign policy, Canadian foreign policy was at the 
time still focused on multilateralism and peace-keeping.  The foreign policy of the UK 
emphasized “maintaining a strong alliance with the US, and a commitment to place 
Britain at the heart of Europe.”7  Finally, the US had become the sole superpower and 
was viewed as the hegemon within the international realm.  It was at the forefront of 
nearly every major inter- or intra-state conflict, from Rwanda, Somalia to Bosnia and 
later Kosovo.  In Japan, certain constitutional provisions did not allow it to engage in any  
military activity. With respect to state structures, Canada and the UK are both 
parliamentary democracies. Canada is a federal state while the UK is confederation.  By 
the same token, even though Canada and the US are both federations, the US government 
is characterized by a presidential system, and Canada is characterized by a parliamentary 
system.  Lastly, Japan is a monarchy, and a bicameral parliamentary liberal democracy.  
Overall, there is substantial variation between the governmental structures of these four 
states.  Yet despite this variation, the common denominator is that the particular policies 
                                                     
7
 Lunn, Jon, Vaughne Miller and Ben Smith.  “British Foreign Policy since 1997.” House of Commons of 




pursued, and later made into national law, were a function of particular domestic groups 
occupying positions of power and influence.  In other words, domestic interest groups 
were able to drum up enough support for their bargaining position regarding the ICC, at a 
particular juncture in time.  
In order to trace ‘initial conditions to outcomes’, records of the negotiation 
process were analyzed in order to uncover how different actors – namely members of the 
‘like-minded group’, NGOs, and the US and the ‘not-so-like-minded-states’ – negotiated 
and argued for, or against, the establishment of an independent Prosecutor.  In general 
terms, the preferences of states were observed beginning with the publishing of the first 
draft statute of the Court in 1994 by the International Law Commission (ILC), continuing 
with the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings throughout the 1990s, and ending 
with debates in national legislatures of the states under scrutiny shortly before the RS was 
ratified and made into national law.  
The cases outlined above were selected because these states were in positions of 
leadership during the timelines under scrutiny and were considered as very important 
within the debates regarding the independent Prosecutor. Canada was approached in 1995 
by the NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC) to lead the charge of 
establishing the Court after the successful Ottawa conference banning the use of land 
mines in conflicts.  Supporting the ICC and the independent Prosecutor seemed a natural 
extension of a multilateralist Canadian foreign policy, which included a leading role of 
the newly established Human Security Network (Axworthy 2004, 202).  At the same 
time, the official opposition in the House of Commons, the Canadian Alliance party, did 
oppose – unsuccessfully because of a Liberal majority supported by the New Democratic 
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Party – the establishment of an independent Prosecutor.  The case of the UK is very 
important as well, as this state is a member of the so-called ‘permanent 5’ (P-5) of the 
UNSC.  The P-5 was seen as a group-to-contend-with, and a group which – as cohesive 
as it was – argued against the establishment of an independent Prosecutor throughout the 
PrepComs until the UK changed its stance.8 This will provide us with an opportunity to 
explore factors responsible for this shift in position.   
The US is an excellent case because it vehemently opposed the establishment of 
an independent Prosecutor even though this was not a major policy aim of the US – at 
least not in Rome.  The pressure provided by the Pentagon and certain members of the 
US Congress and US House of Representatives towards the US negotiating team in order 
to shield US service members and civilians from the reach of the Court by whatever legal 
means necessary – and the failure of the Clinton Administration and the State Department 
to absorb this pressure – shed light on a key explanatory factor for US opposition: 
domestic partisan interests. Lastly, the case of Japan is key to this study as well.  Even 
though Japan was intimately involved in the diplomatic conferences prior to Rome, in 
Rome, and during the work of the Preparatory Commission after the conference, it took 
Japan nearly a decade to ratify the statute.  Japan ratified the statute in 2007, after the 
unanimous support of the members of the Diet, and the tireless advocacy of certain 
members of the Democratic Party of Japan. 
A few additional cases could have also been selected.  From among the 
supporters, Australia, France and even Senegal seemed to be acceptable choices.  
Uruguay and Israel were possible choices from the group of states which did not – at least 
                                                     
8
 Later on during the Rome conference, France, another member of the P-5, also changed its stance.  However, in the 
case of France, the change was due to the achievement of that nation’s negotiated goals as opposed to a change in 
government.   
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initially – support the establishment of the independent Prosecutor.  The main obstacle to 
using most of these cases was data acquisition.  This study was conducted a decade after 
the negotiations were concluded and the Statute was ratified by key states.  Access to 
information regarding these cases was quite difficult, because, for example, states and 
publics were not as interested in the establishment of the Court, or because public 
information about state positions was kept confidential, or simply because members of 
delegations – as in the case of Uruguay – were by then deceased.  In certain other cases, 
materials relevant to state positions regarding the Court were not available in English.     
As is quite evident from the cases selected, authoritarian states have not been used 
for the study.  Other than the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Egypt, for example, none of 
the so-dubbed authoritarian states played a key role during the negotiations.  The Islamic 
Republic of Iran was quite active in Rome, but mostly when the issue of the role of the 
UNSC was debated. Egypt did comment on the role of the Prosecutor within the Court, 
and its stance seemed to have changed to supporting the independent Prosecutor as the 
negotiations progressed. However, the inaccessibility of information regarding these 
states’ policies on the ICC would have created significant obstacles for the study.  
Overall, the biggest obstacle to using these types of states was the availability of 
information on preference formation in these states, and the lack of accessibility to key 
decision makers.   
Process tracing was also key to explaining case studies.  According to George and 
McKeown, it entails evaluating “the decision process by which various initial conditions 
are translated into outcomes” (George and McKeown in King, Keohane and Verba, 226).  
The authors note that via process tracing the individual actors responsible for the 
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particular decisions can be identified.  More importantly, by way of process tracing one is 
able to pinpoint outcomes, which “often imply a particular set of motivations or 
perceptions on the part of these actors” (Ibid., 227).  This type of methodology then is 
very well fitting for the analysis.  The aim of process-tracing in this study is to note the 
specific causal variables by tracing the impact of ideas and interest groups on national 
preference formation regarding the establishment of the ICC with an independent 
Prosecutor.      
Data was further gathered through content analysis of key primary documents – 
including a declassified diplomatic cable, through elite interviews and through participant 
observations.  Key policy papers, parliamentary committee and debate transcripts, as well 
as policy and media publications were used to discern the reasons why the above- 
mentioned key actors negotiated for an independent Prosecutor.  Interviews were 
conducted with a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, a former Under-Secretary General 
of the United Nations, a current Ambassador accredited to the United Nations, a number 
of former negotiators representing states as well as senior bureaucrats in key Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, along with NGO representatives.  Between 2010 and 2013, participant 
observations were also conducted at the Assembly of States Parties meetings of the ICC, 
at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York and in The Hague.  The objects of 
these observations were to not only further understand the position of states under 
scrutiny, but also to understand under what circumstances do states change position on 
key foreign policy issues.   
Finally, ordinal and nominal statistical methods were used to extract data 
regarding state support or opposition from secondary sources found in transcripts of the 
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negotiations in Rome as well as transcripts of meetings of the ILC and the UNGA.9   The 
utility of these research methods was that they provided a basic outline of how many – 
and which – states supported the establishment of an independent Prosecutor.  Further, 
basic statistics also pointed to the number of ‘free’, ‘partially free’ and ‘not free’10 states 
that supported or were against the establishment of an independent Prosecutor.  Data 
from the statistical database of Freedom House was used for this statistical sketch.  
The Argument  
In order to answer the overall question posed in this work – namely ‘why did states 
establish an independent Prosecutor?’ – there are two interrelated questions one must 
examine.  First, it must be determined what accounts for state-preference formation of 
those states which advocated for, but also against, the independent Prosecutor.  Second, it 
must also be established why the advocates of an independent Prosecutor prevailed 
during the negotiations, and in debates during the ratification process.  Even though the 
existing literature on the topic points to mostly national interest-type explanations, liberal 
pluralist and liberal constructivist explanations provide a more complete explanation.  
These theories are fitting here because they problematize the formation of national 
interests and preferences, as opposed to assuming them to be constant irrespective of the 
ideational and material interests of the political actors involved.  These theories can also 
better account for political change.   
                                                     
9
 It was the General Assembly which commissioned the ILC to construct a preliminary draft for a future conference 
regarding the Court.  It was also the General Assembly which established first the two Ad Hoc Committees and later 
the six Preparatory Committees as well.  
10
 Data from the statistical database of Freedom House was used for this statistical outline.  States labeled ‘free’ scored 
high on provision of political and civil rights.  States labeled ‘partially free’ scored in the mid-range, and states labeled 
‘not free’ scored low or ‘0’ on their ability to provide political and civil rights to their citizens.  
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It will be shown that the Court with an independent Prosecutor was the 
achievement of political interest groups and political parties from within the domestic 
politics of states which supported the independent Prosecutor – as was the case with 
Canada and the United Kingdom.  At the same time, the opposition of states to the 
initiative can also be explained by referring to political groups occupying positions of 
domestic political power in key opposing states, as was the case in the US and Japan. The 
ruling and dominating groups framed the national interests and a particular conception of 
national sovereignty in relation to the establishment of the independent Prosecutor in 
such a way that it either maintained, if not enhanced, state sovereignty – as in the case of 
Canada and the UK – or detracted from state sovereignty – as was the case of the US and 
Japan.  With the institution of the Pre-Trial Chamber as a check on the power of the 
Prosecutor in the event that he or she initiates investigations on his or her own, certain 
states were satisfied that their personnel would not be brought in front of the Court.  If 
their personnel would commit any of the crimes falling under the three categories of 
crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court, these individuals would be tried in domestic 
judicial systems. 
David Wippman argues that states established an independent Prosecutor because 
it was in their national foreign policy and security interests to do so.  This explanation is 
plausible as one may argue that states wanted to establish an independent Prosecutor 
because they knew that their personnel – military or civilian – would never be brought in 
front of the Court.  On the other hand, states that did not want the establishment of an 
independent Prosecutor were potentially concerned that their personnel – and their 
civilian leaders themselves – could be brought before the Court.  Given the present 
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configuration of the regime, a soldier, for example, from Sweden or Canada may not in 
fact be brought in front of the Court because he or she would be tried within the Swedish 
or Canadian judicial system.  However, even in these extreme cases, with the 
establishment of the ICC, more pressure would be placed on functioning domestic 
judicial systems to try certain individuals.  In some sense then, all states are – even if 
indirectly – bound by the principles the Court seeks to uphold. Other authors point to 
states and NGOs as the main catalysts in establishing the independent Prosecutor (Schiff, 
2008), while others would point to the role of normative legal ideas upheld by certain 
delegations (Brubacher, 2004) as key for instituting an independent Prosecutor.  What is 
common to these explanations is that, on the theoretical level, they mainly utilize the 
disambiguated concept of the ‘state’ as the key variable.  By extension then, and if the 
discussion remains at state-level discussions, national interest calculations are quite 
plausible as explanatory factors.       
Another major assumption made within the national interest-based explanation is 
that national interests would remain the same across time and irrespective of who forms 
the government in a particular state.  Evidence will show that this was not the case with 
the establishment of the ICC.  For example, the position of the United Kingdom changed 
when the New Labour government led by Tony Blair came to power in 1997.  This 
change in official stance was a source of victory for the supporters of an independent 
Prosecutor.  In the case of Canada, and as the discussion regarding the ratification process 
will show, if the official opposition would have been in power in 1998, Canada perhaps 
would have not been counted as one of the unbridled supporters of the Court.  In the case 
of the US, a Democrat-dominated Congress could have perhaps ushered in more support 
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for the Court, if not even ratification.  In the case of Japan, had the Democratic Party of 
Japan formed the government – or if it would have been a key coalition member – Japan 
could have, at least, joined the Court earlier.  In essence, then, one must necessarily go 
beyond considering states as unitary actors and evaluate the sources of national interest 
formation.   This exercise gives rise and validity to a liberal pluralist explanation.  
 What is very important to discern is how the national interests were defined 
within the particular states, and by whom.  This is the reason why it is argued in this work 
that it was valuational and ideational factors originating from within key states – and by 
so-called ‘sub-state’ actors – that contributed to the establishment of an independent 
Prosecutor.  The valuational and ideational factors underpinned the framing of national 
interests with respect to state sovereignty.  These arguments give rise to a liberal 
constructivist and pluralist explanation.  As David Madar explains, within liberal – or 
pluralist – international relations theory “groups are the basis of political life” (Madar, 
35).  In this conception, “people form groups with others who share their interests, and 
together they seek to influence policies and decisions that affect them.  Policies are not 
proclaimed by government but result from government’s effort to balance and reconcile 
contending interests” (Ibid.).  Underpinning the very utility of using more liberal 
constructivist and pluralist investigations of the establishment of the Court, scholars such 
as Caroline Fehl point out that “liberal approaches that focus on sub-state explanatory 
factors” are important and needed because they “shed light on … domestic 
(re)evaluations of sovereignty costs, ... or on the interaction between governments and 
national publics in the face of atrocities abroad” (Fehl, 384).   
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 These theories would suggest that the reason why certain states – including 
Canada and the UK – supported the establishment of an independent Prosecutor, was that 
state delegations were representing domestic interests which framed their own national 
interests in such a way as to appeal to the widest domestic as well as international opinion 
regarding the Court with an independent Prosecutor.  Therefore, the institution of a Pre-
Trial Chamber serving as an oversight mechanism satisfied particular states and most 
NGOs.  The Pre-Trial Chamber provided – and underpinned – the notion of enhanced 
sovereignty for these states.  In case these states’ personnel committed crimes of 
international criminal concern, and if by way of machination and misunderstanding, the 
Prosecutor did decide to indict these persons, states would be assured that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber – as a check on the power of the Prosecutor – would not allow the investigation 
to proceed.    
 Domestic sources of foreign policy seem also to be the reason why certain states 
opposed – and were suspicious of – the establishment and functioning of the independent 
Prosecutor.  In the case of the US, the administration of President Clinton did sign the RS 
on the last possible day.  However, this administration experienced substantial opposition 
from within the US Congress – in particular from such individuals as the Republican 
Senator Jesse Helms from North Carolina (R-NC) who was the main proponent of the 
‘Hague Invasion Act’ authorizing the US President to use any means necessary to free 
US service members if arrested and/or transferred to the Court.  In the case of the US, it 
was the national interest formulation emanating from the Pentagon and the US Congress 
that carried the day, with the State Department and the White House not being able to 
provide an alternative formulation.  The Pentagon and the Republican members of the US 
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Congress were successful in framing the issue of the independent Prosecutor as an office 
which would detract from the sovereign ability of the US to protect its personnel or to 
pursue its national interest globally.  Some allies of the US fell in line behind it, states 
such as Israel and Japan. 
 The emphasis on the framing of national interests by particular governments 
representing key states animates the overall argument in this work.  In Chapter 2 the 
emphasis will be placed on existing explanations of the establishment of the independent 
Prosecutor and the Court.  In this chapter, the existing literature will be reviewed with the 
explicit aim to situate this work in the broader intellectual discussion regarding the 
establishment of the Court and its Prosecutor.  Chapter 3 will compare the Prosecutorial 
powers of the independent Prosecutor of the ICC with the powers of the Prosecutors of 
the ICTY, ICTR and the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.  The aim of this Chapter is 
uncover the way in which the powers of independence of the Prosecutor of the ICC differ 
from other international Prosecutors.  Chapters 4 and 5 will focus on the cases, namely 
Canada and the UK in Chapter 4, and the US and Japan in Chapter 5.  The aim in these 
chapters is to understand state preference formation during the negotiation processes as 
well as during the ratification processes in national legislatures.  Chapter 6 will focus on 
the negotiations and will provide an explanatory discussion regarding why the supporters 
of the independent Prosecutor were successful in Rome.  In the concluding chapter, a few 
suggestions for further study will be discussed along with several policy-relevant 




How, and in what ways, will this work contribute to the burgeoning literature related to 
the ICC? Even though the ICC is widely discussed in the overall – albeit quite 
interdisciplinary – scholarly literature, there are relatively few attempts at explaining 
cooperation in relation to this institution.  Consequently, there are even fewer attempts at 
empirically explaining cooperation with respect to the establishment of an independent 
Prosecutor, which embodies the constraints states are faced with to bring to trial their 
own citizens, or nationals of other states who commit crimes on their territory.    
The aim of this work is to provide an empirically based causal narrative as to why 
states agreed to allow an individual largely unconstrained by states to investigate high-
ranking civilian or military personnel who serve on behalf of sovereign states.   In other 
words, the primary aim in this work is to discern why states willingly agreed to allow an 
individual, without state constraint, to investigate high ranking civilian or military 
personnel for potential crimes committed during armed conflict.  The secondary aim is to 
discern how this particular design feature impacts the operation of the ICC as a whole.   
Overall there are three broad contributions of this work.  First, dealing specifically 
with international relations scholarship, five particular theories will be tested to discern 
which theory – or theories – are better suited to explain the questions posed in this work.  
Neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, historical institutionalism, constructivism, and 
liberal pluralism will be outlined and used to explain state preference formation, as well 
as why the proponents of a Court with an independent Prosecutor prevailed.  Special 
attention will be paid to the extent to which these theories are able to explain the 
establishment of international organizations.  What is missing from the explanatory 
22 
 
calculus regarding the topic at hand is a discussion which moves beyond the conceptual 
coherency of the ‘state’ as a cohesive – and timeless – source of national interests.  The 
emphasis is on the formation of ‘the national interest’ by domestic interest groups within 
states.  In this light, national interests are formed – and change – based on the interests 
and policy formulation of the groups forming government in a particular time period.  
Neorealism, with its emphasis on the unitary state involved in power relations and 
maintaining this equilibrium, does not fit the empirical mold.  Neoliberal institutionalism 
with its emphasis on the utility of international institutions as origins – and motivators – 
of international cooperation falls short as it cannot account for the central importance of 
actors other than states.  Nor can it account for the origins of state interests, or for why 
particular interests – changing as they are – sought to be implemented in a particular time 
period.  Historical institutionalism falls short in a very key respect: the ad hoc 
manifestations of international criminal justice – such as the Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda – are markedly different from the work of the independent 
Prosecutor of the ICC.  The territorial and temporal constraints with which the 
Prosecutors of the Tribunals contended are done away at the ICC, save the notion of the 
Court not having legal reach prior to its establishment, on July 1st, 2002.  Therefore, the 
historical continuity on which this theory hinges does not provide a complete explanatory 
image.  Constructivism (and more specifically liberal constructivism), along with liberal 
pluralism, do provide a satisfactory explanatory narrative.  Liberal constructivism is able 
to explain the creation and upholding of a set of principles – shared by the vast majority 
of states participating in establishing the ICC – which ushered in the creation of the Court 
with an independent Prosecutor.  Liberal pluralism then is able to explain the origins of 
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these principles.  The origins of these principles are particular formulations of national 
interests – as promoted by domestic political groups in power, at a particular junction in 
time, and in particular states.  
Second, this study contains a number of empirical contributions to the scholarly 
work on the establishment of the independent Prosecutor and the ICC in general.  In order 
to complete this study, and in addition to primary and secondary source documents, elite 
interviews were conducted with former government officials, diplomats, and 
representatives of key NGOs.  In order to complete this research, interviews were 
conducted – over the telephone, Skype, e-mail and in-person, at the United Nations 
headquarters – with Dr. Lloyd Axworthy, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Canada; Dr. Hans Corell, the former Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs of the 
United Nations; Mr. Rolf Einar Fife, the Director General in the Department of Legal 
Affairs in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ambassador Christian Wenaweser, 
the Permanent Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein at the United Nations; 
Mr. Bill Pace, the Convenor of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court; Mr. 
Niccolo Figa-Talamanca, the Secretary General of ‘No Peace Without Justice’; the late 
Mr. Christopher Keith Hall, Senior Legal Advisor, International Justice Project, Amnesty 
International; Mr. John Washburn, the Convenor of the American Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court; Professors Valerie Oosterveld and Darryl Robinson, 
members of the Canadian delegation in Rome; Dr. Morten Bergsmo, member of the 
Norwegian delegation in Rome; and Dr.  William Schabas, Professor at the National 
University of Ireland in Galway, Ireland.  The Assemblies of States Parties meetings of 
the ICC were also attended in New York and in The Hague in order to further gain an 
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understanding of state positions and state preference formations regarding the Court.  
Lastly, and in addition to these forms of new data generation, declassified documents 
were also used to be able to discern the intentions of governments regarding the Court. 
The empirical investigation shows that, despite the overwhelming acceptance of 
the Rome Statute at the end of the conference in 1998, considerable variation of positions 
regarding the Court – in state sovereignty terms – existed between political groups in 
certain states very important to the establishment of the Court with an independent 
Prosecutor.  It mattered quite substantially which political group was in power in Canada, 
and the United Kingdom, as well as in the United States and Japan.  A Conservative 
government in power in Canada or the United Kingdom at the time would have had a 
considerably different position regarding the Court and the Prosecutor.  In similar terms, 
without the centrality of the voice and interest of the Pentagon in US decision-making 
circles, or the opposition of Jesse Helms in the US Congress, the US would have had – at 
the least – a slightly more favourable position on the Court.  Finally, with greater 
influence on Japanese politics, the Democratic Party of Japan could have in fact placed 
greater pressure on the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in order to join the Court sooner.     
 Third, this study contains practical recommendations as to under what domestic 
political conditions it is likely that the Rome Statute of the Court would be ratified.  To 
date there are 124 states which have ratified the RS and 139 which have signed it.11 The 
overall aim of those who were involved in establishing the Court is for it to attain 
universal jurisdiction.  The hope was – and still is – to have every state ratify the Statute.  
In the concluding remarks this work will provide a few practical recommendations 
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regarding the domestic political conditions which might be necessary for a successful 
ratification campaign, and for the jurisdiction of the Court to attain universal reach.  In 
regards to further research, this work shows that more investigation and analysis is 
warranted regarding why – and how – certain states ratify international treaties and why – 
and how – certain states do not.  In other words, this work provides groundwork for 




CHAPTER 2: THEORIZING THE INDEPENDENT PROSECUTOR 
AND THE ICC 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the existing explanatory literature on the creation 
of the independent Prosecutor and the International Criminal Court in order to outline the 
gap in the literature this dissertation seeks to remedy. In doing so, it will be argued in this 
chapter that the scholarly literature explaining why states agreed to include the proprio 
motu provisions in the Rome Statute – enabling the Prosecutor to initiate investigations 
on his or her own – is very much wanting as it leaves a number of interesting questions 
unanswered, such as who was responsible for setting policy with regards to the 
independent Prosecutor and the ICC, and why the supporters prevailed. Further, the 
existing explanation tends to focus on a very definite time frame: 1994 - 1998.  Existing 
explanations tend to be overly state-centric and downplay the key role played by 
domestic interests and ideas in the formation of state preferences and behavior.  An 
expanded time frame that encapsulates the ratification process in key states will further 
broaden the explanatory calculus and the overall understanding of how the Court with an 
independent Prosecutor was established.  
 The chapter begins by reviewing the explanatory and descriptive literature on the 
creation of the independent Prosecutor. It is argued, first, that there are only a very small 
number of works that specifically focus on the creation of the independent Prosecutor and 
its proprio motu powers. Given the significance of these powers – and the departure they 
herald from standard practice – a more in-depth study is warranted. For example, 
explanations pointing to a compromised position on the independent prosecutorial powers 
leave a number of key questions out, including: what enabled the compromises to be 
made, and why were states able to come to a compromise regarding the inclusion of the 
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Prosecutor? This section argues that the existing approaches tend to reflect the more 
state-centric approaches of neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and certain strands of 
constructivism, which downplay the role of domestic ideas and interests.  The overall 
temporal frame the works utilize crucially leaves out the ratification process.  
Consequently, without a substantial understanding of the ratification process, the overall 
establishment of the Court with an independent Prosecutor will only lend itself to a 
partial explanation.   
 The second section of the chapter reviews the explanatory and descriptive 
literature on the creation of the ICC as a whole and categorizes it with respect to specific 
theoretical approaches employed in international relations, including neorealism, 
neoliberal institutionalism, historical institutionalism, liberal pluralism and 
constructivism. Even though explaining the establishment of an independent Prosecutor 
in isolation from the other processes that culminated in the overwhelming acceptance of 
the Rome Statute is important, attention must also be placed on the explanatory 
discussion of the ICC as well. The entire process – spanning from 1994 until 1998 and 
beyond – mainly encapsulated negotiations regarding the particular design features of the 
Court.  This aspect of the institutional development of the ICC validates the discussion at 
hand.  However, at the end of the Rome conference and when national legislatures were 
attempting to ratify the RS, it was the entire statute that needed to be considered by 
national legislatures.  This section argues that, while there is a much broader and more 
theoretically diverse literature on the creation of the ICC, the main gap in this literature 
is, again, the lack of emphasis on the role played by domestic actors, their interests, and 
the conceptual formulations put forth by these actors regarding state sovereignty.  Once 
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again, by focusing on a very definite time frame, the existing works stop short of a more 
encompassing explanation.    
 Following a summary and identification of the overall gap in the literature in the 
third section, the fourth section of this chapter outlines the theoretical approach employed 
in this dissertation. More specifically, it will outline a broadly liberal-pluralist approach 
which takes into account the role of domestic interests and ideas (sometimes referred to 
as actor-centered constructivism’). This approach draws on Andrew Moravcsik’s ‘liberal 
theory of international relations’ and liberal constructivism more broadly. After outlining 
the main assumptions of this approach, the chapter will demonstrate how this approach 
informs the key hypotheses of this dissertation. The final section of this chapter will 
outline the comparative case study and historical process tracing methodologies being 
employed and how they will test the liberal-pluralist and liberal constructivist 
explanations in contrast to the other theoretical approaches.  
Existing Explanations of the Independent Prosecutor  
David Wippman provides an insightful description and explanation as to why states 
established an independent Prosecutor.  Implicitly adopting a broadly neorealist approach 
emphasizing national interests and the international distribution of power, Wippman 
explains that the draft statute provided by the International Law Commission (ILC)  in 
1994, in preparation for the conference in Rome, included two particular trigger 
mechanisms that could be used to initiate investigations: the first outlined that only states 
could trigger the jurisdiction of the Court meaning that the Prosecutor would get involved 
in a case only if a particular state referred a case or situation to the Court.  The other 
trigger mechanism entitled the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to refer a case 
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or a situation to the Court, and thereby trigger the jurisdiction of the Court and the 
involvement of the Prosecutor.  The ILC statute did not contain a provision for the 
Prosecutor to initiate investigations on his or her own accord.   
The proponents of the Court – including the so-called ‘like-minded states’ and the 
NGO community – ‘almost unanimously’ pressed for an independent Prosecutor in 
Rome.  Their argument was “that both the Security Council and individual states would 
employ inappropriate political criteria in determining which situations to refer to the 
court” (Wippman in Reus-Smit, 169).  The permanent members of the UNSC would veto 
any case that would involve themselves or their political allies.  States would not want to 
refer cases against other states due to fears of retaliation.  The NGO community also 
pointed to the two existing ad hoc tribunals at the time – both of which had Prosecutors 
with proprio motu powers – as supporting the need for a strong, independent Prosecutor 
(Wippman in Reus-Smit, 169). 
As Wippman states, the opponents of the Court also warned that political 
meddling would diminish the value and raison d’etre of the Court: “the prosecutor, 
despite various checks on his or her authority built into the statute, would ultimately be 
unaccountable to any executive or legislative authority” (Wippman in Reus-Smith, 169).  
Without state or UNSC backing the Court “would lack the support necessary for effective 
prosecutions” (Wippman in Reus-Smith, 169).   
The two opposite sides of the debate, according to the author, testify to “divergent 
interests and a related divergence in conceptions about the appropriate role of 
international law and institutions” (Wippman in Reus-Smith, 170).  According to 
Wippman, the so-called ‘like-minded group’ and the participating NGOs “wanted to give 
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the prosecutor authority comparable to that exercised by national prosecutors in liberal 
democratic states” (Ibid.).  On the other hand, the US argued that this would only make 
sense if it “could be supervised by a higher executive authority and ultimately held 
accountable to a legislature and a larger body politic” (Ibid.).  Overall, Wippman explains 
that the realist currency of ‘traditional national interests’ carried the day.  It was a lot less 
risky for the like-minded states to agree on an independent Prosecutor as they would be 
much less of a target of politically motivated trials and cases than the US.  The reason 
why the like-minded states could expect that their personnel would be less likely to 
appear before the court is because these states could reasonably expect that their legal 
systems would not be deemed ‘unable’ or ‘unwilling’ to prosecute on their own.      
Second, Matthew R. Brubacher, writing from a legal perspective, also points to an 
explanation as to how and why states established an independent Prosecutor.  
Brubacher’s perspective is implicitly constructivist, as the author points to the role of 
normative legal ideas and the professional affiliations of the members and delegates prior 
to Rome, in Rome, and during the so-called Preparatory Commission meetings following 
the conference.  The author explains that, “although participants in the Preparatory 
Committee came from diverse legal backgrounds and with an even greater variety of 
specific interests, their approaches generally fell into one of two main categories: 
liberalists and realists” (Brubacher, 72).  In terms of the so-called ‘liberalists’, the author 
explains that they considered the ICC “as the manifestation of aspirations to promote the 
building of ethical legal processes through the creation of institutions capable of 
promoting due process and the rule of law” (Brubacher, 73).  Liberalists, in other words, 
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viewed the ICC as an institution that helped maintain “mutual obligation between states.” 
(Ibid.)   
On the other hand, such actors as the US, reflected a more realist conception of 
international law.  According to Brubacher, within this perspective, “the primary 
obligation of states, as the central actors in the international community, is to their 
citizens rather than to foreigners” (Ibid.).  The key here is the guarding of national 
sovereignty and the national interests.  Therefore, legal rules or norms would be trumped 
by national interests and state sovereignty.  In this sense, “independent prosecutorial 
discretion within the ICC is thus incongruent with the realist view, as it is an attempt to 
create a non-state actor, capable of independently modifying state behaviour” (Ibid.). It is 
therefore quite natural that states such as the US “lobbied for an ICC that gave more 
deference to state interests,” which would include prosecuting only as a result of state 
referral and a referral from the UNSC. As Brubacher points out, the proposal by 
Argentina and Germany to have the Pre-Trial chamber authorize proprio motu 
prosecutions can be seen as a certain compromise between the two camps, with the 
‘liberalists’ being victorious (Ibid.).  The active, yet unsuccessful, US opposition to the 
ICC during the beginning of the new millennium clearly testifies of liberal victory.  
Benjamin Schiff provides a short, descriptive, albeit insightful explanation as to 
how the independent Prosecutor was established.  Adopting the neoliberal institutionalist 
emphasis on states, international NGOs and the negotiating process itself, Schiff explains 
that the provision for an independent Prosecutor in the Rome statute was made possible 
because “some NGOs and some of the LMS [like minded states] pressed for a much more 
independent Prosecutor” (Schiff, 82).  Further, Schiff also points to a possible 
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compromise between different legal traditions as well.  The statutory provision requiring 
the pre-trial chamber to authorize prosecutions by the independent Prosecutor was “also a 
reaction by civil-law country representatives to what they perceived as the overly 
common-law-dominated structure of the ICTY and the ICTR” (Ibid.).  Overall, Schiff’s 
explanation provides a new level of insight as to how and why states established an 
independent Prosecutor.         
Still located within the explanatory genre but most certainly falling within the 
legal literature is a chapter written by Kai Ambos, entitled Prosecuting Crimes at the 
National and International Level: Between Justice and Realpolitik.  Ambos also employs 
a neoliberal institutionalist approach (with some concessions to pluralism and domestic 
actors) and argues that “from the very beginning of the ICC negotiations, the so-called, 
like-minded states wanted an independent and strong prosecutor, comparable to the 
prosecutor in national criminal justice systems – who…possess the power to initiate 
investigations ex officio” (Ambos, 56).  In similar vein, Ambos notes the resistance of the 
US, China and India to the initiative.  In the US, in particular, mired in the then-legal and 
political wrangling with the Lewinsky affair, and the somewhat opaque role of the 
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr in the process, public opinion could not 
accommodate another office of this kind – especially not within the international realm   
(Ambos, 57).  The solution, according to Ambos, was brought about by a “compromise 
that…was to provide for an early judicial control of the prosecutorial investigations and 
this was the origin of the so-called Pre-Trial Chamber, modeled after the French 
Chambre d’Accusation and the US Grand Jury.  This chamber intervenes at a very early 
stage in case of a proprio motu investigation, namely, if the Prosecutor concludes, “there 
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is reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation (Article 15(3) ICC Statute)” (Ambos, 
56).   
In addition to these more explanatory accounts, there are a number of more purely 
descriptive accounts of the creation of the independent Prosecutor which, by emphasizing 
states, international NGOs and the negotiation process itself, tend to implicitly adopt a 
neoliberal institutionalist framework. These accounts provide an explanation as to how 
the provision for an independent Prosecutor was included in the Rome Statute of the 
Court.  These accounts are important as they provide the empirical roadmap for a theory-
testing explanation of the subject matter at hand.   
Marlies Glasius provides an excellent descriptive account of how states came to 
accept the inclusion of an independent Prosecutor.12  The subjects of Glasius’ accounts 
are NGOs and their impact at the Rome conference as she provides exceptional insight 
into the activism of NGOs and how states reacted to this activism.  Overall, Glasius 
attributes the success of the establishment of an independent Prosecutor to the efforts of 
NGOs, but also participating states which include Argentina and Germany in particular.      
Perhaps the distinct value of her work is that she outlines the four issue areas 
which were connected to the independence of the Prosecutor: “the division of 
competencies between national courts and the ICC; the way in which a case could come 
to the attention of the Court; which parties, if any, might block a case from being heard 
by the Court; and the extent of the jurisdiction of the Court” (Glasius, 47).  Viewing the 
issue of the independent Prosecutor as a part of a ‘package of issues’ of complementarity, 
                                                     
12
 Some of the legal literature – more particularly Danner (2003), Greenwalt and Wouters et. al. – discussed below also 
contains descriptive accounts of how the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor were included in the RS.   
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trigger mechanisms, regarding who can block a case, and of jurisdiction will be key to a 
better understanding of the reasons why states established an independent Prosecutor.   
Following a brief overview of the genesis of the ILC draft, Glasius points out that 
it was in fact Amnesty International (AI) “which produced one of the earliest NGO 
documents on the ICC, recommending that the Prosecutor would be able to initiate 
investigations on his or her own initiative or after receiving a complaint by or on behalf 
of an individual’” (Glasius, 49).  Another organization, the International Commission of 
Jurists, proposed that “victims should be able to initiate proceedings” (Ibid.).  As she 
explains, “both organisations expressed concerns that very few cases would be likely to 
come to the Court” if states or the UNSC could exclusively refer cases to it.  Lawrence 
Weschler noted that “as it happened, Human Rights Watch (HRW) had recently spent 
several years shopping around the very case of Hussein’s Anfal campaign, trying to find 
a country willing to lodge a formal complaint against Iraq with the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in the Hague” (Weschler, 94).  Several states declined, citing bilateral issues 
of trade, retaliation or even domestic political upheaval (Ibid.).   Later on, states such as 
Austria, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland suggested that the Court 
should employ an independent Prosecutor.  Further, Chile and the Czech Republic also 
suggested that “individuals, victims, and/or NGOs should be able to trigger a procedure” 
with the help of the prosecutor (Ibid.).   
Glasius then outlines the dynamics of the Preparatory Committee meetings where 
the draft statute to be considered in Rome was being developed.   She points to such key 
dynamics as the speech made by Louise Arbour, the first Prosecutor of the ICTY, to the 
fifth PrepCom meeting where Mme. Arbour “made a ‘dramatic and forceful 
35 
 
address…which appears to have made a deep impression on the thinking of government 
delegates on crucial issues, including the role of the Security Council and of the 
prosecutor’” (Glasius, 51).  She further points to a certain ‘change of heart’ by the United 
Kingdom (UK) to ‘listen’ to proposals that advocated an independent Prosecutor.  
According to Glasius, the UK also declared that it would accept the so–called 
Singaporean proposal which, instead of allowing the UNSC to block certain prosecutions, 
proposed that the UNSC could request a 12 month stay of the proceedings. This stay of 
proceedings could be further renewed. Also of interest during this phase in the 
development of the pre-Rome statute was the Argentine-German proposal which, having 
been published in April 1998, proposed that the Prosecutor could proceed with an 
investigation, but would need the approval of the Pre-Trial chamber to start building a 
case (Glasius, 52).     
Christopher Keith Hall also attributed the success of the establishment of the 
independent Prosecutor to the efforts of NGOs and like-minded states.  In his article 
entitled “The Powers and Role of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in 
the Global Fight Against Impunity,”  the author explains that “it was only after intense 
lobbying by the group of like-minded governments and approximately eight hundred 
non-governmental organizations in the Coalition for an International Criminal Court 
(CICC) …that the 1998 diplomatic conference provided for an independent prosecutor 
with powers proprio motu to initiate investigations” (Hall, 125).     
 Antonio Cassese, a distinguished international jurist, provided a lucid descriptive 
account of the inclusion of the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor of the ICC in the 
RS.  Cassese explained that:  
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It is well known that two tendencies clashed at the Rome Conference: 
some states (including the United States, China and others) insisted on 
granting the power to set investigations and prosecutions in motion to 
states and the Security Council only; the other states (the group of so-
called like-minded countries) were bent on advocating the institution of an 
independent Prosecutor capable of initiating proprio motu investigations 
and prosecutions.  The clash was between sovereignty-oriented countries 
and states eager to implement the rule of law in the world community.  
The final result was a compromise (Cassese, 161).   
 
Cassese further noted that once the compromise was reached, two further options 
presented themselves.  The first option was a so-dubbed ‘Nuremberg model’ in which the 
Prosecutor would remain under the authority of states.  The second option was to institute 
a Prosecutor who would able to initiative investigations independently (Cassese, 161).  
As the historical record shows, the latter option was chosen.    
 Ultimately scholars have attempted to explain the establishment of the 
independent Prosecutor in broadly neorealist, neoliberal institutionalist and constructivist 
terms. Wippman provides a number of key insights into the negotiations.  His contention 
is that the proponents and the opponents argued with their best national interests in mind.  
Therefore, national interests seemed to be at the heart of this mostly neorealist 
explanation.  Marlies Glasius and Christopher Keith Hall mostly focus their attention on 
the efforts of the NGOs present in Rome.  In their conception, it was the efforts and 
expertise of NGOs that compelled states to establish an independent Prosecutor.  
Successful cooperation between states within an institutional forum – a neoliberal 
institutionalist conception - was a result of intense NGO lobbying, information provision 
and even direct participation.13  Benjamin Schiff, while providing a broadly neoliberal 
                                                     
13
 A number of NGO members served on official states delegations during the conference.  For example, Mr. Niccollo 
Figa-Talamanca, the Secretary General of ‘No Peace Without Justice’, an NGO based in Brussels, Belgium, served as  
the deputy head of the delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Interview, Figa-Talamanca)  
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institutionalist explanation, also points to the efforts of NGOs as a key explanatory 
variable.  However, Schiff also points to the reconciling of legal traditions – common 
versus civil traditions – and the role of the pre-trial judges in pressing charges against an 
individual.  In his conception NGOs advocated – and later, states accepted – a key role 
played by the so-called ‘Pre-Trial Chamber’ in the initiation of investigations which 
placed an institutional check on the powers of the Prosecutor.  This institutional check, 
according to Schiff, then ensured that states accepted the establishment of the 
independent Prosecutor.  Kai Ambos and Antonio Cassese, while also providing  
neoliberal institutionalist explanations, point strictly to the institution of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber – the result of the blending of different legal traditions and roles for the 
Prosecutor – as the main reason why states accepted the establishment of the independent 
Prosecutor.  Finally, Matthew Brubacher, providing more of a constructivist explanation, 
notes that the debate about the independent Prosecutor was conducted along the legal 
‘liberal’ versus ‘realist’ ideational lines.  The ‘liberal’ ideas were victorious and the 
‘realist’ ideas fell by the wayside.  It is important to note that Brubacher’s constructivist 
argument differs from a more liberal constructivist argument in that it does not 
disaggregate the concept of the state in the analysis. His argument may be dubbed a more 
state-centric constructivist argument.           
What is clear is that the common thread in attempts to explain the establishment 
of the independent Prosecutor is the role ‘states’, as conceptually disambiguated entities, 
played.  The causal importance – albeit with substantial involvement and effort exerted 
by NGOs – was ascribed mainly to states as unitary actors.  These analyses also seem to 
be the natural extensions of the more limited temporal frames which they employ: 
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namely the Rome and the pre-Rome negotiation processes at the international level.  
These insights do provide valid explanations and much needed insight.  However in order 
for the ICC to be established and the RS to be legally binding – in effect establishing a 
functioning court with an independent Prosecutor – the statute had to be ratified in 
national legislatures. Therefore to explain the establishing of independent Prosecutor for 
the ICC, domestic level analyses need to be included in the explanatory calculus.   
Equally importantly, state-level explanations further assume that national interests 
are held constant over time.  In practice this would mean that any state involved in the 
negotiations would not change its interest-calculations substantially from the beginning to 
the end of the negotiation process and beyond.  The empirical record, however, shows 
otherwise.  In a very key respect, the position of the United Kingdom changed 
substantially in 1997, after the New Labour government of Tony Blair came into power.  
Further, and only by looking deeper within the ratification processes, will one be able to 
see that national interests calculation were not uniform, and were substantially debated, 
even in states which seemed at the forefront of establishing the Court, namely in Canada.  
Therefore, a more nuanced and deep understanding of state preference formation is 
needed because preferences changed over time, and were contingent on what group 
formed the government during the ratification process.  
Existing Explanations of the International Criminal Court  
This section reviews the explanatory and descriptive literature on the creation of the ICC 
as a whole and categorizes it in terms of specific theoretical approaches including 
neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, constructivism and historical institutionalism.  
Before doing so, each theoretical strand of IR is outlined in order to aid the discussion.  
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In this section, it is argued that, while there is a much broader and more theoretically 
diverse literature on the creation of the ICC, the main gap in this literature is the lack of 
emphasis on the role played by domestic interests and ideas in the formation of state 
preferences.  
Neorealist Approaches 
Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik point to three basic assumptions that are 
common to realist theory: i)  “rational, unitary political units in anarchy are the main 
actors or entities in international relations; ii) “state preferences are fixed and are 
uniformly conflictual,”; and lastly, iii) what is most important within this anarchic 
structure of international relations is “material capabilities.”  In other words, “the ability 
of a state to do [interstate bargaining] successfully is proportional to its underlying 
power, which is defined in terms of its access to exogenously varying material resources” 
(Legro and Moravcsik, 12–17).  The ‘material resources’ are thought to be mostly 
military and economic assets.     
Key neorealists, such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearscheimer argue that it is 
this anarchic nature of the international realm that determines how states will act.  
Anarchy, in this sense, “means that states have to protect and look out for 
themselves…Self-help is the basis for enforcing rules and protecting interests”  (Ibid., 
14).  The next natural step in this puzzle is to realize that these conceptions give rise to 
the security dilemma in which defensive posturing by one state in order to enhance its 
security compels other states to take up defensive postures as well (Ibid.).     
In the neorealist conception “the structure of the international system forces states 
to attend not just to their own interests but to any changes in the power of other states” 
40 
 
(Ibid., 11).  Therefore, this conception paves the way for the conception of the balance of 
power.  As Rosenau and Durfee explain, states may use “law, war, and diplomacy” to 
keep the balance within the system of states (Rosenau and Durfee, 21).  Even though 
classical realists believe that states have much freedom in choosing to balance or not, 
neorealists would posit that the balance is created naturally due to the anarchical nature of 
the international realm (Ibid.).   
The next important question that must be addressed in this anarchic international 
realm is if cooperation is possible.  Neorealists believe that cooperation is possible only if 
the most powerful state, or the hegemon, sets the rules and enforces these rules within the 
international realm (Ibid., 26).  In essence then, neorealism only affords a secondary role 
for institutions, domestic or international.  In this conception institutions, or their more 
general variant, regimes, are established only if the most powerful in the system wish 
them to be established.  Even in the neorelist case, these institutions and regimes will be 
at the mercy of the most powerful states.  Without the explicit help in establishing and 
guiding these institutions by the most powerful actors, they will be ineffective and 
irrelevant.   
Rehearsing a neorealist position, Erik K. Leonard focuses on the role of ‘power-
based factors’ in explaining the establishment of the ICC.  The author explains that, as 
the only hegemon, the US worked quite consistently to oppose the RS (Leonard, 141).  
Yet in practice, the US had quite a substantial impact on the negotiations and even on the 
final outcome at Rome (Leonard, 141).  According to many, including members of the 
CICC – the support of the US was necessary for the Court to be seen as legitimate and 
functional.  Therefore, the author explains that the negotiators in Rome did attempt to 
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cater to the US demands (Leonard, 142).  Despite all these efforts, and even though the 
US initially signed the statute, it withdrew from the Rome Statute shortly after depositing 
its signature to the United Nations (UN).   
Jay Goodliffe and Darren Hawkins provide a more systemic explanation for the 
adoption of the Rome Statute.  The authors argue that by taking into consideration direct 
benefits and costs, geography, identity and NGOs, states aligned their positions with their 
bilateral and multilateral partners (Goodliffe and Hawkins, 977).  In essence, then, state 
preferences in regards to the Court were a function of judging the reaction of 
‘international partners’ with whom they enjoyed long relationships (Ibid., 978).  
Although this explanation is plausible, key allies of the US for example – namely 
Germany and Japan – acted counter to this explanation.  Germany signed and ratified the 
RS in 2000.  Japan initially signed the RS, and it acceded to the Statute a decade later, in 
2007.   
Neoliberal Institutionalist Approaches 
Neoliberalism shares a number of assumptions with neorealism.  However, the theory’s 
ability to explain cooperation via multilateral institutions not only sets it apart from 
neorealism but also affords it utility when attempting to explain the ICC and the 
independent Prosecutor in particular.  Neoliberal institutionalism is well suited for the 
analysis it affords the multilateral negotiating fora causal relevance.  In other words, via 
neoliberal institutionalism one is able incorporate the negotiating tactics, for example, 
into the explanatory calculus.  It is also able to shed light on other aspects of the 
conference as well, such as leadership, and the relevance of different negotiating camps.        
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As Robert O. Keohane explains in his chapter entitled “Institutional Theory and 
the Realist Challenge After the Cold War,” both neorealism and neoliberalism hold that 
states are the main actors within the international realm.  This realm is seen as anarchic, 
meaning that there is no overarching government within the system, and that this 
conception will also have a major impact on the behaviour of states.  States are also 
utility maximizers – borrowing some conceptions from economic theory – which means 
that they will attempt to structure their behaviour to maximize their own gains.  Simply, 
states are self-interested.  Interests in terms of gains – relative and absolute – will be 
important; relative gains will be important for neorealists, and absolute gains for 
neoliberals (Keohane, 271).  Neorealists are mainly concerned with material capabilities, 
culminating in concerns over security.  Neoliberals are thought to be more concerned – 
broadly speaking – with mainly economic and environmental issues.   
It is important to note that power itself, as well as how it is distributed, are 
important for both theories. However, neoliberals posit that institutions can in fact 
“change conceptions of self-interests” (Ibid.).  For this camp, self-interests will best be 
pursued through institutions.  To sum up, Keohane explains that within the neoliberal 
conception, “governments will still seek to attain their end, including increasing shares of 
the gains from cooperation, through the use of political influence.  However, the exercise 
of influence will depend not merely on their material capabilities but also on the 
relationship between their ends and means, on the one hand, and the rules and practices 
of the international institutitons, on the other” (Keohane, 274).   
In contrast to neoliberal institutionalism, neorealists would see institutions as 
‘means-to-an-end’, and as always serving the interests of the most powerful states.  In 
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this regard, institutions always occupy the role of dependant variables.  Institutions will 
be subject to state interests, but more importantly the interests of the great powers.  As 
Robert Jervis explains in his article “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation,” within 
the realist conception, institutions are viewed as not “more than a tool of statescraft” 
(Jervis, 43).  As Keohane and Martin explain in their article “The Promise of 
International Institutions,” neoliberals, on the other hand, would view institutions as 
dependent and independent variables.  In their conception, institutions will be the result 
of state agency, but at the same time, institutions will also impact state behaviour 
(Keohane and Martin, 46).  Because of their direct impact on the behaviour of states, 
institutions are able to deal with the problem of cheating in the international arena, the 
key obstacle to cooperation.  More specifically, institutions may mitigate cheating by 
attempting to show that collective, as opposed to individual interests will be attainable if 
the “short-term benefits…[are given up]…for the sake of long-term benefits” 
(Mearsheimer, 17).   
One of the main strengths of neoliberal institutionalism is its emphasis on 
cooperation (Jervis, 48).  If it is the case that cooperation is very difficult to attain and 
maintain, and the international realm is made up of self-interested utility maximizers who 
do not trust each other, then the question is why would there not be constant conflict 
within the system – or a constant all-against-all war?  (Keohane, 275)  Quite clearly, 
cooperation does occur, and it occurs within the security realm but also within other 
realms as well.  Realists would posit that it is quite easy to cooperate within realms other 
than the security realm as the stakes within these realms are not as high.  Keohane and 
Martin explain however, that institutions provide information – a mitigating factor of 
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uncertainty – even within the realm of security as well.  Hence institutions can enhance 
the attainment of maximized utility as opposed to only assuming the worst case scenario 
where policy provisions cannot aim for utility maximization (Keohane and Martin, 44). 
Erik K. Leonard poses three questions relating to the establishment of the ICC, 
which could be addressed by neoliberal institutionalism: “1) why have so many states 
approved the Statute? 2) why has the United States so vehemently opposed the Statute? 
3) and, what has the impact of American opposition been on the formation process” 
(Leonard, 85).   Leonard begins his analysis with a discussion of the US and its position 
on the ICC.  He outlined the objections the then-US Ambassador for War Crimes, David 
Scheffer, communicated when appearing before the US Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee.  Leonard noted that, from the US perspective, “cooperation was impossible 
and that the formation of the ICC [was] implausible” (Leonard, 89).  Yet, Leonard 
himself notes, clearly states did cooperate, and this cooperation did not need the guiding 
– and coercing – hand of the hegemon (Leonard, 89).   
Therefore, Leonard posits that there are at least three factors that explain the 
establishment of the ICC.  First, the participating states were assumed to be rational, 
utility-maximizing actors.  Second, “the mutual goal of the Rome Conference participants 
is the security of a known and enforceable system of international justice.” Third, 
because “states’ interests are static” and they desired the above-mentioned common goal, 
cooperation then “was the result of institutional preference, not basic interest” (Leonard, 
90).  Yet the author states further that the task in Rome was not only the establishment of 
an international criminal court, but the particular design features that it was to take.  In a 
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similar vein, the US objections to the Court were not in principle – or if the Court should 
come into existence at all – but what form the Court should take.  
The neoliberal paradigm does seem to provide an explanation as to the motives 
and actions of such group of states as the ‘like-minded’ group, the ‘non-aligned 
movement’ as well as the US.  However, there were a few anomalous situations 
surrounding the establishment of the Court that neoliberalism is not be able to explain.  
First and foremost, NGOs were involved in the process en masse.  As a state centric 
theory, neoliberalism cannot account for the causal importance of NGOs.  Second, as 
Leonard himself points to the static nature of state interest, this paradigm does not seem 
to explain the underlying origins of states’ interests.  Third, and stemming from the 
previous point, neoliberal institutionalism cannot explain the change in preference 
formation of certain states taking place even during the negotiations.  Fourth, and as 
Leonard suggests again, neoliberal institutionalism cannot account for the “question of 
why now” (Leonard, 100).  In other words, neoliberal institutionalism cannot explain 
why the Court was established in that particular juncture in time.     
For Leonard, regime theory holds much more utility for explaining the 
establishment of the Court.  Leonard chose Young and Osherenko’s “multivariate model 
of regime formation” as the theory that would best explain the formation of the ICC.  The 
author explains that “what Young and Osherenko’s model accomplishes is to combine the 
traditional schools of thought, while adding the cross-cutting factors of leadership and 
context, to achieve a more plausible mode for understanding regime formation” 
(Leonard, 130). Turning to the particulars of the theory, it “consists of two independent 
variables: social driving forces and cross-cutting factors.  The social driving forces 
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(power, interest and knowledge factors) impact the institutional bargaining process in a 
direct manner …   The key is that this model demands that its users look at all three 
factors when analyzing regime formation” (Leonard, 131). 
   The second independent variable “cross-cutting factors” such as “leadership and 
context”, have an ‘indirect’ impact (Leonard, 131).  The ‘cross-cutting’ factors 
“determine how actors exercise their power and the ability of these actors to use 
knowledge factors in the process.  They often establish and maintain the rules of the 
bargaining process and they establish the global environment within which negotiations 
take place” (Leonard, 131).  Yet the authors explain that the ‘cross-cutting factors’ have 
an ‘important but indirect impact on regime formation” (Leonard, 131).   
The author begins by explaining that interest-based accounts – even though they 
may account for the motivation of states to establish the Court – are “not enough” 
(Leonard, 134).  Interest-based accounts consider “the formation of the Rome Statute as a 
result of state negotiation and cooperation.  In assessing the success of the Rome 
Conference this perspective predicates its findings on the overlapping of states’ interests” 
(Leonard, 133).  Leonard then turns his attention to the influence of NGOs in the process.  
The Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC), formed on February 25, 1995, 
was very much at the heart not only of the Rome Conference but also of the entire 
process of establishing the Court.  The CICC was involved in knowledge-provision, 
knowledge-communication and it also had an interpretive role with respect to the main 




Next, Leonard focuses on ‘leadership’ as the first ‘cross-cutting factor’ that helps 
to explain the establishment of the Court.  The focus here is on ‘structural’, 
‘enterpreneurial’ and ‘intellectual leadership’ as explanatory factors (Leonard, 144-145).  
Adrian Bos from the Foreign Ministry of The Netherlands is identified as a ‘structural 
leader’ and Ambassador Philippe Kirsch of Canada as an ‘enterpreneurial leader’.  
Adrian Bos was instrumental in the process prior to the conference and leading up to the 
conference as well (Leonard, 146). Ambassador Kirsch, who was the Legal Advisor of 
the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and Chairman of 
the Committee of the Whole during the Rome Conference very much ‘pushed’ the 
delegations towards ‘consensus’ (Leonard, 147).   With respect to ‘intellectual 
leadership’, the emphasis is placed on Cherif Bassiouni and William Pace.  Cherif 
Bassiouni “was the Vice-Chair of the PrepCom and the Chairman of the Rome 
Conference Drafting Committee” (Leonard, 149).  Bassiouni’s intellectual leadership 
originated “from Bassiouni’s extensive research on the issue of a permanent ICC and his 
work as both an NGO activist and a DePaul University Law School Professor” (Leonard, 
149).  William Pace is dubbed as an ‘intellectual leader’ due to his “dedication to the 
formation of the CICC and then the unprecedented success of this organization” 
(Leonard, 149).   
The last set of explanatory variables Leonard discusses are contextual factors.  
These factors are “national and world circumstances and events seemingly unrelated to 
the issue area under consideration” (Young and Osherenko in Leonard, 150).  Leonard 
discusses five contextual factors such as the end of the Cold War, the increasing 
phenomenon of civil or intra-state wars, the establishment of the tribunals for Yugoslavia 
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and Rwanda, the US policy, the establishment of new institutions of global governance 
(Leonard, 150).  These factors, in general, had at the very least proximate impact on the 
outcome of the negotiations and the establishment of the Court with an independent 
Prosecutor.    
Caroline Fehl, in her article entitled “Explaining the International Criminal Court: 
A ‘Practice Test’ for Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches”, provides yet another 
rationalist argument for explaining the establishment of the ICC, as well as the particular 
institutional features which were bestowed onto the Court.  She notes that “first, states 
faced a public good problem in international criminal justice, having disincentives to 
prosecute perpetrators in national courts on the basis of universal jurisdiction; the ICC 
solves this problem by centralizing prosecutions.  Second, the ICC lowers the transaction 
costs incurred in a system of ad hoc tribunals established by the UN Security Council” 
(Fehl, 382).  Rationalism would posit that for states, an institutional arrangement such as 
the ICC would in fact reduce so-called ‘sovereignty costs’ as well as uncertainty, as states 
would be able to participate and have an impact on the institutional arrangement itself.  In 
other words, by joining the ICC, states would be able to ensure that their own ability to 
prosecute is not threatened.       
Interestingly enough, the author explained that holding “sovereignty costs and 
uncertainty as objective, constant values,” masks the dynamics present when one takes a 
look inside the ‘pandora’s box’ of the state, a box that rationalists dare not open.  In the 
case of the United Kingdom as well as the United States, domestic factors played a key 
role in “contesting” the nature of sovereignty costs.  In the case of the UK, it “initially 
supported US objections, but joined the LMG after the 1997 Labour victory” (Fehl, 378).  
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In the case of the US, “several studies point out that the critical stance of the US towards 
the Rome Statute has been shaped especially by the Pentagon… and individual Congress 
leaders” (Fehl, 378).  Fehl rightfully explains then that rationalism cannot explain the 
“domestic underpinnings of ‘sovereignty costs’” (Fehl, 378-379).   
In sum, Fehl points to a more functionalist explanation – as opposed to the 
‘rationalist’ one she proposes.  According to Harmes, functionalism ”focuses on the 
transition from one institutional form to another. It explains change as the outcome of an 
evolutionary dynamic in which institutions respond to changes in their environment” 
(Harmes, 13). In international relations theory, the utility of ‘functionalism’ lies in its 
ability to explain institutional change as a process whereby earlier incarnations of 
institutions are replaced by other, more robust institutions,  ‘international and 
supranational institutions’ in particular (Harmes, 13).  Fehl’s use of ‘rationalism’ 
therefore is too narrow and imprecise as it seems to exclusively refer to dynamics often 
described as ‘functionalist’.  
Finally, Beth A. Simmons and Allison Danner, arguing within the functionalist 
camp, posit the following central question: “why was [the ICC] created, and more 
importantly, why do states agree to join this institution?” (Simmons and Danner, 225)  
The authors utilize ‘credible commitment theory’ to explain that “the states that are both 
the least and the most vulnerable to the possibility of an ICC case affecting their citizens 
have committed most readily to the ICC, while potentially vulnerable states with credible 
alternative means to hold leader accountable do not” (Ibid.).  The authors explain that, 
according to ‘credible commitment theory’, states are thought to be unable to cooperate 
as they are not able to commit to agreements (Ibid., 232).  Therefore institutions must be 
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established in such a way as to compel states to keep commitments.  The aim then is to 
“empower an independent third party to make and carry out policy decisions that 
effectively remove the decision from the credibility-challenged actor’s authority” (Ibid.).  
The ICC provides such a solution as it increases the “risk for states of future punishment 
of their senior leaders.  This exposure to prosecution by an independent international 
institution acts as an implicit promise by governments that they will foreswear 
particularly heinous military options” (Ibid., 234). In the domestic political sphere, a loss 
of ‘popular support’ would be a high enough cost to deter engagement in atrocities.  
Overall, then, the authors explain that “joining the ICC is therefore a form of self-binding 
commitment, in which states attempt to persuade other players – rebels, potentially 
supportive publics – that the government has voluntarily abandoned the option of 
engaging in unlimited violence, thus creating incentives for other actors to alter their 
behavior as well” (Ibid.).   
There are two particular concerns with the utilization of ‘credible commitment 
theory’.  Although it provides a plausible neoliberal institutionalist explanation for the 
establishment of the ICC, it fails to provide an explanation regarding why states are not 
able to commit – or are perceived by others to not be able to commit – to international 
agreements.  One plausible explanation for this is that representatives of states cannot in 
fact guarantee that when another group forms the government, the policy on a particular 
issue area will remain the same.  Second, if in fact it is the case that by joining the ICC 
states are signaling to their domestic adversaries and ‘publics’ that they are willing to 
play by the ‘rules’ of international criminal justice, then more emphasis should be placed 
on the domestic impact of this signaling.  It still remains to be seen if this ‘signaling’ by 
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states is in fact perceived as self-binding, or simply as a strategy to stay in power and 
garner domestic and international support while possibly masking one’s own wrongdoing 
in a conflict.       
Constructivism and Constructivist Explanations  
According to Emmanuel Adler, in his article entitled “Seizing the Middle Ground: 
Constructivism in World Politics”, “international reality is socially constructed by 
cognitive structures that give meaning to the material world” (Adler, 319). Further, how 
the material world is given meaning depends on ‘normative and epistemic interpretations’ 
of the social and material worlds (Adler, 322).  Institutions and conceptions that seem 
natural and inevitable are actually “based on collective understanding; they are reified 
structures that were once upon a time conceived ex nihilo by human consciousness; and 
these understandings were subsequently diffused and consolidated until they were taken 
for granted” (Ibid.).  Adler also explains that it is the “human capacity for reflection and 
learning” that impacts the construction of meaning as well as cognitive processes about 
the world.  In fact, ‘collective understandings’ give “indications as to how they [humans] 
should use their material abilities and power” (Ibid.).   
Adler notes that there are four different strands of constructivist thought.  The first 
one, termed ‘modernism’, posit that “once ontological extremism is removed, there is no 
reason to exclude the use of standard methods alongside interpretive methods” (Ibid.) 
Within this strand, one can also distinguish between state-centric constructivists and 
those who take nation-states or ethnic groups as the main actors in international relations.  
(Adler, 335).  The next strand of constructivists is led by Kratochwill and Onuf who “use 
insights from international law and jurisprudence to show the impact on international 
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relations of modes of reasoning and persuasion and of rule-guided behaviour” (Ibid.).  
The third strand “emphasizes narrative knowing,” where “particular attention has been 
given to gender-based narratives, actions of agents such as social movements, and the 
development of security images” (Adler, 336).  The last strand of constructivism 
encompasses some of the methods of postmodernists such as “Foucault’s genealogical 
method … [or] ... the ‘deconstruction of sovereignty’ by means of a detailed history of 
the delegitimation of non-Western polities by Western states” (Ibid.).    
Returning to the ‘modernist’ strands in constructivist thought, Alexander Wendt 
explains in his article entitled ‘Constructing International Politics’, that constructivists 
hold the following in common with the rationalists: that anarchy characterizes the 
international realm, states do possess offensive capabilities, intentions are quite opaque, 
survival is a prime motivation in the system, and states are rational actors.  Further, states 
are the primary units of analysis within constructivism, and according to Wendt, third 
image – or systemic – theorizing is also at the heart of the constructivist project (Wendt, 
72).  Where constructivism diverges from the rationalist and materialist approaches is 
regarding the conception of structure and its affect on state interests and identities.  
Constructivists posit that structures are a social milieu and that they arise out of processes 
of interaction between states.  In turn, these processes condition and shape actors’ – or 
states’ – identity as well as interests.  Furthermore, material capabilities are important 
vis-à-vis the meaning that actors attach to them.  In and of themselves, material 
capabilities are not meaningful; but rather only in relations between states.   
One can sum up by stating that it is within the processes of interaction that social 
structures are formed which conditions states’ identities and interests, and are the basis of 
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assigning meaning to material capabilities.  Within the rationalist and materialist schools 
of thought, identity and interests are exogenously given, meaning that they are assigned 
prior to interaction.  Further, the system does condition these but only insofar as 
behaviour is concerned.  Neorealism and neoliberalism do not contain elements that 
allow for a transformation of identity and interests; they are static and only changing 
superficially as opposed to substantially.   
Therefore, as Wendt explains in his book entitled a Social Theory of International 
Relations (1998), there are two main constructivist assumptions: a) structures are shaped 
by shared ideas as opposed to material capabilities; b) identity and interests of actors are 
shaped by these socially constructed ideas as opposed to being assumed to be  ‘given by 
nature’ (Wendt 1998, 1).  In order to fully appreciate – as well as understand – the above-
outlined statements, one must pay particular attention to what is meant by structure.  
Within the neo-neo debate, structure means the interactions of individual, self-interested 
states within the international realm, which compel states to modify – if not change – 
their behaviour and patterns of interactions.  Under this light, structure is seen as a static 
and deterministic entity that is underpinned by material pillars such as the economy as 
well as military capabilities.  In the case of constructivism, on the other hand, structure is 
viewed under a fundamentally different light.  Constructivists conceive of structure as a 
function of shared knowledge, material resources, and practices.   
As Wendt explains, social structures are – in part – defined as “shared 
understandings, expectation, or knowledge” (Wendt 1998, 73).  These aspects of 
structures define the actors and the relationships in which the actors are engaged in.  
Wendt distinguishes between the security dilemma and a security community, which is 
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seen as an aspect of ‘intersubjective understandings’.  The ‘security community’, is 
characterized by shared knowledge, and therefore trust.  Further, social structure does 
give rise to the ‘ideational’ aspects of international relations, which are socially based due 
to their intersubjective quality, and therefore shared knowledge.   
The second aspect of structure is the meaning of the material aspects of 
international relations, such as military or economic capabilities.  As was indicated 
above, rationalists conceive of material structures as in and of themselves determinant 
factors within the international system.  Constructivists, on the other hand, conceive of 
material capabilities in a social sense as well.  In particular, material capabilities in this 
sense are meaningful because they convey meaning.  Wendt uses the example of nuclear 
weapons possessed by the United Kingdom and North Korea.  Even though the United 
Kingdom may possess more nuclear weapons, North Korea is seen as more threatening 
because of the conflictual relationship that exists between the US and North Korea.  
Ultimately, then, material capabilities are important insofar as they are a function of 
meaning, relationships and knowledge between actors within the international realm. 
Lastly, social structures are a function of practices first and foremost and 
therefore are reinforced by these practices themselves.  Structures exist in processes, and 
are not exogenous to them.  As Wendt explains, the Cold War was a social process that 
was underpinned by shared knowledge.  Once this ‘interaction’ was over, the Cold War 
in itself ceased to exist.  On can therefore assert that it was not the arms race alone that 
characterized the Cold War, nor the nuclear build-up.  It was in fact the process of 
interaction between the Soviet Union and its allies, and the United States and its allies.  
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Erik K. Leonard points to the notion that, seemingly, “a knowledge-based theory 
provided the best understanding of the ICC formation process” (Leonard, 127).  The 
reason for the apparent utility of the knowledge-based theories is becasue they “explore 
the origins’ of states’ interests, the process of learning, and the role of epistemic 
communities such as the NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC)” 
(Leonard, 125). Fehl also points to the utility of constructivist explanations, not only for 
explaining the emergence of the ICC but also the particular institutional design features it 
encompasses.  According to Fehl, constructivists – by pointing to the importance of 
norms – do add much depth to the explanatory calculus.  Fehl specifically notes that “in 
looking at the normative developments preceding the ICC’s establishment, one can 
explain how states came to intersubjectively identify the ‘public good’ of prosecution and 
deterrence” (Fehl, 372).  In essence then, not only did the end of the Cold War contribute 
to the establishment of the ICC, but also “the proliferation and increasing worldwide 
acceptance of human rights norms” as well (Fehl, 371).  The nature of these norms define 
the “community of liberal states and of its members” (Fehl, 372).   
In essence if a state would wish to be a member of the international community – 
in good standing at that – and to “view itself” as well as be viewed by others as such, a 
state must comply with these human rights norms.  Therefore, the adherence to these 
norms “can explain that massive human rights violations, as well as impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes, were increasingly perceived as a collective problem of just 
that international community” (Fehl, 372).  In addition, “there is also some evidence that 
constitutive human rights norms contributed to a greater demand for the prosecution of 
atrocities” (Fehl, 373).  Here the author points to “the emotional calls by Western publics 
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upon the ‘international community’ to ‘do something’ about human rights violations in 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda that triggered the establishment of the two ad hoc tribunals” 
(Fehl, 373).  Furthermore, the author also points to a statement made by David Scheffer 
who noted that with the advent of the end of the Cold War and the increasing number of 
democracies and ‘pluralistic societies’, public opinion in these societies could not 
accommodate tolerance for such horrendous crimes (Fehl, 373).   
Fehl mentions that the constructivist perspective “could be complemented by a 
liberal theoretical argument that emphasizes rational action of sub-state actors” (Fehl, 
373).  Contradicting this, however, she then seems to explain away the impact of these 
sub-state groups by stating that “since the reaction of the public must itself be explained 
by normative changes that lowered the tolerance for massive human rights violations, it 
seems fair to treat the argument as constructivist at the ‘aggregate-level’ of the state” 
(Fehl, 373).   
Turning the discussion to explain the design features of the ICC, Fehl lists four 
contested issues that the negotiators and members of the Preparatory Committee 
wrangled with.  These issues were the so-called ‘trigger mechanisms’ of the Court, the 
role of the UNSC, the status of non-party states with respect to the jurisdiction of the 
Court, and finally, the issue of ‘opt-out provisions’ which allow states to ‘opy-out’ from 
the jurisdiction of the Court for a specified amount of time.  For the discussion at hand, 
the first one is of most importance.  The RS provides for the UNSC, states as well as the 
Prosecutor to trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC.   At Rome, “a number of states led by 
the US sought to restrict the right of initiative to the Security Council, notably to prevent 
an independent prosecutor” (Fehl, 376).  Other negotiating teams – India, Mexico and 
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Egypt for example – opposed the role of the UNSC in triggering investigations (Fehl, 
376).  
A constructivist explanation for the institutional design of the ICC  points to the 
effort as well as involvement and activism of certain NGOs, in the considerations of the 
“contested provisions – notably the ‘proprio motu’ power of the prosecutor and the 
jurisdiction over non-member states in certain cases” (Fehl, 381).  Naturally, NGOs 
would not have been able to take part in the process to the extent they did “if states had 
not already been receptive both to the general involvement of NGOs in the process and to 
the demands put forward by them” (Fehl, 381).  The author attributes this to the 
phenomenon of ‘new diplomacy’ very much in vogue at the time (Fehl, 381).   Within 
this strand of ‘treaty-making’, the assumption is that it is more preferable to have a 
functional treaty which may be opposed by some, as opposed to having a ‘weak’ treaty 
which is accepted by all (Fehl, 381).  Another aspect of the negotiations was the 
“bundling’ of the final package by the conference leadership, which is presented to the 
participants as a whole at the end of the conference, with no possibility for individual 
states to request an unbundling” (Fehl, 381).   
Turning to discourse-based explanations, Michael J. Struett, in his book entitled 
The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court: NGOs, Discourse and 
Agency, attempts to explain the establishment of the ICC from the perspective of the role 
NGOs played in the process.  Focusing on the impact of NGOs, and anchoring his story 
in the involvement of civil society, the author focuses on the ‘reasoning ability’ of NGOs 
and analyzes how the reasoned discourse of NGOs contributed to the establishment of the 
ICC.   
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The central question of his work is: “How did it come to pass that so many states 
were willing to cede such substantial authority to an international [Court]?”  He, too, 
places the phenomenon of establishing the ICC within the wider context of global 
governance, but Struett’s focus is on the ability of NGOs to shape the content of the 
Rome Statute.  Struett’s argument is “that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) played 
a crucial role in shaping the Rome Statute of the ICC and in securing its entry into force 
less than four years later after it opened for signatures” (Struett, 2).  In order to fully 
develop his argument, Struett asks a few other questions as well: “How is it that NGOs 
were able to play such a decisive role? What are the implications for the structure and 
legitimacy of emerging forms of global governance?” (Struett, 2)  The author’s answer – 
based on an “analysis of NGOs’ discursive practices” is that “NGOs were persuasive, and 
ultimately effective, because of their reliance on communicatively rational arguments that 
can be justified to a (potentially) universal audience” (Struett, 2).   
   Struett places fundamental importance on the notion of individual criminal 
responsibility which is enshrined in the Rome Statute of the ICC.  The author views the 
emphasis on individual criminal responsibility, coupled with the establishment of a 
permanent International Criminal Court, as “an idea about how to modify the 
organization and conduct of international politics” (Struett, 4).  By the same token, “the 
court’s establishment represents a powerful change in the rules of state sovereignty 
because it creates a supranational judicial authority with the power to rule whether or not 
particular uses of force by state officials are criminal and sanctionable violations of 
international law” (Struett, 4-5).  In essence, then, NGOs were successful because of the 
‘nature of their normative discourse’ which was geared towards finding norms-based 
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solutions to individual impunity which would be accepted across the proverbial ‘board’ 
(Struett, 7).   
These constructivist explanations share a common aim: to explain why the ICC – 
along with its design features – was established with the help of the emergence of 
international norms, ideas, as well as continuous contact between states’ representatives.  
The ‘proliferation of human rights’ after the Cold War, the emphasis placed on individual 
as opposed to ‘state’ responsibility, the common understanding within the international 
realm that institutions of international criminal justice are one of the most prudent ways 
to hold individuals accountable all point to the causal relevance of norms and ideas in 
impacting and guiding the actions of states.  While the causal relevance of norms and 
ideas is crucial to the ensuing analysis, due to the fact that their relevance is only 
investigated in ‘state-to-state’ interaction, they leave a key question unanswered: where 
did these ideas and norms originate from?  Ideas and norms are a function of social 
interaction of actors.  Therefore they must originate with actors and then are reproduced 
in social structures within the international as well as the domestic political realms.  
 Fehl notes that “liberal approaches that focus on sub-state explanatory factors – 
both from a rationalist and a constructivist perspective – were excluded from the analysis.  
Yet they could shed further light on some aspects of the ICC’s establishment and design, 
for example on domestic (re)evaluations of sovereignty costs (constructivist arguments), 
or on the interaction between governments and national publics in the face of atrocities 
abroad (constructivist and rationalist arguments)” (Fehl, 384).  In conclusion, what is 
clearly missing from the above outlined analyses – as well as from general analyses about 
the Court and its design features – is an investigation of the causal impact, and origin, of 
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norms within the domestic political realms. By extension, then, what is further missing 
from the analyses are explanations of how domestic norms and ideas, with the help of 
domestic actors, helped establish the ICC and its design features.     
Historical Institutionalist Approaches  
A welcomed addition to the arsenal of explanatory theories regarding the independent 
Prosecutor and the ICC in general is historical institutionalism.  Historical 
institutionalism is mostly used within comparative politics, and is part of a group of so-
called ‘new institutionalist’ theories.  These theories differ from ‘old institutionalist’ 
theories because they “focus on how institutions impact political outcomes, rather than 
simply on how institutions work” (Tremblay et. al. in Harmes, 14).  As a theory, 
therefore, which aims to explain the impact of institutions on political life, historical 
institutionalism “is a broadly liberal approach in that it focuses on actors and ideas as 
well as institutions” (Harmes, 14).  Yet because “its proponents view institutions as 
“ontologically prior” to actors and ideas,” institutions will be the key “determinants of 
policy and institutional change” (Harmes, 14). Further borrowing from liberal pluralist 
theory, historical institutionalism looks beyond the state and at the “constitutive and 
regulative role of both international and domestic institutions” (Harmes, 14).  The aim of 
historical institutionalism, then, is to explain “how existing institutions have worked, over 
time, to construct political actors and their preferences as well as to impose constraints on 
them through mechanisms such as path dependence and unintended consequences” 
(Ibid.).  
 Historical institutionalism contributes to the theories used in this work for two 
particular reasons.  First and foremost, none of the existing theories provide a historically 
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contingent explanation, even though a number of observers pointed to the probability that 
in a different historical period, the ICC would have not been established (Fife, Interview).  
Second, and more importantly, none of the theories used to explain the ICC to date offer 
a historically contingent institutionalist account even though the empirical research points 
in the direction of a possibly institutionalist explanation.   
Historical institutionalism offers a few interesting hypotheses when attempting to 
explain the establishment of the independent Prosecutor and the ICC.  This particular 
theory is able to account for the fact that predominantly democratic and liberal 
democratic states were at the forefront of attempting to establish the ICC and the 
independent Prosecutor in particular.  The theory is able to account for the institutional 
experience of democratic states with such an institutional arrangement. At the same time, 
staunchly authoritarian – or even totalitarian – regimes were very much against 
establishing the Court and the independent Prosecutor.  At the end of the Rome 
Conference, the states that voted against the ICC included Iraq, Cuba and Yemen.  
Similarly, the states comprising the ‘like-minded group’ led by Canada was comprised of 
mostly liberal and social democratic states, and newly democratizing states.  With respect 
to the independent Prosecutor, data shows similar patterns.  States scoring low on the 
Freedom House, ‘political’ and ‘civil rights’ indexes tended to oppose the institution of 
the independent Prosecutor.  Those states which score high on these indicators tended to 
favour the institution of the independent Prosecutor.14   
The empirical record also shows patterns which seem to head against the 
theoretical grain of historical institutionalism.  In particular, in the case of the US and 
Japan – which are both liberal democratic states – the former had not joined the Court at 
                                                     
14
 Please see Appendixes I – III.  
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the time of writing and was even vehemently campaigning against the Court and the 
independent Prosecutor at the turn of the millennium.  In the case of Japan, even though 
Japanese diplomats were very active during the initial stages of establishing the Court 
and the RS contained a provision for the independent Prosecutor, Japan did not join the 
Court until nearly ten years after the conclusion of the Rome Conference.           
Gap in the Literature 
Overall, there are three broad observations that can be made about the state of the 
literature on the creation of the Independent Prosecutor and the ICC.  First, there are 
relatively few explanatory accounts of why states established an independent Prosecutor.  
Given the revolutionary nature and importance of the Court and its Prosecutor, this 
scarcity should certainly be remedied.  The independent Prosecutor is a unique 
phenomenon, and its origin and impact on state sovereignty will only add to the overall 
understanding of role of states, NGOs and sub-states groups and processes as functions of 
global governance.  Second, the existing explanations hold the ‘state’ as a unitary actor, 
and naturally ascribe casual importance to state and national interests.  While referring to 
state-level explanations, a number of key issues and dynamics are not problematized 
which provide further depth to not only the overall analysis, but also to the understanding 
of the establishment of the Court with an independent Prosecutor as well.  The role of 
sub-state actors is neglected in the explanatory calculus.  The role of NGOs is certainly 
discussed and attributed to the success of establishing such institutions.  However, the 
broader ontological form of NGOs – as manifestations of an active civil society in 
democratic states – stops short of attributing the origins of NGOs and their ideas as well 
as their relevance to political processes located within domestic political realms.  In this 
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vein then, it is quite proper to argue that norms and ideas contributed greatly to the 
establishment of the Court and the Prosecutor.  Yet most of the explanatory relevance is 
placed on the proliferation of global norms, principles and ideas regarding human rights 
and international criminal justice, among others.  At issue therefore is that these norms, 
principles and ideas, while embedded in social structures – global and domestic – 
originate with actors which primarily originate from domestic and local political realms.  
Therefore adding a domestic element to the origin of norms, ideas and processes is 
crucial for the understanding of the origins and establishment of the Court with an 
independent Prosecutor.   
 Given the intellectual and practical significance of the independent Prosecutor, a 
more in-depth study is warranted. For instance, explanations pointing to a compromised 
position on the independent Prosecutorial powers leave a number of key questions out, 
including: what enabled the compromises to be made, and why were states able to come 
to a compromise regarding the inclusion of the Prosecutor?  Further, the existing state-
centric approaches of neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism 
downplay the role of domestic ideas and interests.  As Caroline Fehl observes in the case 
of the ICC, these analyses are important for ongoing debates, contemplations and 
conversations about the origins of the very first permanent and independent international 
criminal court.  
 Essentially, there are three distinct ways in which this dissertation will 
supplement the explanatory scholarship regarding the ICC.  First, it will focus on a 
particular institutional design feature of the Court: the independent Prosecutor of the ICC.  
This design feature – or others in fact – have not been explained adequately in the 
64 
 
international relations literature.  Second, the dissertation will disaggregate the ‘state’ and 
will use domestic interest groups as units of analysis.  Third, by using sub-state actors as 
units of analysis, the particular ways in which these actors formulated the notion of their 
own state sovereignty in the event that an independent Prosecutor for the ICC is 
established will bring to light the importance of these sub-state actors in shaping national 
interests.  Further, this type of an analysis will outline how their dominance at a particular 
junction in time and in a particular historical and temporal contexts helped establish an 
independent Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court.  
Theoretical Approach 
This section outlines the theoretical approach employed in this dissertation, that is a  
broadly liberal-pluralist approach which takes into account the role of domestic interests 
and ideas (sometimes referred to as ‘actor-centered constructivism’). This approach 
draws on Andrew Moravcsik’s ‘liberal theory of international relations’ (and its three- 
stage approach), and liberal constructivism more broadly. After outlining the main 
assumptions of this approach, this section demonstrates how this approach informs the 
key hypotheses of this dissertation. 
 In his article entitled “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics,” Andrew Moravcsik notes that the domestic and international 
social context states are embedded in have an impact on state behavior in international 
relations (Moravcsik, 513).  Moravcsik further notes that “societal ideas, interests, and 
institutions influence state behavior by shaping state preferences...” (Ibid.).  In essence, 
‘state preferences’ matter the most to world politics for liberals, as opposed to “the 
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configuration of capabilities”, as for realists, and “the configuration of information and 
institutions” as for institutionalists and ‘functional regime theorists’ (Ibid.).  
 Moravcsik points to three fundamental assumptions of a liberal theory of 
international politics.  First, he notes that the most important actors in international 
relations are “individuals and private groups, who are on average rational and risk-averse 
and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests 
under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in 
societal influence” (Moravcsik, 516).  Second, the author notes that “states (or other 
political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose 
interests state officials define state preferences” (Moravcsik, 518).  Third, Moravcsik 
further points to a variant of liberal theory – ‘ideational liberalism’ – which seems to 
provide explanatory clout for the analysis.  The point here is that ideational liberalism 
“views the configuration of domestic social identities and values as basic determinant of 
state preferences and, therefore, of interstate conflict and cooperation” (Moravcsik, 525).  
This theoretical approach then informs the key hypotheses of this study in such a way 
that it emphasizes the causal importance of key individuals and groups – mainly political 
parties and non-governmental organization – within key polities, which were crucial for 
the establishment of the Court with an independent Prosecutor.  
Methodology  
In this section, comparative case study and historical process tracing will be outlined.  
The case study method and the methodology of process tracing are used in order to test 
liberal-pluralist as well as neorealist, neoliberal institutionalist, constructivist, and 
historical institutionalist explanations.  In order to satisfactorily answer the overall 
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question animating this work – namely, why states established an independent Prosecutor 
– there are two further questions under contention.  First, and foremost, which states 
supported and which opposed the establishment of an independent Prosecutor, and why? 
Second, why and how did the supporters of an independent Prosecutor win?  
 Turning to the question of who supported, who opposed, and for what reasons, the 
establishment of an independent Prosecutor, it will be hypothesized via liberal pluralism 
that domestic ideas and interests played the central role.  These domestic ideas and 
interests originated from the political parties in power and their domestic constituencies.  
By extension, then, a change in parties in power, and the ideas these alternate parties held 
regarding the independent Prosecutor, have led to a change in a state’s position.  The key 
test for liberal-pluralist explanations will be to discern if domestic ideas and interests 
(non-governmental organizations (NGOs), political parties and their ideational 
backdrops), as well as a change in government, add to the explanatory calculus.  The 
neorealist, neoliberal institutionalist and constructivist explanations do not disaggregate 
‘the state’ as an analytic concept, therefore they do not ascribe primary causal relevance 
to domestic actors.  In addition, these theoretical strands explain preferences based on a 
state’s position in the international distribution of power or they leave the source of state 
preference unexamined.   
 In general terms, comparative case studies may rely on the ‘method of 
difference’, the ‘method of agreement’, and the ‘method of concomitant variable’.   
Jonathan Hopkin notes that the ‘method of difference’ “involves studying two very 
similar cases, which differ only in respect of the variables whose relationship to each 
other one is studying” (Hopkin in Marsh, et. al., 252).   The ‘method of agreement’, on 
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the other hand, “is the opposite of the ‘method of difference’: the two cases should differ 
in every respect except the variables being studied” (Ibid., 253).  Lastly, “the ‘method of 
concomitant variables’ seeks to identify variables which seem to move more or less 
contemporaneously in the hypothesized direction” (Ibid.).      
The four selected cases fit very well with the ‘method of agreement’ research 
design, which espouses that “cases should differ in every respect except for the variables 
being studied” (Hopkin, 202).  Apart from representatives of all three states continually 
participating in the debates about the Prosecutor and the Court in general, the three cases 
show substantial difference in their foreign policies, governmental structures, and party 
politics as well.  With respect to foreign policy, Canadian foreign policy was at the time 
still focused on multilateralism and peace-keeping.  The foreign policy of the UK was 
“maintaining a strong alliance with the US, and a commitment to place Britain at the 
heart of Europe.” (Research Paper, House of Commons, UK)  The US became the sole 
superpower and was viewed as the hegemon within the international realm.  It was at the 
forefront of nearly every major inter- or intra-state conflict, from Rwanda, Somalia to 
Bosnia and later Kosovo. Finally, Japan was certainly seen as a regional economic power 
in the Asia-Pacific with very strong military and defense ties to the United States.    
With respect to state structures, Canada and the UK are both parliamentary 
democracies, however Canada is a federal state while the UK is a unitary state.  By the 
same token, even though Canada and the US are both federations, the US government is 
characterized by a presidential system, and Canada is characterized by a parliamentary 
system.  Lastly, Japan is a Constitutional Monarchy, and unitary state, which is 
characterized by a bicameral parliamentary liberal democracy.   
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In general terms, the selection of cases is balanced in a more geo-strategic sense 
as well.  Canada and Japan – states from either sides in this debate – are thought to be 
more ‘middle powers’ regionally, as in the case of Japan, and globally as in the case of 
Canada and Japan as well.  The United Kingdom and the US – once again, straddling 
both sides of the debate – are thought to be more either regional or global major powers.  
This balance between, and across the debate, further affords the study credibility and 
strength.  
The above-indicated cases were selected because these states had the most impact 
and were the most influential in the debate regarding the independent Prosecutor. In the 
case of Canada, it was approached in 1995 by the NGO Coalition for an International 
Criminal Court (CICC) to lead the charge of establishing the Court after the successful 
Ottawa conference banning the use of land mines in conflicts.  Supporting the ICC and 
the independent Prosecutor seemed as a natural extension and continuation of a 
multilateralist Canadian foreign policy – which included a leading role of the newly 
established Human Security Network.  At the same time, the official opposition in the 
House of Commons, the Canadian Alliance party, did oppose – unsuccessfully because of 
a Liberal majority supported by the New Democratic Party – the establishment of an 
independent Prosecutor.  The case of the UK is very important as well as this state is a 
member of the so-called ‘permanent 5’ (P-5) of the UNSC.  The P-5 was seen as a 
cohesive group arguing against the establishment of an independent Prosecutor all 
throughout the PrepComs until the UK – due to a change from a Conservative 
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government to a Labour government in 1997 – changed its stance.15  Lastly, the US is an 
excellent case because it vehemently opposed the establishment of an independent 
Prosecutor even though it was not a major policy aim of the US – at least not in Rome.  
The pressure provided by the Pentagon and certain members of the US Congress and US 
House of Representatives towards the US negotiating team in order to necessarily shield 
US service members and civilians from the reach of the Court sheds light on a key 
explanatory factor for US opposition: domestic partisan interests.  Lastly, Japan was 
involved all throughout the international diplomatic process of establishing the Court, yet 
its government formed by the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan at the time took nearly a 
decade to ratify the RS.  In addition Japan was initially very much opposed to the 
establishment of the independent Prosecutor as well.  
 With respect to the second key question under contention in this work – or why 
and how did the supporters of an independent Prosecutor win – it will be hypothesized 
that states, INGOs, leadership, agency and coalition-building, and norms mattered in 
negotiating process.  In order to map the relevance of these hypotheses the method of 
historical process tracing will be used.   
Historical process tracing is defined by David Collier as “an analytic tool for 
drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence— often 
understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (Collier, 824).  In 
particular, ‘process tracing’ “gives close attention to sequences of independent, 
dependent, and intervening variables” (Collier, 823).  For the purposes of this study, the 
aim here was to shed light on the ILC document that preceded the RS, evaluate the six 
                                                     
15
 France, another member of the P-5 also changed its stance later on during the Rome conference.  However, in the 
case of France, the change was due to the achievement of that nation’s negotiated goals as opposed to a change in 
government.   
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sessions of the Preparatory Commission prior to the Rome conference and then trace the 
negotiation process in Rome as well as post-Rome process in particular legislatures – up 
to the point in time when states ratified the RS.  In particular, records of the negotiation 
process were analyzed in order to uncover how different actors – namely members of the 
‘like-minded group’, NGOs and the US and the ‘not-so-like-minded-states’ – negotiated 
and argued for – or against – the establishment of an independent Prosecutor.  Key policy 
papers, parliamentary committee and debate transcripts, as well as policy and media 
publications were used to discern the reasons why the above mentioned key actors 
negotiated for an independent Prosecutor.   
Lastly, it is important to note that data was gathered via primary and secondary 
sources, as well as interviews with key participants. With respect to alternative 
hypotheses, one is able to posit – via neorealism and power-based approaches – that the 
US should have been able to prevent the establishment of the ICC.  Further, one should 
be able to argue that, due to the absence of the US from the group of states which are 
members of the Court, the Court is ineffective.  Neoliberal institutionalism could lead one 
to argue that state interests were sacrosanct – which would in fact dictate the 
establishment of a Court without an independent Prosecutor and a strong UNSC 
involvement – and they would matter most, in conjunction with international NGOs and 
the dynamics of the negotiation process.  Constructivist hypotheses would posit that that 
what is at stake in this explanation is the role and impact of international norms.  One 
could argue that international norms were the catalysts as well as the causal mechanisms 
which enabled the establishment of an independent Prosecutor.  Lastly, liberal pluralist 
explanation will shed light on the role of domestic interest groups such as political parties 
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and domestic NGOs.  Considering this theoretical explanation, it will be important to see 
if changes in the parties which formed the government – during the negotiations process 
and beyond – signalled a change in official state policy whereby highlighting the causal 




CHAPTER 3: THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE PROSECUTOR 
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion with regard to the investigation of criminal 
conduct and the institution of judicial proceedings is a necessary and fundamental 
concept in the administration of criminal justice.  Its necessity springs from the practical 
need for a selective, rather than automatic approach to the institution of criminal 
proceeding, thus avoiding the overburdening and perhaps clogging of the machinery of 
justice.  Somebody somewhere thus has to decide whether or not to institute proceedings 
and for what offence or offences (Hassan B. Jallow, Chief Prosecutor, International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 145).  
 
The overall purpose of this chapter is to provide the historical, legal and institutional 
background to the establishment of the ICC with an independent Prosecutor.  In order to 
satisfy this purpose, first, the work of the Prosecutor – and with it, the corporate identity 
of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) as an organ of the Court – will be described via an 
exposition of the basic structure of the relevant parts of the Rome Statute, the ICC in its 
organizational forms, as well as the OTP itself.  Here special attention will be placed on 
the ways in which the OTP, from an institutional point of view, and the Prosecutor, from 
a statutory point of view, are independent actors within the Court.  In order to locate the 
discussion in the international and legal and political context, this chapter will then 
describe and show the qualitative difference in the independence of the Prosecutor of the 
ICC and his/her international predecessors.  The debate over the ‘independence’ of 
prosecutorial discretion is quite extensive in the legal and – to a lesser extent, political – 
literature.  Some attention will be paid to this debate as well.  However, approaching the 
notion of independence from a political and international relations point of view, the 
central claim of this chapter is that the ‘independence’ bestowed on the Prosecutor of the 
ICC – by  virtue of the Court’s mandate as a permanent international criminal court, 
along with its key statutory provisions – has made the Court fundamentally different from 
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its predecessors.  Politically, the exercise of independent decision-making and discretion 
of the Prosecutor of the ICC is fundamentally different than those of earlier ad hoc 
tribunals.      
The ICC itself is one of the most innovative, yet controversial, international 
institutions that emerged in the late 20th century.  It is a permanent international criminal 
court which is responsible to prosecute individuals who have committed crimes against 
humanity, war crimes or genocide in conflicts which are deemed “the most serious 
conflicts of international concern” (Rome Statute, Article 1).  It is also ‘complementary 
to national criminal jurisdictions,’ so the Court is restricted to operate in situations where 
the state is either incapacitated or is unwilling to prosecute (Rome Statute, Article 1).  
With respect to its jurisdiction, the reach of the Court is not restricted to only signatory 
states, or states that have signed the Rome Statute.  As the Statute outlines, the Court may 
exercise jurisdiction if the crime committed occurred within “the State on the territory of 
which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel 
or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft; b) the State of which the 
person accused of the crime is a national” (Rome Statute, Article 12).  Therefore, 
nationals of non-party states may also be brought in front of the Court if they have 
committed crimes on the territory of a signatory state.  
Before embarking on an exposition of the Court and the role of the Prosecutor 
within the Court, it is important to place the forthcoming discussion within the statutory 
framework of the Rome Statute.  In this section, particular attention will be paid to the 
provisions in the RS that directly address the role and work of the Prosecutor within the 
Court.   
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At the outset, it is important to mention that some observers and scholars note that 
“[T]he Rome Statute…[is] one of the most complex international treaties ever drafted…” 
(Olasolo 2003, 87).  Substantively, the final version of the RS accepted by state 
delegations in Rome in 1998, had two earlier incarnations, one originating from the 
International Law Commission (ILC), and the other emerging from the Preparatory 
Committee negotiations16 leading up to the Rome Conference in 1998.  The ILC draft 
originating from 1994 only gave states and the UNSC the power to refer cases to the 
Court.  The fear was that an independent Prosecutor would only encourage politically-
charged prosecutions.  Overall, the ILC reasoned that “affording the Prosecutor the power 
to initiate investigations on his own – what has come to be known as his proprio motu 
powers – was not advisable ‘at the present stage of development of the international legal 
system” (Fernandez de Gurmendi in Danner 2003, 513).  During the Preparatory 
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 The article describing the role of the Prosecutor as it appeared in the Preparatory Commission’s Draft – Article 12 – 
in preparation for the Rome Conference: “The Prosecutor [may] [shall] initiate investigations [ex officio][proprio 
motu] [or] on the basis of information [obtained] [he may seek] from any source, in particular from Governments, 
United Nations organs [and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations]. The Prosecutor shall assess the 
information received or obtained and decide whether there insufficient basis to proceed. [The Prosecutor may, for the 
purpose of initiating an investigation, receive information on alleged crimes under article 5,paragraphs (a) to (d), from 
Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, victims and associations representing them, or 
other reliable sources.]36”(Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Cours United Nations Conference Records, Addition , A/Conf.183/2/Add.1, Page 37)   
 
In comparison, the Draft Statute originating from the ILC in 1994 reads as follows: Article 12  
The Procuracy; (1.) The Procuracy is an independent organ of the Court responsible for the investigation of 
complaints brought in accordance with this Statute and for the conduct of prosecutions. A member of the Procuracy 
shall not seek or act on instructions from any external source. (2.) The Procuracy shall be headed by the Prosecutor, 
assisted by one or more Deputy Prosecutors, who may act in place of the Prosecutor in the event that the Prosecutor is 
unavailable. The Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall be of different nationalities. The Prosecutor may 
appoint such other qualified staff as may be required. (3.) The Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors shall be persons of 
high moral character and have high competence and experience in the prosecution of criminal cases. They shall be 
elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the States Parties, from among candidates nominated by States 
Parties. Unless a shorter term is otherwise decided on at the time of their election, they shall hold office for a term of 
five years and are eligible for re-election. (4.) The States Parties may elect the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors on 
the basis that they are willing to serve as required. (5.) The Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors shall not act in 
relation to a complaint involving a person of their own nationality. (6.) The Presidency may excuse the Prosecutor or a 
Deputy Prosecutor at their request from acting in a particular case, and shall decide any question raised in a 
particular case as to the disqualification of the Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor. (7.) The staff of the Procuracy shall 
be subject to Staff Regulations drawn up by the Prosecutor (Draft Statute for an international criminal court, United 




Committee meetings however, delegations began suggesting that the Prosecutor should 
be able to receive information from ‘nonstate sources’, including NGOs   (Danner, 2003, 
513).  As a result then the notions of an independent Prosecutor became one of the most 
contentious issues addressed throughout the negotiations  (Danner 2003, 513).    
The final version of the RS which “was adopted by 120 states on July 18th, 1998,” 
is “composed of a preamble and thirteen parts, including 128 articles” (Arsanjani, 24) 
Overall, the RS is a document which is an ‘instrument’ establishing an international 
organization, it contains a ‘penal code’ and a ‘criminal procedure code’ (Olasolo 2003, 
87-88).  Arsanjani notes that the Statute itself is underpinned by three pillars: first, the 
principle of ‘complimentarity’ ensures that national jurisdictions are necessarily prior to 
the jurisdiction of the Court.  The Court is ‘complementary’ to national jurisdictions, and 
not the other way around (Arsanjani, 24-25).  There are two particular reasons for the 
inclusion of complementarity in the RS.  First, “the majority of participating states … had 
a vital interest in remaining responsible and accountable for prosecuting violations of 
their laws.  The international community had a comparable interest, inasmuch as national 
systems are expected to maintain and enforce adherence to international standards” 
(Arsanjani, 25).  The second pillar of the Statute is that it is designed to address the ‘most 
serious crimes’ that “affected the selection of crimes, as well as the determination of their 
threshold application” (Arsajnani, 25).  The thought behind this perspective was that “this 
principle would promote broad acceptance of the court by states and consequently 
enhance its credibility, moral authority and effectiveness.  In addition, it would avoid 
overloading the court with cases that could be dealt with adequately by national courts, at 
the same time limiting the financial burden imposed on the international community” 
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(Arsanjani, 25). The third pillar is the pillar of ‘customary international law’.  The intent 
behind this pillar was that states wanted the statute to be acceptable by as many states as 
possible (Arsanjani, 25). 
The overall Statute is composed of thirteen different parts, of which Part 2 dealing 
with “Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law” is the most important for the 
ensuing discussion.  Part 2 “is the heart of the statute and was the most difficult to 
negotiate.  This part deals with the list and the definition of crimes, the trigger 
mechanisms, admissibility and applicable law.  The text of part 2 was negotiated until the 
penultimate day of the conference” (Arsanjani, 25).  Overall, the jurisdictional regime of 
the Court holds that the Court has jurisdiction over crimes enumerated in the statute if the 
Court has consent to prosecute from the territorial state where the crime occurred, or if 
the accused is a national of a state which ratified the statute (Arsanjani, 26).  The 
jurisdictional regime of the Court with respect to the UNSC is different, however.  In the 
case that the UNSC refers a situation to the court, the Court would have a wider 
jurisdiction which would be exercised even if the accused is a national of a non-party 
state, and without the explicit consent of the territorial state or the state of which the 
accused is a national (Arsajani, 26).  Further, at Rome, the P5 of the UNSC voiced further 
concerns over the possibility that the jurisdictional regime of the Court would interfere 
with the work of the UNSC.  At issue was the possibility that an investigation by the 
Court would coincide with the work of the Council in regards to resolving a conflict  
(Arsanjani, 26).   According to Arsanjani, as a compromise, the UNSC could ask the 
Court to defer the investigation for a renewable 12 months (Arsanjani, 27).   
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In essence either a state party or the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter may refer a ‘situation’ to the Court.17  In addition, the Prosecutor may authorize 
an investigation on his or her own accord – or proprio motu  (Arsanjani, 27).  In this case, 
the Prosecutor would have to inform all stakeholders of her or his decision in advance.  If 
any state has proceeded with an investigation, the Prosecutor then would have to defer 
the investigation.  The Prosecutor may ask for periodic updates in regards to the 
investigation.  Further, the Prosecutor may even review the state investigation if there has 
been a large-scale change in the particular state’s “unwillingness or inability genuinely to 
carry out the investigation” (Arsanjani, 27).       
Organizationally, the ICC is comprised of four main organs: the Presidency, the 
Judiciary, the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry.  The office of the Presidency is 
entrusted with the overall administration of the Court, except for the Office of the 
Prosecutor.  The Presidency is headed by three judges who are elected by their fellow 
jurists at the Court for a term of three years.  The presiding judge of the Court is assisted 
by a first Vice-President and a second Vice-President. 18   The role of the Judiciary 
consists of the judges of the Court – eighteen in total – who serve in one of three judicial 
divisions: Pre-Trial, Trial and Appeals division.  The assignment of judges to the 
different divisions is based on the ‘function’ of the different division as well as the 
‘qualifications and expertise’ of the judges.  In terms of qualification, it is ascertained that 
the personnel have ‘expertise in criminal law and procedure and international law.’  The 
office of the Registry “is responsible for the non-judicial aspects of the administration 
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 Including the word ‘situation’ as opposed to ‘case’ meant to “minimize politicization of the court by naming 
individuals” (Arsanjani, 27).                
18
 International Criminal Court. Chambers.  http://www.icc-




and servicing of the Court.”  This organ is headed by a Registrar who is under the 
supervision of the President of the Court.  The Registrar is elected by the judges of the 
Court for a five year term.  Lastly, the Court also contains three other so-called ‘semi-
autonomous’ offices that fall under the administration of the Registry, though these 
offices operate autonomously.  These are the Office of Public Counsel for Victims, 
Office of Public Counsel for Defense, and the Trust Funds office.  The Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) is an autonomous and independent organ of the Court.  It is not 
administered by the Presidency of the Court nor any other international organ, including 
the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council.  The OTP is headed by the 
Prosecutor. The Prosecutor is elected for a non-renewable nine years by the Assembly of 
State Parties.  She is assisted by the Deputy Prosecutor who is in charge of the three sub-
divisions within the OTP: the Prosecution division, the Jurisdiction, Complementarity 
and Cooperation Division, and the Investigation Division.  The latter two divisions are 
headed by a Director and a Head respectively.19 
 In order to show the distinctiveness and uniqueness of the proprio motu powers of 
the Prosecutor of the ICC, one must provide at least a cursory exposition of the 
independence – or lack thereof – bestowed on the Prosecutors of the institutions dealing 
with international criminal justice which preceded the ICC, namely the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials, and the ad hoc tribunals dealing with atrocities in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda.   
The first institutional approach pursued by the Allies at the end of World War II 
took place at the Palace of St. James in 1942, when the Allies established the United 
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 Hector Olasolo notes that the “(a) Presidency; (b) the Appeals, Trials and Pre-Trial Divisions; and (c) The Registry,” 
along with the OTP are “the so-called four judicial organs of the Court provided for in the R.S, Art. 34...”  On the other 
hand, the “political organs established by the R.S. [Art. 112] are “(a) The Assembly of States Parties; and (b) The 
Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties” (Olasolo 2003, 90).  
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Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC).  This commission essentially led to the 
establishment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT)  (Bassiouni, 
21).  The Commission was composed of 17 state representatives and it did amass 8172 
dossiers of persons who were thought to have committed war crimes (Ibid., 22).  
However, between 1942 and 1945, the work of the commission did not progress as 
planned.  The intention of the Allies to prosecute war criminals was further cemented at 
the signing of the Moscow Declaration in 1943, which was signed by Churchill, 
Roosevelt, and Stalin.  At that point, there was less thought about an institutional 
approach, and more about capital punishment for the perpetrators.  Nearly all three sides 
agreed to this course of action, with the only dissent coming from the United States (US),  
even  after  President Truman had replaced President Roosevelt.  Following the work of 
the commission and the Declaration, the IMT was essentially established on August 8th, 
1945 by way of the London Agreement.  It was signed by the four major Allied powers as 
well as nineteen other states.  The US did take the lead on logistics as well as personnel 
for the operation of the tribunal.  Ironically, it was the efficiency of German record 
keeping that provided the Allies with most of their evidential ammunition (Bassiouni, 
28).     
The London agreement contained the charter of the new tribunal.  The charter 
essentially reflected the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1929 Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Bassiouni, 25 – 26).   One additional Law 
– the Control Council Law No. 10 – further contributed to the codification of the 
prosecutions, as it allowed the Allies to prosecute German military personnel within their 
own respective zones  (Bassiouni, 29).    Of further note is the fact that the Kellogg-
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Briand Peace Pact of 1928 was used along with treaties that Germany had itself signed, 
such as the Locarno Treaties (King, 40).  The aim was to prosecute i) crimes against 
peace; ii) war crimes; and iii) crimes against humanity.  The type of crimes prosecuted 
will be important as it will become evident that crimes prosecuted by subsequent 
tribunals and institutions became more focused on individual criminal responsibility. 
The purpose of the tribunal was to provide “for the just and prompt trial and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis” (IMT Statute). The 
jurisdiction of the IMT – as described in Article 6 of the IMT – was such that it had “the 
power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis, 
whether as individuals or as members of organizations…” have committed ‘crimes 
against peace’, ‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity’.     
 In the IMT, the role ascribed to Chief Prosecutors was outlined in section III of 
the Statute called the “Committee for the Investigation and Prosecution of Major War 
Criminals” (IMT Statute).  Article 14 of the Statute outlined that “[E]ach Signatory shall 
appoint a Chief Prosecutor for the investigation of the charges against and the 
prosecution of major war criminals” (IMT Statute).  The Committee was then charged “a) 
to agree upon a plan of the individual work of each of the Chief Prosecutors and his staff, 
b) to settle the final designation of major war criminals to be tried by the Tribunal; c) to 
improve the Indictment and the documents to be submitted therewith; d) to lodge the 
Indictment and the accompanying documents with the Tribunal; c) to draw up and 
recommend to the Tribunal for its approval draft rules of procedure…” (IMT Statute).  
Article 15 then outlined that each Chief Prosecutor will also be responsible for “a) 
investigation, collection, and production before or at the Trial of all necessary evidence; 
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b) the preparation of the indictment for approval by the Committee in accordance with 
paragraph (c) of Article 14 hereof; d) the preliminary examination of all necessary 
witnesses and of the Defendants; e) to serve as a prosecutor at the Trial; e) to appoint 
representatives to carry out such duties as may be assigned to them; f) to undertake such 
other matters as may appear necessary to them for the purposes of the preparation for and 
conduct of the Trial” (IMT Statute).  
 It was the Chief Prosecutors who decided whom to prosecute.  As Article 14 
stated, it was within their responsibilities. Together with the outlined jurisdiction of the 
IMT – members of the European Axis powers, “individuals or … members of 
organizations” – it was therefore within the powers of the Chief Prosecutors to decide 
who would be tried and who would not be tried.  As William Schabas notes, these 
Prosecutors were not ‘independent’.  They were representing the interests of their own 
governments (Schabas 2008, 372).  Schabas further notes that potentially they might have 
gotten instructions from their own governments in regards to whom to prosecute or not20 
(Schabas 2008, 732).   
Turning to the Far East, the Tokyo trials were preceded by the Far Eastern 
Commission which was agreed to in Moscow in December of 1945.  It was comprised of 
eleven states21 and the Commission was based in Washington.  The Allied Council of 
Japan was the local governing body taking directives from Washington.  The Council was 
made up of the US, the United Kingdom, China and Russia.  Its mandate was more 
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 It is interesting to note that “[A] recent study shows how intelligence agents were planted on the staff of the 
American Prosecutor at the highest levels.  One aspect of their job was to ensure that high-ranking Nazis who had 
collaborated with the United States in the final months of the war were not prosecuted” (Schabas, 732). 
21
 These states were: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Great Britain, India, the United States, the Philippines, China, 
the Soviet Union, France, and the Netherlands.  However, the Commission further “received evidence relating to 
Manchuria, the People’s Republic of Mongolia, Thailand, Cambodia, Burma, and Portuguese possessions in East Asia” 
(Pritchard, 27, Footnote).  
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political as opposed to investigative as it sought to establish the occupation policy in 
Japan.  The actual Tribunal – dubbed the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE) – and its Charter, issued as an order by General Douglas McArthur, the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers were issues and signed on January 19th, 
1946.  The eleven states were represented at the Tribunals by one representative each.  
(Pritchard, 27)  As far as the defendants were concerned, they did not, for example, 
include the Emperor Hirohito, whose prosecution and eventual trial were bypassed out of 
political considerations  (‘From Versailles’, Bassiouni, 35).  It is important to note that 
certain states did hold trials in the Pacific Theater, including Australia, China, France, the 
Netherlands, the Philippines, the UK, the United States and the USSR (Ibid.).    
The jurisdiction of the IMTFE was such that it had “the power to try and punish 
Far Eastern war criminals who as individuals or as members of organizations are charged 
with offences which include Crimes against Peace” (IMTFE Statute). The crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the IMTFE were ‘crimes against peace’, ‘conventional war crimes’, 
and ‘crimes against humanity.’  The prosecutorial role within the IMTFE was assigned to 
the ‘Chief of Counsel’ who is appointed by the ‘Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers’ (IMTFE Statute).  Based on this designation, the Chief of Counsel can hardly be 
seen as independent from other judicial authority.  Further, the IMTFE did provide for the 
appointment of an ‘Associate Counsel’ whom was to be appointed by “any United Nation 
with which Japan has been at war…” (IMTFE Statute).  
 With respect to trigger mechanisms, seemingly it was the Tribunal with its no 
“less than six members nor more than eleven members, appointed by the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers…” that determined which individuals the Chief of 
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Counsel could “investigate and prosecute” (IMTFE Statute).  In addition, the rules of 
evidence outlined in Article 13 provided further insight into whom and how individuals 
may be brought in front of the IMTFE.  Article 13 stated with respect to ‘Admissibility’ 
that “[T]he Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence.  It shall adopt and 
apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall 
admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value.  All purported admissions or 
statements of the accused are admissible” (IMTFE Statute).  
During the Cold War and its preference for ‘realpolitik’, institutions of 
international criminal justice were not used.  Hardships and setbacks notwithstanding, the 
Security Council did establish the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on May 3, 
1993 when it passed Resolution 827, which also included a draft Statute of the Tribunal.  
The ICTY officially came into existence on May 25th, 1993.  One must pay particular 
attention to the crimes the Statute of the ICTY is able to prosecute: “individual criminal 
responsibility, including that of Head of State…[as well as] … 1) grave breaches of the 
Geneva Convention of 1949; 2) violations of the laws or customs of war; 3) genocide; 
and 4) crimes against humanity” (Bassiouni, 43).  A further feature of the tribunal was 
that it applied to everyone who violated humanitarian law as opposed to only a select 
few, as was the case with the IMT and the IMTFE.  The tribunal was not answerable to 
the UNSC, but rather to the General Assembly of the UN, but only in regards to 
budgetary matters.  The track record of the Tribunal at its inception was as follows: 
twenty-two persons were indicted within months of the establishment of the tribunal, and 
as of September 1996, “seventy-five persons have been indicted, one is being prosecuted, 
one plead guilty, and seven are being held in custody” (Bassiouni, 45).  It must be 
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mentioned that after 1996 and before 2001 such other figures indicted and transferred to 
the Hague as the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s president Slobodan Milosevic, 
Serbia’s President Milan Milutinovic, the president of the Serbian Radical Party Vojislav 
Seselj, and a few other former leading Serbian politicians.  The Hague also saw the 
indictment of one of Kosovo’s Prime Ministers as well who willingly traveled to The 
Hague to appear before the Court. Overall, the ICTY was the most successful tribunal in 
history.  Its success stems from the fact that it arrested all of its indictees.  
There are three particular components of the Statute of the ICTY that are relevant 
for the discussion at hand.  First, the role of the Prosecutor is relevant as it provides an 
outline for the functioning of the Prosecutor.  Second, the jurisdictional parameters of the 
tribunal are also important as they provide the jurisdictional context for the operation of 
the Tribunal.  The third element of the Statute that is relevant is the way investigations 
are initiated.   
 The assumption of the role of the Prosecutor as well as his or her duties and 
responsibilities are outlined in Article 16th of the Statute.  Article 16, section 4 states that 
it is the responsibility of the UNSC to appoint the Prosecutor, based on the 
recommendation of the Secretary General.  It is also stipulated – as it is in the case of the 
ICC – that the appointed person “shall be of high moral character and possess the highest 
level of competence and experience in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions of 
criminal cases” (ICTY Statute).  Article 16 section 2, on the other hand, outlines that “the 
prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the International Tribunal.  He 
or she shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other 
source” (ICTY Statute).  
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 Section 1 of the Statute outlines the temporal, territorial and therefore 
jurisdictional parameters of the Tribunal.  Section 1 states that “the Prosecutor shall be 
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991” (ICTY Statute).  Lastly, Article 18 of the Statute 
describes the way in which investigations may be initiated by the Prosecutor.22  The 
Article 18, section 1 states that the Prosecutor may initiate investigations ‘ex-officio’ or 
on the basis of information obtained from states, the UN and its organs, and 
intergovernmental organizations of NGOs (ICTY Statute).   
 It is clear from the above discussion that even though the Prosecutor of the ICTY 
was to act independently from any other governmental or institutional organ, ‘the 
investigations and prosecution’ of cases that he or she may pursue are clearly outlined 
along with the beginning of the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal.  The Prosecutor 
therefore, in the case of the ICTY, is prescribed a set temporal and territorial jurisdiction.  
Lastly, the Prosecutor may act independently – as described in Article 18 – but only with 
respect to crimes that fall within the territorial and temporal parameters of the Statute.     
Turning the discussion to the ICTR, it is once more the UNSC that established the 
Tribunal.  As is the case with the ICTY, the jurisdictional parameters are similarly 
outlined – in somewhat of a clearer fashion than for the ICTY.  The Statute of the ICTR 
                                                     
22
 The Prosecutor shall be responsible for the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991. (2.) The 
Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the International Tribunal. He or she shall not seek or receive 
instructions from any Government or from any other source. (3.) The Office of the Prosecutor shall be composed of a 
Prosecutor and such other qualified staff as may be required. (4.) The Prosecutor shall be appointed by the Security 
Council on nomination by the Secretary-General. He or she shall be of high moral character and possess the highest 
level of competence and experience in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions of criminal cases. The Prosecutor 
shall serve for a four-year term and be eligible for reappointment. The terms and conditions of service of the Prosecutor 
shall be those of an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations. (5.) The staff of the Office of the Prosecutor shall 
be appointed by the Secretary-General on the recommendation of the Prosecutor  (Statute of the ICTY). 
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also outlines the powers of the Prosecutor.  Lastly, the independence of the Prosecutor is 
contained within the statute.  
The Rwandan Commission of Experts was established in July 1994 by the UNSC 
passing Resolution 935.  The Commission was charged with investigating possible 
genocide as well as ‘grave violations of international humanitarian law’ (Bassiouni, 46).  
The Rwandan commission had a total of three weeks to complete its reports and very 
limited resources.  The Report submitted to the Secretary-General “was based on reports 
made by other bodies, and other media and published reports” (Bassiouni, 46).  It came 
into existence temporarily during 1994 – from January 1st until December 31st – but it 
was not until 1996 that the ICTR became fully operational.  Due to the nature of the 
conflict – a civil war fought between two ethnic groups within Rwanda– neither the 
Geneva Conventions nor the laws regulating customs of war could be used as bases for 
prosecution.  The type of crimes prosecuted, therefore, were genocide and crimes against 
humanity.  There were 75,000 people held by the government of Rwanda in 1996, who 
were waiting to be tried either within the national system or by the ICTR.  The trials of 
those held had to be postponed as a task of that magnitude could not be accomplished 
without  substantial help from the UN and the UNSC.  Due to the devastation in the 
country, the UNSC was responsible  not only  for the logistics and resources of the ICTR 
but also to assign the seat of the Court to Arusha, Tanzania, which was not well equipped 
to deal with the Tribunal of this magnitude (Bassiouni, 46).  
 The jurisdictional parameters of the Statute of the ICTR are such that the Tribunal 
has jurisdiction over “genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide 
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and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring states, between 1 
January 1994 and 31 December 1994” (ICTR Statute).  Clearly, the territorial and 
temporal of the ICTR are even more specific than those of the ICTY. 
 At the outset, the “the Statute of the ICTR provided…for the Prosecutor of the 
ICTY to also be the Prosecutor of the ICTR (Article 15, para. 3)” (Jallow, 147).  On 
August 28th, 2003, the UNSC, via an amendment of the statute of the ICTR provided a 
separate Prosecutor and prosecutorial office for the Rwanda trial (Jallow, 147).   
 Article 15 of the Statute of the ICTR describes the role of the Prosecutor, which, 
similarly to the ICTY, “shall act independently as a separate organ of the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda.  He or she shall not seek or receive instructors from any 
Government of from any other source” (ICTR Statute).  Lastly, and as is the case with 
respect to the Prosecutor of the ICTY, he or she may initiate investigations independently 
and from information provided from a variety of sources.  The wording of Article 15 of 
the statute of the ICTR is identical to the wording of Article 18 of the Statute of the 
ICTY.   
 The OTP of the ICTR was designed to be wholly independent from outside – or 
inside – interference.  Jallow explains that “[i]mplicit in this independence of the OTP is 
the recognition that in the exercise of its functions, it is not to be subject to control by any 
other person or entity, save the law” (Jallow, 147).  Just as in the case with the ICC, the 
Prosecutor of the ICTR “is vested with responsibility to initiate investigations at his 
discretion on the basis of information received by him” (Jallow, 147).  Yet, contrary to 
the RS of the ICC, “the Prosecutor does not require any prior authorization to initiate an 
investigation.  The Chambers have no rule under the Statute in this respect.  The 
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Prosecutor acts at his discretion, subject to some qualifications…” (Jallow, 147).  At the 
ICTR, “once an investigation has been concluded, the Statute again vests authority in the 
Prosecutor to exercise his discretion and judgment as to whether an indictment should be 
filled” (Jallow, 147).    
The establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR both paved the way for the 
establishment of the ICC.  As Kirsch and Oosterveld explain, the need for the creation of 
these ad hoc tribunals “sent a strong signal to the international community…that an 
international court was necessary, even if it had to be established on an ad hoc basis.  The 
creation of the two tribunals gave a working model, showing that an ICC was 
intellectually and procedurally possible (Kirsch and Oosterveld, 1146).  
Yet, in order to understand the way in which the Prosecutor of the ICC may 
initiate investigations and exercise his proprio motu powers, it is important to focus both 
on the notion of situations and cases (Schabas 2008, 734).  Before an arrest warrant may 
be unsealed, a ‘situation’ must be under the Court’s legal jurisdiction.  The documents 
establishing the IMT, IMTFE, the ICTY or the ICTR did not afford such a provision to 
the Prosecutors of those institutions.  With respect to the ICC, situations are then 
‘identified’ through state referral, UNSC referral or based on the proprio motu powers of 
the Prosecutor.   Schabas explains that “in the first two, neither the Prosecutor nor the 
judges have any discretion.  This is a manifestation of state sovereignty, through either 
the action of one state or that of the international community, acting collectively through 
the Security Council” (Schabas, 734).  The great and ‘controversial’ departure from prior 
legal practice is in the ability of the Prosecutor to initiate investigations on his or her own 
accord, and simultaneously select cases to investigate as well, once he or she has received 
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authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber (Schabas, 734).  In a more practical sense, 
regardless of how the jurisdiction of the Court has been triggered, the selection of cases 
rests with the Prosecutor.  As Schabas notes,  “the Prosecutor can decide that there 
simply are no cases, and choose to proceed no further, subject to the review of this 
decision by a Pre-Trial Chamber” (Schabas, 734).     
 In the wider statutory and therefore procedural sense, “…the States Parties have 
established a number of material prerequisites…[‘activation prerequisites”] provided for 
in arts. 15(3) and (4), 16, 18(2) and 53(1) RS23 and in rule 48 (RPE)24 that must be met 
                                                     
23
 The relevant articles are as follows: Art. 15 (3): “If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to 
proceed with an investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an 
investigation, together with any supporting material collected. Victims may make representations to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”  Art. 15 (4): “If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon 
examination of the request and the supporting material, considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the commencement 
of the investigation, without prejudice to subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and 
admissibility of a case.” Art. 16: “No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this 
Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same 
conditions.” Art. 18 (2): “  Within one month of receipt of that notification, a State may inform the Court that it is 
investigating or has investigated its nationals or others within its jurisdiction with respect to criminal acts which may 
constitute crimes referred to in article 5 and which relate to the information provided in the notification to States. At the 
request of that State, the Prosecutor shall defer to the State's investigation of those persons unless the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, on the application of the Prosecutor, decides to authorize the investigation.” Art. 53 (1) 1.         The 
Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or 
she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an 
investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether: a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a 
reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed; (b)The case 
is or would be admissible under article 17; and (c)  Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of 
victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of 
justice.” (“Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, 1999. Web. 31 
Jan. 2011. http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/romefra.htm).  
24
 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rule 48: “ In determining whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation under article 15, paragraph 3, the Prosecutor shall consider the factors set out in article 53, 
paragraph 1 (a) to (c)” “Rules of Procedure and Evidence.” ICC-CPI.INT, International Criminal Court, 2002. Web. 31 







for the ICC’s power to investigate, prosecute, declare and enforce the individual criminal 
responsibility arising in any given situation to be activated…” (Olasolo 2005, 39).  
Olasolo then further states that “[O]nly after defining the situation at hand and verifying 
that the activation prerequisites provided for in arts. 15(3) and (4), 16, 18(2), and 53(1) 
RS and rule 48 RPE are met in connection with it, will the Court’s competent organ 
activate its dormant jurisdiction” (Olasolo 2005, 40). 
Analysis 
At this juncture one must address a question that is logically lurking in the background: 
why is it important to determine why states agreed to include the proprio motu 
provisions, given that the majority of the literature addressing the independence of the 
Prosecutor indicates that the Prosecutor’s ability to utilize her proprio motu powers is 
very much curtailed in the Statute?  In other words, why is the question of the inclusion 
of the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor important given that other statutory 
provisions limit the Prosecutor’s independence?   
The first answer to this question is that the provisions included in the RS for the 
work of the Prosecutor – and the OTP in general – are fundamentally unique from the 
other, earlier institutional incarnations of international criminal justice.   If one only takes 
the mandate of the ICC into account, one can clearly see that due to its global reach the 
Prosecutor of the ICC is not limited to only considering particular conflicts, but is able to 
investigate or initiate an investigation against anyone – given the statutory provisions of 
territorial and personal jurisdiction of the Court, of course – and can do this in instances 
of inter-state or intra-state conflict.  David Scheffer, the head of the US delegation at 
Rome explains that “the fate of the tribunals of the Balkans, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and 
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Cambodia is their temporary and limited jurisdiction.  These courts were built as ad hoc 
judicial remedies for specific theatres of atrocity crimes committed during snapshots of 
time.  They are meant to close their doors soon, with their courtrooms and offices likely 
converted to regional justice or some other public endeavour” (Scheffer, 163).  In a 
similar vein, as Olasolo states, “the personal, material, territorial and temporal 
jurisdictions of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia … and 
Rwanda… have been precisely defined by the political body, the Security Council of the 
United Nations (Security Council), that created them” (Olasolo 2003, 91).  Consequently, 
because the tribunals have been established with very specific territorial, temporal and 
crises in mind, they are characterized as ‘ad hoc’ tribunals (Olasolo 2003, 91-92).  In 
comparison, the ICC is a permanent Court and it does not have the same constraining 
parameters. In addition, Danner states that the ICC may bring ‘high officials’ to justice 
regardless of the position of the accused.  The Tribunals may do the same, however their 
work is very much curtailed by the USNC and the territorial and temporal limitations on 
their work.  The ICC is by-and-large independent of the UNSC.  The power to investigate 
such officials rests with the Prosecutor (Danner, 510).  As a result, “…the RS, unlike the 
ICTYs and the ICTRs, creates a permanent Court whose jurisdictional powers cover the 
territory and the nationals of the States Parties, and are universal in the case of Security 
Council referrals.  Thus, it is impossible to determine a priori in which situations the ICC 
will get involved” (Olasolo 2005, 39).   
Quite clearly, notwithstanding the statutory provisions which may limit the 
independence of the Prosecutor, the fact that the mandate of the Court is global – in other 
words it has no personal, temporal and only very limited territorial limits – and is not 
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entirely reactionary to conflicts already occurring, the inclusion of the proprio motu 
powers in the RS for the work of the Prosecutor of the ICC is revolutionary, and, 
therefore unique in international criminal jurisprudence.   
The second reason why it is significant to understand the reasons and dynamics 
by which the proprio motu powers were included in the RS is because, at the time of the 
negotiations, most of the statutory implications for the independent role of the Prosecutor 
were not clearly known.  Some statutory limitations – such as the requirement that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber authorize investigations that have been proposed to it by the 
Prosecutor – were very well known and were also sought by certain states.  This 
particular statutory limitation in fact played a key role in the inclusion of the proprio 
motu powers in the RS.  However, the impact of other statutory provisions that could 
have a constraining effect on the independence of the Prosecutor was only brought to the 
fore after years of reflection and study.  The point is simply this: the negotiators in Rome 
could not foresee in as much detail as consequent commentators could in what ways and 
to what degree the Prosecutor would be able to exercise his or her discretionary powers.  
The negotiators were debating and eventually voting on a provision which enabled the 
Prosecutor of the ICC to initiate investigations on his or her own accord, given that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber authorized the initiation of such investigation.  In some ways, the 
Prosecutor was given a kind of ‘carte blanche’ within certain procedural parameters.        
At this juncture it is of great importance to say a few words about the nature of 
‘independence’ and discretion in general.  Discretion in any instance provides one not 
only the freedom to act, but also the freedom not to act.  Independence, as applied to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC, provides the Prosecutor the power to pursue certain situations, but 
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it also affords – certainly in a less detailed way – the power not to act in certain 
circumstances.  As Cote explains, in addition to the rules and procedures which provide a 
legal basis for the Prosecutor to act, certain statutory provisions also allow the Prosecutor 
to not proceed with an investigation, especially if he or she has “serious reasons to 
believe that an investigation would not serve the interest of justice” (Cote, 142).  
According to Cote, this ability to decide if a situation or a case may or may not serve the 
‘interests of justice’ conveys great ‘political responsibility’ on the prosecutor (Cote, 143).  
There a number of ‘criteria’ listed in Article 53 which provide guidelines if the ‘interest 
of justice’ has or has not been served in a particular situation or case, yet “this list is not 
exhaustive and cannot relieve the prosecutor of the duty he has, in certain cases, to ‘set 
off the obligation to serve interests of justice against the obligation to serve interests of 
peace’” (Cote, 143).  Yet, it is important to note that the determination of the Prosecutor 
will be subject to ‘judicial review’ as well.    
‘Independence’ in the case of the Prosecutor of the ICC provides him or her the 
freedom and responsibility to select situations and cases to pursue, as well as situations 
and cases not to pursue.  At the same time, by their very nature and the ‘freedom and 
discretion they afford’, these discretionary powers thrust the independent Prosecutor out 
of the realm of justice and into the realm of politics.  As much as the trigger mechanisms 
of the Court guide the work of the Prosecutor, given the global reach of the Court and, 
therefore, the non-existence of temporal, personal and territorial limitations of the Court, 
the choice of the Prosecutor regarding which situations and cases to pursue will not only 
be seen as politicized but will also be seen as impacting – or impinging – on state 
sovereignty.  Why did states establish an independent Prosecutor who, by the virtue of 
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this independence, can choose what situations to pursue and which individuals to 
prosecute?  More specifically, which actors were the most important in establishing an 




CHAPTER 4: EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR THE INDEPENDENT 
PROSECUTOR: THE CASE OF CANADA AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
 
“Some favour a strong, robust Court; others say they do but clearly don’t; while others say they 
don’t and mean it.  It often depends on who happens to be in power back home at the moment” 
(Ambassador Philippe Kirsch in Weschler, 87). 
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the way in which the policy preferences of 
Canada and the United Kingdom contributed to the support for the establishment of the 
ICC with an independent Prosecutor.  The cases show that the sources of support stem 
from particular formulations of national security interests which originate from domestic 
interest groups – in this case political parties and their leadership in power at around the 
time of negotiating the Rome Statute (RS) and during the process of ratifying the RS.  
These ideational and interest-based formulations of national interests encompassed a 
reformulated conception of state sovereignty which was able to accommodate, and 
support, the establishment of a Court with an independent Prosecutor who is able to 
initiate investigations in addition to state and UNSC referrals.     
 The primary explanatory and causal focus in this chapter is on domestic actors, 
their ideas and interests.  This explanatory focus exemplifies a liberal pluralist and 
constructivist theory of international relations.  In essence, this focus also challenges 
realist and institutionalist explanations.  Realists would argue that Canada and the UK, 
partly due to their very different geopolitical and geostrategic positions, would have very 
different and divergent positions on the independent Prosecutor.  Realists would further 
argue that the UK should have in fact opposed the establishment of the independent 
Prosecutor and should have been more sympathetic to the US position on the matter.  
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Institutionalists on the other hand would posit – with much plausibility – that it was 
mainly democratic states which advocated for the establishment of an independent 
Prosecutor, because an independent Prosecutor was consistent with their domestic legal 
and political institutional practices.  Further in line with institutionalist explanations, one 
can argue that democratic states supported the establishment of an independent 
Prosecutor mostly because these states were satisfied with the institutional checks and 
balances provided by the Pre-Trial chamber.   
 Even though an institutionalist explanation would add a considerable degree of 
clarity to explaining the establishment of an independent Prosecutor, a deeper look at the 
United Kingdom reveals a dynamic which is better explained by way of a liberal pluralist 
and constructivist theory of international relations.  In 1997, just months before the start 
of the Rome conference, the British Labour Party led by Tony Blair won the elections 
and replaced the Conservative John Major in the House of Commons.  Mr. Blair and his 
government’s ‘ethical foreign policy’ were more than sympathetic to an independent 
Prosecutor which would be free from state or UNSC restraint.  According to a number of 
observers in Rome and beyond, this change in government paved the way for a change in 
the policy of the UK.  Liberal pluralist and constructivist theory is better fitted therefore 
to explain the establishment of an independent Prosecutor because realist and 
institutionalists would not afford much explanatory clout to domestic actors and their 
ideas and interests. As the latter theories hold state interests as constant, they are not able 
to explain substantial shifts in policy formation after a change in government.  In the UK 
case, support for the independent Prosecutor came specifically following such a change.   
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      The Canadian case also shows that liberal pluralist and constructivist explanations 
are better suited for explaining the establishment of the independent Prosecutor.  In the 
Canadian case, former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy and the Liberal Party of Canada 
clearly supported the establishment of an independent Prosecutor.  Lloyd Axworthy 
championed the notion of ‘human security’ in the post-Cold War international realm 
which counted individuals as referent objects of security as opposed to states.  The very 
raison d’etre of an independent Prosecutor unencumbered by constraints from states or 
the UNSC was to bring individuals to justice who endangered the safety of others, and 
who were often agents of the governments in conflicts.  The empirical record also shows 
that the official opposition of the day, the Canadian Alliance, openly opposed Canada’s 
ratification of the RS in 2000, the year legislation was introduced to ratify the RS.  
Transcripts from legislative as well as committee debates show that, had the Canadian 
Alliance been in power, Canada would not have been as supportive of the establishment 
of an independent Prosecutor.    
Canada and the International Criminal Court 
In this section the aim will be to discern why Canada supported the establishment of the 
ICC with an independent Prosecutor.  In other words, the aim here will be to uncover 
what Canada’s sources of preference formation were regarding the Court and the 
independent Prosecutor in particular.  It will be argued that domestic actors along with 
their ideas and interests best explain Canada’s support for the Court and the independent 
Prosecutor.  The Liberal Party of Canada’s foreign policy directive at the time involving 
the notion of human security – advocated and championed by the Foreign Minister at the 
time – paved the way for Canada’s support and leadership in establishing a Court with an 
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independent Prosecutor.  Relying on domestic actors and ideas also explains the 
opposition of the more conservative groups to the Court, both ‘across the floor’ in the 
House of Commons, as well as within the Canadian domestic political realm as well.     
In order to fully develop the argument outlined above, ‘human security’ – as a 
Canadian foreign policy principle – will be discussed, which will be followed by an 
exposition of the origins of the human security principle in Canadian foreign policy.  
Finally, light will also be shed on the domestic political debate during the ratification 
process of the Rome Statute, both in the House of Commons and in the Canadian Senate. 
Human Security  
The notion of ‘human security’ became the central tenet of Canadian foreign policy 
during the last decade of the 20th century.  Lloyd Axworthy, Canada’s Minister of 
Foreign affairs at the time, noted during an interview that Canada’s support for the 
independent Prosecutor and the ICC in general “began with the commitment to human 
security as the underpinning conception of foreign policy” (Axworthy, Interview).   The 
changed nature of warfare – shifting in type from inter-state to intra-state type – showed 
that “protection of people is as important as protecting nation states.  State rulers were 
becoming predators on their own people, and the international system based on nation- 
state sovereignty was not capable at that to hold them accountable” (Axworthy, 
Interview).  Yet before embarking on a substantial exposition of Canadian foreign policy 
with respect to the ICC, an outline of the notion of human security is also warranted.  
The treaty ending the ‘Thirty Year War’ in Europe in the 17th century, the Treaty 
of Westphalia, entrenched not only the state as the only legitimate ruling entity within a 
particular territory, but also the notion of state sovereignty.  State sovereignty, or the 
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inviolability of the state as the only entity which could exercise control, power and force 
within a particular territory, was seen as sacrosanct.  By extension, the protection of the 
security of the state was seen as sacrosanct. More specifically, state security was seen as 
a function of the state providing security for its subjects in exchange for an explicit and 
‘free’ adherence to, and participation in, this arrangement by the population of the 
particular state.  Thus, “the state’s ethical claim to primacy in security rested on a 
notional bargain whereby individuals traded their individual sovereignty for protection 
against both domestic and international anarchy” (McFarlene and Khong, 6).   
 Approaching the 20th century, such events and dynamics as mass conscription 
and the industrial revolution – and with it the improvement of weapons production 
techniques, the improvement of communication as well as advances in airpower – 
contributed to a need for a different conceptualization of security.  Decolonization aided 
this process as well, as “weak states were frequently captured by elites who used the 
state’s resources in order to enrich themselves at the expense of the security and well- 
being of their citizens” (McFarlene and Khong, 7).  Simultaneously, the bipolar world of 
the Cold War encouraged a ‘confrontational’ security climate in international relations.   
With the end of the Cold War, and the advent of globalization, it became clear to 
the international community that the old conceptions of national security and sovereignty 
could not be sustained anymore.  The processes and dynamics of globalization alone 
which exposed the state further to economic, social and political processes showed that it 
was difficult to support a purely ‘statist’ conception,  not only of security but also, state 
sovereignty.  In the post-Cold War context, the size of civilian casualties, the “rapid 
proliferation of small arms” along with “the growing salience of civil war, and the 
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significance of ethnicity and identity in these wars”, and the phenomena of “weak and 
collapsing state structures that were unable to cope with the effects of war on civilian 
populations [with the effects of] starvation, disease-related death, and mass 
displacement” all further contributed to the urgent need to reconceptualise security 
(McFarlene and Khong, 8-9). 
 The phenomena of ‘failing’ or ‘failed’ states, in which the security of individuals 
was directly endangered by agents of the state, compelled members of the international 
community to call for the protection of these individuals.  Hence the principle of ‘human 
security’ was born, originating within the UN system – the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) in particular – in 1994.  Concurrently, the notion of humanitarian 
intervention was brought to the fore as well, including the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
(R2P) doctrine.  Among practitioners and scholars, the main concern was to strike a 
balance between sovereignty and human security, and understanding under what 
conditions intervention is acceptable.  
Lloyd Axworthy, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs noted the following:  
“At a minimum, human security requires that basic needs are met, but it also 
acknowledges that sustained economic development, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development 
and social equity are as important to global peace as arms control and 
disarmament” (Axworthy, 184). 
 
Axworthy, addressing an American audience at the Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars in Washington, further noted that “no longer are we limited to 
discussions of states’ rights and national sovereignty. This shift in language reflects a 
change in perception – a recognition that the needs of individuals must be our principal 
concern” (Axworthy, 2000). Shifting the subject of security from the state to the 
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individual carried with it a broadening of the understanding of not only who may pose a 
threat but also who may provide security for the individual.  By extension, the concept of 
human security played a key role in not only establishing the ICC with an independent 
Prosecutor but also in animating Canada’s advocacy, championing and leadership of the 
Court as well.    
Canadian Foreign Policy and Human Security  
The Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s may be characterized as multilateralist while 
attempting to maintain an overall geopolitical role and image as a ‘middle power’.  In 
1997, right before participating states were gearing up for the Rome conference, the 
Liberal Party of Canada was re-elected.  The Liberal Party, a party more on the center-
left of the political spectrum, was in majority in the House, and the Reform Party, a more 
right of center party – which later was renamed the Canadian Alliance – formed the 
official opposition.  In the House, the New Democratic Party of Canada along with the 
Bloc Quebecois were also represented.25  The Liberal Party, but more specifically Lloyd 
Axworthy, was very much in support of the ICC and was also the champion and main 
advocate of the ‘human security’ agenda.  In an in-person interview in New York, 
William Schabas, a member of the NGO, ‘Coalition for an International Criminal Court’ 
(CICC) who attended the Rome conference noted that “the Liberals were more amenable 
to a world view – a Pearsonean world view,” which included an emphasis on diplomacy, 
peacekeeping and a certain intentional distance from the foreign policy of the US.26 At 
the same time, within the domestic political context, the Canadian Alliance was very 
                                                     
25
  “Members of Parliament.” Parliament of Canada. House of Commons, 2000. Web. 31 Jan. 2011. 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Parliamentarians/en/members?parliament=36   
26
 Schabas, Dr. William. Personal Interview. New York. 05 April 2011.  
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much in opposition, if not to the ‘human security’ agenda specifically, then to the 
perceived diminished notion of Canadian national sovereignty.   
 The principles of human security permeated Canadian foreign policy in many 
respects.  Most notably, the principles of human security were imbedded in Canada’s 
values-based support of the ICC, and Canada’s initiative to ban anti-personnel land mines 
as well.  Human security was also at the heart of establishing the landmines treaty which 
was “passed with 155 votes for, none against, and 10 abstentions, [and] resulted in the 
prohibition of land mines to ‘non-state entities, such as revolutionary parties,” and 
instituted a ban on “the deployment of landmines in intrastate conflicts” (Ibid., 188).  In a 
more institutionalized sense, Foreign Minister Axworthy and his Norwegian counterpart, 
Knut Vollenbaek, signed the so-called Lysoen Declaration in 1998, which paved the way 
for the Human Security Network as well as the Commission on Human Security and a 
Trust Fund for Human Security at the UN.27 Therefore, with Canada at the helm, along 
with other ‘like-minded’ states, the principles of ‘human security’ were becoming more 
institutionalized and to some extent legalized.     
The human security agenda found resonance in the establishment of the ICC with 
its emphasis on individual criminal responsibility, the primacy of the rule of law over 
force, accountability for crimes and the support of peace efforts.  Furthermore, in the 
mid-1990s, Canada was seen as having the “capacity and the credibility to play a 
leadership role in support of human security in the developing world [because] Canada 
has sought to improve international governance through, inter alia, democratization, 
respect for human rights, and the peaceful resolution of disputes” (Axworthy CICC – 
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184).  This leading role fit very well with Canadian diplomatic tradition, which sought 
“active support for multilateral efforts to develop and strengthen international institutions 
capable of enhancing global security…since the Second World War” (Donaghy, 47).  In 
the 1990s in particular, “as a middle power free of the ‘baggage of colonialism” and 
skilled in forming alliances with ‘like-minded countries’, Canada had “both the capacity 
and credibility to play a leadership role” (Donaghy, 43).   
Canada’s support for the ICC also included practical considerations, 
considerations born out of experiences with the Tribunals.  Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon 
noted an unnamed source within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade (DFAIT), that for Canada, “a permanent Court is preferable to ad hoc 
arrangements on several counts.  The former is more cost-effective than the latter.  Ad 
hoc arrangements provide a more selective form of justice because a political body 
determines when they can act and what their mandate will be” (Riddell-Dixon, 1070-
1071). With the ICC fully operating, Canada “would not want to see alternatives to the 
[ICC] established in the future.  Canada does not like the idea of picking and choosing 
between instruments and considers it more effective and more equitable to have one 
principal court to try all cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity” 
(Riddell-Dixon, 1071).  
The Canadian Domestic Debate 
Further insight will be gained into the struggle to establish – but more importantly to 
permanently institutionalize – an independent Prosecutor, and with it an independent 
international criminal court, by examining the contours of the Canadian national debate 
on these matters.  More specifically, in this section light will be shed on the extent to 
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which Canadian domestic political actors contributed to the establishment of the ICC 
with an independent Prosecutor.  In order to provide a revealing discussion of the 
domestic debate and of the role of domestic actors in the debate and decision making, the 
narrative will begin with a discussion of the domestic debate prior to the Rome 
conference.  Next, a brief exposition of the stages of the passage of the bill – Bill C-19, 
the ‘Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act’ – in both Houses of the Canadian 
Parliament will follow.  This sub-section will be brought to a close with a discussion 
about the debates of the bill in both Houses of Parliament, along with an outline of the 
attitudes of Canadian civil society groups.  The discussion will then show two particular 
phenomena critical for this analysis.  First, the debates in the House of Commons during 
the third reading of the Bill will show that the Official Opposition of the day, the 
Canadian Alliance and the Reform Party,28  vehemently opposed the Bill.  These parties 
suggested that they would not vote for it.29  There was a very clear ideational divide 
between the more conservative members of the Houses of Parliament and the Liberal 
Party supported by the New Democratic Party and the Bloc Quebecois.  Both camps 
publicly acknowledged the fact that in a different parliamentary climate the Bill would 
not have passed.  The second key point is that these debates and testimonies underpin the 
overall argument in this work, which is that it was domestic actors and interest groups 
which helped pass implementing legislation in Canada which gave way to the ratification 
of the Rome Statute.  It was also key domestic groups – in Parliament and in Canadian 
society as a whole – which vehemently opposed the passage of the Bill.  As the 
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conservative members of parliament and members of civil society indicated, had they 
been in power, the Bill would have been repealed, which effectively would have, at least, 
stalled the ratification process.   
 ‘All Roads Lead To Rome’ 
Immediately before the Rome conference, the House of Commons Standing Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met on Tuesday, June 9th, 1998.  Its 
committee members heard from some of the members of the delegation which would 
eventually represent Canada at Rome.  This delegation included members of DFAIT, the 
Department of Justice, the university community, members of NGOs, the Women’s 
Caucus on Gender Justice in the ICC, and the Unitarian Universalist Association.  
Members of Parliament also heard from think tanks such as the International Centre for 
Human Rights and Democratic Development and the International Centre for Criminal 
Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy.   
 The over six-hour discussion included the outlining of the positions of a number 
of stakeholders, including the Canadian position on the Court itself, the NGO 
community, the gendered perspective on the Court, as well as responses and concerns 
from Members of Parliament.  The discussion included questions and answers regarding 
the rules and procedures in Rome which led to a very brief yet crucial discussion on the 
main negotiating tactics Canada had been employing to that point in time.  The 
discussion also highlighted the need for such legislation in Canada because, at the time, 
“the Minister of Justice decided to no longer undertake proceedings in Canada for crimes 
of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes when these crimes were committed 
outside the country” (Schabas, 6).     
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 Mr. Allan Kessel, the Director, United Nations, Criminal and Treaty Law 
Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade spoke of the success of 
the Canadian delegation in the process up to that point, but he also shed light on the 
complexities, and perhaps of the uncertainties, of the negotiation process to come in 
Rome.  Mr. Kessel explained that “we’re very optimistic going into this process.  We’ve 
worked long and hard, and yes, the text is 172 pages long and has 1,300 brackets, but at 
the end of this process we expect to have an independent and effective court based upon a 
workable statute”.30 Mr. Kessel also pointed to the issue of timing of the establishment of 
the Court.  He elaborated on the reasons why the timing of the Court – in 1998 – was 
correct: “realistically, there’s only one chance to build a court that is universal, 
independent and truly effective, and that time is now.  If we had stood in this room five 
years ago, and you were running this meeting and asked whether it was possible that five 
years from now we would have a court, most people would have said no” (Ibid.).   
Going into the negotiations, Kessel pointed to four major issues that needed to be 
addressed in Rome.  The key points Kessel brought to the fore dealt with the “court to be 
genuinely independent and able to exercise its jurisdiction without running into 
unnecessary obstacles” (Ibid.).   The second point dealt with the UNSC.  Kessel did see a 
role for the UNSC in the work of the Court, but he stated that “the court must not be 
allowed to be paralysed simply because the matter is on the Security Council agenda.  
Some situations have been on it for 30 years, without any action being taken” (Ibid.).    
With regards to “temporary suspension of court activities” due to UNSC involvement in 
certain cases, Mr. Kessel explained that “such suspension should be decided by a positive 
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decision of the Security Council, [and] should not be automatic, and should not be limited 
in time” (Ibid.).  
 Finally, Kessel also referrred to the “issue of the independence of the prosecutor.”  
He stated that “Canada and many other states support a proposal that the prosecutor 
should also be able to initiate proceedings ex officio” (Ibid.).   In his view, the Canadian 
delegation did “not believe that a prosecutor should depend entirely on the initiative of 
states of organizations if indeed the kinds of crimes that we have been discussing have 
been committed” (Ibid.).  The rationale given for an independent prosecutor seemed to 
have been that “considering the high calibre of any prosecutor in such a position, we 
remain wholly unpersuaded by concerns that the prosecutor might somehow not behave 
responsibly.  The independence of the prosecutor is, for us, essential” (Ibid.).  
 In his final comments, Mr. Kessel also focused on the notion of complementarity.  
He explained that “the basic principle is that the ICC will complement, not replace, 
national courts.  This creates a presumption that the prosecutor will be precluded from 
taking any action when a state has a functioning, judicial system, unless the state is 
‘unwilling or unable genuinely’ to carry out the investigation of prosecution” (Ibid.).  
Before closing, Mr. Kessel noted that “we must have a court that is worth having” (Ibid.).   
 Following the presentation of the Canadian government and NGO perspectives – 
which were also supportive of the overall initiative to establish the Court – members of 
the Reform Party as well as the Parti Quebecois noted that Canada’s position had not 
been debated in the House of Commons before the commencement of the Rome 
conference.  Bob Mills (Reform) noted that “this has never been debated in the House of 
Commons, where accountable people, elected people, can in fact say what Canadians 
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think about whatever the issue is. So I have a little problem: we sell democracy abroad 
and yet we sometimes seem to have little democracy in Canada.”31  In a similar vein, 
Daniel Turp (Bloc Quebecois) noted that “this issue deserved to be fully debated 
beforehand, in a parliamentary environment.”32  
Next, the Chairman of the Committee, Bill Graham (Liberal) explicitly asked the 
delegation about their negotiation strategy.  While Alan Kessel first noted that “we do 
want an effective and independent court”33, he further noted the following:  
 an objective of ours was to break the solidarity of the P-5.  We did that at 
the last PrepCom.  We now have the UK inside the tent, not outside … 
Also, with the UK as the head of the European Union this time around, we 
have the presidency of the European Union, plus one of the P-5, inside our 
tent looking at the French outside the tent… We’re optimistic that we can 
continue to erode the solidarity of those who don’t like this particular 
issue, and we are very convinced that at the end of the day if there’s even 
a third of those who don’t care for this court, they will be quiet in the face 
of the two-thirds who do (Ibid.).  
Parliamentary Debates 
In order to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC, and effectively join the ICC, Canada 
needed to pass implementing legislation.  The implementing legislation, Bill C-19, was 
introduced by then-Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy.  After a short, six month period, 
the Bill was adopted by both houses of Parliament in June, 2000.  During this six month 
period, the Bill was read the first time on December 10th, 1999, the second time on May 
8th, debated in committee on June 7th and reported on June 9th, and then read the third 
time in the House of Commons – and passed – on June 13th, 2000.  In the Senate, it was 
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read the first time on June 14th, the second time on June 22nd, was discussed in Senate 
Committee on June 27th and then read the third time – and passed on division on the 
request of Senator Anne C. Cools – on June 28th.34  
Bill C-19 is a form of implementing legislation.  In other words, in order to 
Canada to ratify a bill needed to be passed in order to harmonize Canadian laws with the 
provisions in the Rome Statute.  The Canadian legal practice is that Canada “adopt[s] 
legislation that implements treaties but we don't adopt the treaty.” 35  Once the 
implementing legislation was passed, then Canada could in fact ratify the Rome Statute.  
The Bill was “the first major comprehensive implementing legislation brought forward 
by any legislature around the world…”36  With respect to its content, the Bill also made 
changes to the Criminal Code as well as other legislations.   
The overall debate about Bill C-19 in both houses progressed from a less detailed 
and more conceptual discussion and debate, to a more ‘clause-by-clause’ discussion 
during the later stages of the passage of the bill.  A number of experts who appeared 
before both houses of parliament provided key insight into both Canadian foreign policy 
on the matter, and Canadian law and jurisprudence as well.  For the most part, all parties 
supported the bill, including the Official Opposition, but the latter only in principle.  The 
Canadian Alliance/Reform Party – even after being pressured by a number of other 
parties to change its stance – voted against the bill during its third reading. 
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Debates in the Senate 
The debates in the Senate focused on the procedural aspects of the Bill, and the more 
substantial – or thematic – aspects of it, both in camera and during the committee stage 
as well.  The Senators commented mostly on the speed at which the Bill was aimed to be 
passed and the lack of time afforded to them to debate the contents of the Bill.  They 
noted the Bill’s impact on the protection of children, and the ways in which the Bill was 
to be – or not – a model for other countries to follow. The senators also noted the Bill’s 
jurisdictional aspects.37  In general terms, Bill C-19 received widespread support from the 
government and from the official opposition. In Senator A. Reynell Andreychuk’s words, 
“the issues that plague the world will not be solved by Bill C-19, nor by the Rome 
Statute, but they will go a long way towards developing badly needed international 
acceptance of the rule of law with regards to …horrendous crimes.”38  
Debates in the House of Commons 
The debates during the House Standing Committee welcomed a number of different 
experts, including from the United States and Australia.  Those appearing in front of the 
Standing Committee commented on the utility as well as substance of the bill.  The 
testimony of one particular individual, Gwendolyn Landolt, the then-National Vice-
President of REAL Women of Canada, was quite telling of the attitudes of the more 
conservatives groups in Canada regarding the Court.  Her testimony is recounted below. 
The testimony is important as it sheds light on the sharp, wider ideological divide 
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between the Liberal government, and those on the conservative ‘right’ who were only 
supporting the bill in principle, and who wanted in fact to repeal the bill.  The testimony, 
in no uncertain terms, also shows that a different party in government would not have 
enacted the bill altogether.  
In addition to Ms. Landolt’s not only ideological but also quite threatening 
remarks, the remarks of the Members of Parliament representing the Canadian Alliance 
and the Reform Party were equally critical.  These elected officials, via their foreign 
affairs critic, Gurman Grewal, commented on what they considered the nauseating speed 
by which this legislation was being led through Parliament, as well as on adverse effects 
of this legislation on Canadian national sovereignty.  During the second reading of the 
Bill in the House of Commons, Grewal noted that the “Canadian Alliance supports the 
bill in principle.  We believe it is a good initiative, a step forward, but we do not agree 
with the contents of the bill.”39 He noted that the Canadian Alliance was “committed to 
protecting national sovereignty, which is very important and which could be at stake” 
(Ibid.).  In the same speech, Grewal noted that “the permanent international body may 
become unaccountable and may override the sovereignty of a nation’s legal and 
government systems” (Ibid.).  Echoing Grewal’s words, John Reynolds noted that “the 
Canadian Alliance favours the prosecution of individuals who commit genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.  At the same time, we are very conscious of the need 
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to protect our own sovereignty and want assurances that this will be built into Bill C-
19.”40  
The mantra from the Canadian Alliance was quite similar all throughout the 
committee stage of the Bill in the House of Commons.  On the second day of 
deliberations on May 16th, 2000, Deepak Obhrai noted that “one of the major concerns 
that come around here is that Canadian sovereignty and the laws of Canada and the 
ability of Canada itself and the Parliament of Canada to maintain the democratic voice of 
the Canadian people.  How much infringement is there on that?”41  During the same 
debate, Obhrai noted that the concern is that “somebody from outside is going to take 
over” (Ibid.). To illustrate his point, Obhrai noted the example of Zimbabwe, where white 
farmers were being killed because of their race.  His question was regarding who would 
be prosecuting these individuals.  In his conception, “the local laws of that country should 
be prevailing to do that…” (Ibid.).  
The overall response of the government – and an alternative view of sovereignty - 
to Obhrai’s questions was illustrated by Warren Allmand, who noted the following:   
“state boundaries should never protect people who commit genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes.  The very idea that you can hide behind state 
boundaries or use state sovereignty to permit you to commit these crimes is an outdated 
notion.  Sovereignty is not an unlimited concept … the new policy on human security 
that’s being promoted in Canada and other countries of the world recognizes that the 
international community has a right to intervene when the security of individuals is being 
attacked.”42  
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In a similar vein, Bruce Broomhall, then of the Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights, noted on the third day of deliberations in the House Standing Committee that the 
Rome Statute contains “the best balance between sovereignty and international justice 
that the world community was ready for at the time.”43  He further explained that the 
“ICC is a balance between sovereignty and the needs of effective international justice.  
As such, it requires intensive cooperation from states if it is going to be effective as an 
institution” (Ibid.).   
The Canadian Alliance and the Reform Party were never satisfied with these 
assurances.  During this last – and extremely revealing – debate on May 29th, 2000, 
Grewal noted that the manner in which Bill C-19 was introduced in parliament and was 
pressed through “is a disgrace to Canada’s democratic institutions and the spirit of 
openness and accountability which Canadians deserve.”44  He noted that the Canadian 
Alliance would add a clause stating that “notwithstanding anything in this act, Canada’s 
national sovereignty is to be protected,” and “international law is not to be permitted to 
supersede Canadian law” (Ibid.).  In his opinion, the “bill is full of holes and may 
threaten our national security” (Ibid.).  Grewal forcefully noted that he “would 
recommend that an Alliance government would repeal Bill C-19 so that the work that 
needs to be done actually gets done” (Ibid.).  Svend J. Robinson, the then-leader of the 
NDP, also noted “the member said that a Canadian Alliance government would throw out 
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Bill C-19, that it would scrap Bill C-19, that it would repeal Bill C-19.”45  At the end of 
the debate, and during the parliamentary voting on the matter, the Canadian Alliance was 
the only party out of five which opposed the bill – and voted against it – during the final 
vote.  Bill C-19 was passed by a 224-36 vote on June 13th, 2000.46  
Comments by Civil Society Groups  
In the midst of the debate on Canada’s position on the Court and on its implementing 
legislation, several civil society groups contributed to the overall discussion.  Before 
leaving for Rome, a number of groups appeared before the House Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs in order to outline their position on the ICC.  These groups included 
NGOs focusing on gender issues, and faith-based groups.  In general terms, all these 
groups were in favour, not only of Canada’s support of the Court, but also of the Court 
itself.  Naturally, each group also outlined their own general positions with respect to the 
ICC.  The World Federalist Movement, for example, focused, among other issues, on 
disarmament.  The Women’s Caucus on Gender Justice focused on promoting gender 
sensitivity, criminalizing sexual violence and attempting to steer the Court towards 
gender balance and expertise.  Finally, the Unitarian Universalist Association focused on 
infusing language concerning spirituality in the preamble of the Rome Statute.   
During the debates in the House of Commons, a member of the conservative 
REAL Women of Canada spoke.  The comments emanating from this organization were 
quite significant and telling as they outlined a very different vision of the ICC.  
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Gwendolyn Landolt represented REAL Women of Canada.  The organization in general 
terms describes itself as “a pro-family conservative women's movement.”  Its aim is to 
“promote the equality, advancement and well-being of women whether in the home, the 
workplace, or the community, and to motivate government to integrate the needs of the 
family into government policy and legislation.”47   
Landolt told the committee that the ICC “is a gender court”, and that the 
“prosecutor, who no doubt will have a feminist bias, since the feminists’ control of this 
ICC is apparent, will insist that it include a worldwide right to abortion on demand.”48  In 
her prior comments, Ms. Landolt, told the Committee that “the prosecutor unfortunately 
makes up complaints on the individuals and groups anywhere in the world, and there is 
no accountability under this statute” (Ibid.). She also commented on the apparently ‘less-
than-transparent’ way in which the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the persona of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister “control the entire situation with 
regard to Canadian delegations” (Ibid.).  She told the committee that “you’re only told 
what the Department of Foreign Affairs chooses to let you know” (Ibid.).  Her last words 
during her first intervention were, “if those who are on the Liberal side say, “That’s okay, 
we’re getting what we want”, think a minute.  Some day you won’t have a Liberal 
government in power.  It’s always possible.  There may be another government that will 
reverse this” (Ibid.).  
Overall then, most of the civil society groups were more than in support of 
Canada’s position with regards to the ICC.  They clearly supported the establishment of 
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the Court.  However, comments by members of the Canadian Alliance and those of 
Gwendollyn Landolt of REAL Women of Canada further underpin the notion that 
because of ideological differences, conservative groups – and a conservative government 
– would have been opposed to the Court.  
The Case of the United Kingdom 
The case of the United Kingdom is crucial for a discussion regarding the establishment of 
the independent Prosecutor and the establishment of the ICC.  During the pre-Rome 
process, the position of the United Kingdom was very much in line with other permanent 
members of the UNSC.  The aim was to achieve a strong role for the UNSC in referring 
situations to the Court.  In 1997 however, the change in government in the UK signalled a 
fundamental change in position.  The foreign policy of the incoming Labour government 
headed by Prime Minister Tony Blair introduced a more ‘internationalist’ agenda.  This 
agenda included not only a support for the establishment of the ICC but also for 
establishing an independent Prosecutor.  According to a number of key negotiators, the 
decision of the UK – and later of France – to deviate from the ‘Permanent five’ on the 
issue of an independent Court – tipped the scales towards achieving the four cornerstone 
positions of the ICC, which explicitly included the establishment of an independent 
Prosecutor.  With the advent of the change in government in the United Kingdom, the 
state-consent regime embodied by state and UNSC referrals – as opposed to a referral by 
an independent Prosecutor – changed dramatically to a position supporting a lesser role 
for the UNSC and the establishment of an independent Prosecutor as well. The discussion 
below therefore will focus on highlighting the shift in the position of the government of 
117 
 
the UK in the wake of a substantial foreign policy change due to a change in government 
in Westminster.  
  
The United Kingdom and the Pre-Rome Process 
Under the leadership of the Conservative party in the time period prior to the Rome 
conference, the UK’s policy towards the ICC and the Prosecutor was very much in line 
with the perspectives and positions of the other permanent members of the UNSC.  
During the 46th session of the International Law Commission (ILC) of the United 
Nations, held between May 2nd and July 22nd, 1994, Derek William Bowett, the 
representative of the UK government, commented, among other topics, on the definition 
of crimes – including the crime of aggression – as well as on the proper role of the UNSC 
in referring situations to the Court.49  With respect to the role of the UNSC, Bowett noted 
that even though the UNSC should be able to ‘refer cases’ to the Court, the reaction of 
governments to the initial draft statute was such that it was more prudent “not to refer 
specific complaints against specific, named individuals, but to bring to the attention of 
the court situations which warranted the opening of an investigation” (Ibid.). The actual 
investigation would essentially “be conducted by the Procuracy, [of the Office of the 
Prosecutor] which would decide whether an indictment should be brought against a 
named individual.”  He noted further that “it would be for the Procuracy, in accordance 
with normal procedure, to identify individuals who should be charged with 
responsibility” (Ibid.).   Overall, Bowett’s comments were quite consistent with the way 
in which the initial statute of an international criminal court was envisaged.  Even though 
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the powers of the UNSC with respect to referring ‘cases’ to the court were curtailed, the 
Council still retained an important role with respect to referring ‘cases’ – and later 
situations – to the court.   
In Bowett’s comments, one is also able to see how attempts to limit the 
politicization of the role of the UNSC – and the court in general – were being opposed.  
With respect to the role of the Prosecutor at this early stage of statutory development, 
‘independence’ was only envisaged once particular cases or situations were referred to 
the Court.  The role of the Prosecutor was equated with the role – and powers – of the 
two tribunals originating from within the United Nations system.  Overall, at this stage of 
statutory development, an independent Prosecutor who would be able to initiate 
investigations on his or her own accord was not envisaged.  ‘Independence’ of the 
Prosecutor was seen as a function of professional conduct, and only once a ‘situation’ 
was in fact referred to the Court.          
During the first two Preparatory Committee meetings in 1996, Christopher Keith 
Hall, then the legal counsel for Amnesty International, noted that “the United Kingdom, 
emphasized the primary right of states to bring criminals to justice, the integration of the 
concept of complementarity in all aspects of state cooperation with the ICC, and an 
exceptional and restricted role for the ICC” (Hall 1997, 182).  This interpretation of the 
principle of complementarity meant that states and the UNSC would play a predominant 
role in referring cases to the ICC.  The Prosecutor would not be afforded independent 
powers for initiating investigations on his or her own accord.   
 In 1997, during the third and fourth Preparatory Committee meetings, the position 
of the United Kingdom changed, in no small part because of the change in government.  
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By this time, Hall noted that “for the first time one permanent member, the United 
Kingdom, stated that, although it has always been mindful of the burden on the 
prosecutor for having to act on his or her own initiative, it was now listening closely to 
what other delegations had to say about this proposal” (Hall 1998, 132). In a similar vein, 
while appearing before the Canadian Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade on June 9th, 1998, Mr. Warren Allmand, the then-President of the 
International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development noted that “the 
United Kingdom …changed its position following the last election in the United 
Kingdom.”50  Finally, a third source noted that “during the December 1997 preparatory 
committee session…the U.K. confirmed its decision to oppose the provision in the draft 
statute that would require prior approval by the Security Council before the court could 
proceed with investigations and trials. This change of policy by the U.K. ultimately led to 
it joining the Like-Minded Group” (Washburn and Benedetti, 16).   
On the domestic political front, in 1997, the British Labour Party headed by Tony 
Blair won the general elections in the United Kingdom, replacing the Conservative 
government of John Major.  With respect to the foreign policy of the Labour party, three 
key characteristics may be identified: “an activist philosophy of ‘interventionism’, 
maintaining a strong alliance with the US and a commitment to placing Britain at the 
heart of Europe.”51 In more particular terms, “Tony Blair’s adoption of an interventionist 
foreign policy was set in motion by the 1999 Kosovo crisis, during which he made his 
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now famous ‘Chicago speech’, unveiling a ‘doctrine of the international community’.”52 
Blair noted in Chicago that “we are witnessing the beginnings of a new doctrine of 
international community…the explicit recognition that today more than ever before we 
are mutually dependent, [and] that national interest is to a significant extent governed by 
international collaboration.”53 In addition, it was also the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, 
“who proposed in the first few weeks of the new Labour Government to inject ‘an ethical 
dimension’ into British foreign policy, most notably through what he proclaimed would 
be greater attention to human rights issues.”54 Cook’s explicit aim was to get the UK to 
join the so-called ‘like-minded group’ and thrust away from the position of the 
‘permanent 5’ members of the UNSC.55  This way, the UK moved from a position of 
trying to ‘wreck’ the Court to “helping deliver it” (Pace, Interview).  
 The domestic debate in the UK prior to the Rome conference quite clearly 
underlined the domestic – yet divergent – debates regarding the support for the 
establishment of an independent Prosecutor.  In a House of Commons debate on July 
12th, 1996, the Conservative Member of Parliament William Powell noted that the 
government of the UK and the then-Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, Nicholas Bonsor, did “endorse and encourage the establishment of an 
international criminal court.”56  Bonsor noted, however – very much sporting a more 
reserved and ‘luke-warm’ support for the Court, and very much in contrast to the position 
of the incoming Labour government – that issues of efficiency and cost-effectiveness 
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should be at the forefront when establishing the Court.  Bonsor noted that “we must adopt 
imaginative and flexible arrangements for this unique court.  I am afraid that history does 
not give us much encouragement when it comes to being sure that the United Nations 
will get adequate financial support for its operations, in that all too many countries are 
already in default of their payments to the UN.”57  Sir Bonsor further noted that “we must 
be realistic about the sort and extent of court that we wish to set up, and that we much 
limit the cost of doing so” (Ibid.).  With respect to the Prosecutor, Sir Bonsor only 
alluded to the proper qualifications of the individual the Court will choose, noting that 
“the choice of the prosecutor is also of the utmost importance, and we consider it 
essential to find someone for the job with the necessary experience in conducting 
investigations and prosecutions of criminal cases” (Ibid.). 
 In contrast to this fairly lukewarm and reserved support, in the House of Lords on 
June 9th, 1998, Lord Whitty (Larry Whitty, Labour) noted that the “United Kingdom 
Government will strongly support the independence of the prosecutor and the authority of 
that office.  We need to protect that office from political pressure.”58  Lord Whitty further 
noted that “the Government wish[es] to see the prosecutor having independent 
jurisdiction and the court having power to initiate prosecutions without those being 
approved by either the Security Council or the states involved and they should generally 
be free of political interference” (Ibid.).   
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The United Kingdom in Rome 
It was therefore with this new supportive approach that the delegation of the United 
Kingdom entered the negotiations in Rome on June 17th, 1998.  According to the official 
record of the Rome conference, the UK delegation first spoke on Friday, June 19th, 1998, 
during a discussion regarding the articles of the statute which deal with the jurisdiction of 
the Court.  The UK, in fact, brought forward an “alternative proposal regarding the 
acceptance of jurisdiction” (Bassiouni 2005, 145).  During this debate, the UK also 
supported the inclusion of the word ‘situation’ as opposed to ‘case’ in the statute. As 
Elizabeth Wilmshurst noted, “it was not the task of a state to identify a particular offence 
and a particular culprit” (Ibid.).  Three days later, on Monday, June 22nd, 1998, 
Wilmshurst commented on the role of the UNSC59 in referring situations to the Court.  In 
her comments, she noted that “her delegation strongly supported enabling the Security 
Council to make referrals, but agreed that that should be under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations” (Bassiouni 2005, 183). She further noted that “she was puzzled by 
the fears expressed by some delegations that such referrals would interfere with the 
independence of the Court simply because the Security Council was a political body: no 
one had accused the Security Council of interfering with the independence of the 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which had already been in operation 
for some time” (Ibid.).  
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 One of the last comments during the Committee of the Whole originating from 
the delegation of the UK took place on Thursday, July 9th, 1998.  Commenting directly 
on the role of the Prosecutor, Wilmshurst noted that “her delegation was in favour of 
provisions that would support and protect his or her independence and the authority of the 
office.  Appropriate checks and balances should therefore be included to afford such 
protection as States might require in the light of all the provisions of the Statute, 
including the principle of complementarity” (Bassiouni, 304, 2005).     
 On the sidelines of the Rome conference, a number of further developments not 
only underscored the perspective of the UK in the negotiations but also paved the way for 
the inclusion of the proprio motue powers of the Prosecutor in the RS.  Lloyd Axworthy 
noted during the interview that critical for the success of the inclusion of the proprio 
motu clause in what was to become Article 15 of the RS, was the support and influence 
exerted by the then-Foreign Secretary of the UK, Robin Cook. 60   In addition, the 
permanent 5 members of the UNSC seem to have splintered in such a way that France 
and the UK became part of the ‘like-minded group’. As Ambassador David Scheffer, the 
head of the US delegation at Rome, noted in his book “by July 8th, Britain had already 
jumped into the like-minded camp and voiced that group’s primary concerns, which were 
to have an ‘effective’ court built on fundamental principles of independence.  Their view 
translated as support for an independent prosecutor” (Scheffer, 208).  This was significant 
because according to Valerie Oosterveld, member of the Canadian negotiating team in 
Rome, with the split, there was a better chance of the inclusion of the proprio motu 
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clauses in the RS.61  In clear terms, by weakening the strategic negotiating power of the 
‘permanent 5’ of the UNSC and their insistence on a ‘state consent’ regime, the ‘like-
minded group’ were better positioned to keep the proprio motu clause in the RS.   
The Post-Rome Domestic Debate 
The post-Rome domestic debate in the UK followed, for the most part, the same 
legislative trajectory as in Canada – including the relative speed by which the RS was 
passed in both Houses of Parliament.  It was debated in both houses of Parliament, and 
was put to extensive committee scrutiny.  The bill was first introduced in Parliament on 
December 14th, 2000 in the House of Lords, and it received Royal Assent on May 11, 
2001.  In addition, and breaking with prior custom, the bill was also available for 
significant public consultations as well.  In the UK, the implementing legislation was 
named the ‘International Criminal Court Bill’, which, after its passage in 2001 was 
named the ‘International Criminal Court Act’.   
 Research Paper 01/39, entitled ‘The International Criminal Court Bill [HL]: Bill 
70 of 2000 – 2001’ – originating from the library of the House of Commons – outlines a 
number of important topics which were discussed in connection with the Bill.  In the 
House of Lords – the legislative body which first had the opportunity to read and debate 
the Bill – the focus was on territorial issues with respect to the Bill’s applicability on the 
territory of the UK 62 , along with the issues of universal jurisdiction, command 
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responsibility, war crimes, and immunities from the legal reach of the Bill.  The debates 
involving the Labour and Liberal Democratic parties focused on the overall utility and 
moral need to pass the Bill and establish a Court versus the more cautious and 
sovereignty-protecting tone and rhetoric of the Conservative party.  The Conservative 
members drew very clear parallels with the objections of the US to the Court.         
 During the second reading of the Bill in the House of Lords, Lord Howell of 
Guildford, a Conservative Lord, drew attention to the concerns of the US.  In his view, 
the US concerns “provide[s] guidance on where, if anywhere, we should seek to make 
further improvements or air worries on the Bill as currently drafted.”63  His opinion was 
that “the project will not get under way until the US is convinced and on board in this 
vast international undertaking” (Ibid.).  In a similar vein, during the second reading in the 
House of Commons, Crispin Blunt, a Conservative Party Member of Parliament, noted 
that “the United Kingdom and the United States have a proud record of protecting the 
interests of liberty and freedom in the decades since 1945.  The issue is that, in the new 
world order to be policed by the ICC under the mechanisms set up in the Rome Statute, 
there is a threat to our willingness to go on making the contribution in security terms.”64  
Finally, and perhaps the strongest evidence of the Conservative desire seek solidarity 
with the US on the Court, as well as a deep divide between the two political camps, was a 
motion introduced by Lord Lamont of Lerwick on March 20th, 2001, during the 3rd 
reading of the Bill in the House of Lords.   
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Lord Lamont sought to introduce the following language into the Bill: “The 
Secretary of State shall not ratify the ICC Statute before it has been ratified by the United 
States of America.”65  He proceeded to say – in referring to keeping in step with the US – 
that “we are the countries that are very much at risk. We cannot just dismiss the fears that 
have been expressed so widely in the United States.” He then noted that “it is not just a 
question of a so-called ‘conservative’ Congress, as has previously been alleged. There is 
very little Democratic support for the measure” (Ibid.).  Blunt similarly noted in the 
House of Commons that “I believe that the Senate will never ratify the statute.”66  His 
view was that if there was no support for ratification in the US Congress, then there was 
no need to pass any legislation in the UK either. This was a clear indication that a 
Conservative government in London would not pass such a bill.   In the end, after the 
vote on the bill, the Conservative party voted against the bill.  The bill did, however, pass 
with 238 votes for and 90 votes against.67  
Analysis 
Which international relations theory is best suited to explain the preference formation of 
Canada and the United Kingdom towards to the International Criminal Court with an 
independent Prosecutor? In order to provide a satisfactory answer to this question 
neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, historical institutionalism and liberal pluralism 
and liberal constructivism will be considered.  After providing a basic exposition of the 
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aforementioned theories, it will be shown that liberal pluralism and liberal constructivism 
provide the best explanation for preference formation in Canada and the United 
Kingdom.   
 For realists, states are the most important actors within the international realm and 
are thought to be actors which are primarily concerned with the maximization of their 
power.  Power is thought to be a function of material capabilities.  Moreover – and 
importantly for this work – their preferences then are fixed and are uniform across time.   
 Neorealism does not lend itself very well to explaining preference formation 
regarding the ICC in Canada and the United Kingdom.  Preference formation in both 
states was a function of particular domestic interest groups asserting their ideational 
preferences over foreign policy-making regarding the ICC at a particular time period.  
One may be able to argue that the United Kingdom could be viewed, at the very least, as 
a regional hegemon in Europe, which is also a member of the UNSC.  These privileged 
positions could have afforded the UK an immense ability to influence other states to join 
the court.  However, the UK broke with the solidarity of the Permanent 5 members of the 
UNSC when Tony Blair, and the Labour Party, came to power in 1997.  This change in 
government also heralded a change in preference formation in the UK with respect to the 
ICC.  Overall then, the very fact that there was a sharp change in the UK’s policy towards 
the ICC and the Prosecutor points to the argument that neorealism is not very well suited 
for the explanation at hand.    
 Neoliberal institutionalism shares a number of core assumptions with neorealism. 
Both theories hold the state as the most important actor in international relations.  Both 
theories also posit that states are utility maximizers which will attempt to further their 
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own goals within the anarchic international realm.  Power is also very important to both 
theories.  However, with respect to cooperation, states within the neoliberal 
institutionalist conception are more interested in absolute as opposed to relative gains.  
Unlike neorealists, neoliberal institutionalists argue that institutions and international 
organizations in particular are able to condition the way in which states formulate – and 
understand – their own interests.  Institutions are thought to be products of human 
agency, and once established, are able to influence state behaviour because they “reduce 
the destabilizing effects of multipolar anarchy…“ (Jackson and Sorenson, 108).  Because 
of their direct impact on state behavior, institutions then are thought to be able to prevent 
– or dissuade – states from ‘cheating’ or reneging on their promises and obligations – a 
major obstacle to state cooperation within neorealist thought.  Institutions as modes of 
collective action for mutual benefit are shown to demonstrate and assure states that it is 
worth cooperating in order to gain long-term benefits.  Those states which ‘cheat’ would 
be ‘punished’, and will thereby loose the long-term benefits of institutional membership.  
In addition, access to information regarding the intent and behavior of other states would 
further entice states to join and maintain institutions, even within policy areas which may 
be construed as ‘high politics’ such as the security realm, as opposed to only dealing with 
‘low politics’ such as environmental politics and economic cooperation and trade.  In 
sum, in the neoliberal institutionalist conception, “international institutions help promote 
cooperation between states and thereby help alleviate the lack of trust between states and 
states’ fear of each other which are considered to be the traditional problems associated 
with international anarchy” (Jackson and Sorensen, 108)  In addition, institutions 
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“provide a forum for negotiation between states” and “provide continuity and a sense of 
stability” within the international realm (Jackson and Sorensen, 108).  
 Neoliberal institutionalism comes quite close to explaining the creation of the ICC 
with an independent Prosecutor.  The ICC is seen as a hallmark of unprecedented state 
cooperation within the international realm.  The Court – and its Prosecutor – was 
established after a series of ad hoc Tribunals which employed ‘independent’ Prosecutors.  
In addition, Canada and the UK both played key roles within the entire process of 
establishing the Court.  Canada supplied the Chairperson of the Committee of the Whole 
at Rome and was very active during the pre-Rome process.  The United Kingdom was 
also seen as a key member of the ‘like-minded group’, especially once the New Labour 
Party came into power in 1997.  
 This change in government in the UK shows, however, that neoliberal 
institutionalism does not provide a complete explanation.  As Lawrence Weschler notes, 
“in what may have been the single most important development during the PrepCom 
process, in December 1997, Great Britain, under fresh New Labour auspices (with its 
highly valued ‘ethical foreign policy’) swung around the Singapore Proposal.  In doing 
so, Britain became the first and only permanent five member to join what was becoming 
known as the ‘like-minded group’ – a loose coalition of some sixty countries” (Weschler, 
93).  In addition, in the Canadian case, it was the Liberal Party of Canada’s foreign policy 
directive on ‘human security’ which provided the ideational support for the Court and the 
independent Prosecutor.  In either case, had another party been in power – as the 
empirical record shows – support for the Court from these two key states would have 
been less than favourable.  Therefore, because neoliberal institutionalism does not 
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disaggregate the state as an explanatory variable, it stops short of being able to fully 
explain preference formation in Canada and the United Kingdom.   
    Historical institutionalism also provides a useful analytical tool with which to 
explain the establishment of the ICC and the institutionalization of the independent 
Prosecutor in particular.  With the help of this theory, one is able to account for the role 
that the path dependence of long standing institutions – such as regime types, liberal or 
social democracies, or parliamentary systems – play in the establishment of the Court and 
the independent Prosecutor.  Historical institutionalism is premised on the causal 
relevance of historical events – or events taking place in a particular sequence over time – 
and the causal primacy of domestic and international institutions.  As was mentioned in 
Chapter 3, ideas and actors occupy important explanatory roles within historical 
institutionalism.  However, historical institutionalism considers institutions as causally 
more relevant than the actors or ideas which helped establish them.   
 In the case of the establishment of the independent Prosecutor and the ICC, 
historical institutionalism does explain a number of interesting phenomena, especially 
within the cases considered in this work.  With respect to international institutions, the 
ICC along with the Tribunals originated from within the UN system, and they also 
contain elements of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.  In other words, there are a 
number of institutional continuities in relation to the UN as well as the earlier 
incarnations of institutions of international criminal justice.  For example, originating 
from within the UN system means that the way in which personnel are selected by the 
Court – as well as the Tribunals – and the way in which the Court and the Tribunals were 
funded are very much consistent with the practices employed by the UN.  Similarly, the 
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relative independence with which the Prosecutors – beginning with the tribunals at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, and continuing with the ICTY, ICTR – were able to select 
individuals to be brought to justice also provides a sense of continuity between the 
institutions.   
The natural departure between the tribunals and the ICC is in the way in which 
the Prosecutor of the ICC is able to initiate investigations on his or her own accord, 
thereby freeing the Prosecutor from the temporal and territorial constraints that were 
imposed on the Prosecutors of the ICTY, ICTR, IMT and the IMTFE.  The fundamental 
change with respect to the ability of the Prosecutor to initiate investigations on his or her 
accord therefore, was not an institutional inheritance – but, rather, a stark departure – 
from the practices present in the Tribunals.  Historical institutionalism overall however, 
with its emphasis on path dependence, is much better positioned to explain permanence 
than institutional change.   
 Shifting the focus to domestic institutions and their impact, the empirical record 
shows that for the most part, it was liberal, social and newly established democracies 
which supported the establishment of the Court and the Prosecutor, with mostly 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes opposing both initiatives.  It seemed to have been 
the case that ‘regime-type’ mattered with respect to supporting or opposing the ICC and 
the independent Prosecutor. 68   The ‘like-minded group’ which was led by Canada, 
Norway and other well- and long-established democracies, was very much at the 
forefront of this process.  These states were also among the very first ones to ratify the 
Rome Statute as well.  Their willingness to establish international organizations close to 
the likeness of their own domestic institutions – including the general primacy of, and the 
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respect for the rule of law, along with the role Prosecutors play in national jurisdictions – 
further motivated these states to establish the Court and the independent Prosecutor. 
 The above outlined empirical record, however, shows that even though historical 
institutionalism does add to the explanatory calculus, the emphasis within historical 
institutionalism on the causal relevance – and priority – of institutions over ideas and 
actors falls somewhat short in explaining the establishment of the very first permanent 
International Criminal Court and the institution of an independent Prosecutor in 
particular.  Notwithstanding international institutional processes and continuities, without 
explicit domestic support neither the ICC, nor the independent Prosecutor, would have 
been established.  In the case of the UK, the change in government in London in 1997 
signalled a change in policy that is difficult for historical institutionalism to explain. This 
change in foreign policy heralded support from a key UNSC member.   
Without this change, the UK would most likely have aligned itself with the rest of 
the permanent five member of the UNSC which would have dealt a severe blow to the 
likelihood of establishing the Court and, with it, the independent Prosecutor.  In the case 
of Canada, Ambassador Phillippe Kirsch, the head of the Canadian delegation in Rome, 
and the Chair of the Committee of the Whole, noted that “some favour a strong, robust 
Court; others say they do but clearly don’t; while others say they don’t and mean it.  It 
often depends on who happens to be in power back home at the moment” (Weschler, 87).  
It so happened that in Canada, in the UK, and in many other nations in the world, 
sympathetic governments were in power at the particular junction in time.   
 Liberal international relations theory is able to remedy the explanatory gap left by 
neorealism, neoliberalism, and historical institutionalism.  There are two main aspects of 
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liberal international theory that are at the heart of its explanatory force: (domestic) 
preference formation and agency.  According to Madar, the source of state preferences is 
the domestic political realm. Both interests and ideas make up state preferences (Madar, 
37).  Societal groups organize in order to “protect their existing goods and benefits and 
will act to increase them if doing so does not put their existing holdings at risk” (Madar, 
37-38).  In essence within the liberal theoretical frame, interests are perceived in 
conceptual rather than material terms.  The government is often “enlisted” in order to 
protect the interests of particular groups if the group is not able to do so.”  Ideas – the 
other component in preference-formation – are non-material and may encompass ‘justice, 
security and identity’ (Madar, 38).  Preferences regarding identity and justice become 
contested when the particular arrangement upheld for a certain period of time does not 
match the ideational aspects of these notions.   
 Liberal international relations theory also addresses institutions as well. In this 
sense, by ‘institutions’ it is meant “government organizations and laws” (Madar, 39).  
Particular ministries or other administrative units of governments are considered as 
institutions that employ “officials … who have professional expertise in their policy area 
[and] have … interests as well, and they can form policy preferences …” (Madar, 39).  In 
tandem with government, “the preferences of domestic agencies form a context in which 
some demands from domestic groups resonate more strongly than others” (Madar, 39).  
In this sense “representative institutions and practices vary among governments and … 
they, as well as their society’s demands, determine what states seek to achieve” (Madar, 
39).  In essence the satisfying of new or re-emerging social demands explains the 
changing of state interests (Madar, 39).   
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 Turning attention to interdependence, it arises out of the notion that “states pursue 
their preferences in light of the opportunities and constraints created by others, and 
realizing those preferences depends upon group aims, the way they are translated into 
state strategy and the way that strategy meshes with other states’ strategies” (Madar, 40).  
International relations take place on an ‘issue by issue’ basis.  This also means that the 
“international system does not determine conflict or harmony;” rather, it is the way in 
which different interests are able to harmonize their interest (Madar, 40).  Conflict – 
arising over material or ideational considerations – is a function of scarcity or threat.  
With respect to ideas about identity, justice and security, when they are based on 
‘fundamental’ values and beliefs which are contested, conflict is more likely.  When 
values and beliefs are less contested – or there are less than fundamental differences 
between values and beliefs about identity, justice and security – cooperation is more 
prevalent within the domestic as well as international realms. 
 Liberal pluralism thus provides an important addition to the explanatory calculus 
for the establishment of the independent Prosecutor and the ICC as a whole.  By 
venturing beyond the conceptual rigidity of state-level analyses, the theory affords 
domestic-level explanations for the establishment of a truly unique institutional feature of 
the very first permanent International Criminal Court.  In the Canadian case, the nucleus 
of support for the establishment of the ICC, including an independent Prosecutor, 
originated within the Liberal Party of Canada and with Canada’s Foreign Minister at the 
time, Lloyd Axworthy.  The re-formulated notion of state sovereignty based on the 
human security doctrine provided the conceptual background for the establishment of an 
international organization and Court with a near-global reach.  It also provided the 
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conceptual underpinning for the institutionalization of an independent Prosecutor who is 
able to trigger an investigation into a situation within the legal parameters of the Court on 
his or her own accord.  The multilateral foreign policy agenda of the Liberal Party of 
Canada provided the institutional and organizational impetus for the former Foreign 
Minister – supported by the then-Prime Minister as well as the members of the Canadian 
diplomatic corps – to vigorously pursue the ‘cause of the Court’ domestically and 
internationally.  It also provided the motivation for Canadian diplomats to play leading 
roles among nations in supporting the establishment of the Court and the independent 
Prosecutor.  Domestically, the idea of the Court and the Prosecutor – and their meaning 
for state sovereignty and security in particular – found resonance within a number of 
different political parties,  except for the ‘Official Opposition’ of the day, the Canadian 
Alliance / Reform Party of Canada.   
 Within the Canadian context one is able to argue that ideational interests of the 
government in power during the Rome Conference and during the ratification process, 
supported by the DFAIT and the diplomatic corps, provided the means by which Canada 
supported the Court and provide the leadership to other nations in order to support the 
Court as well.  It can also be argued that without the overwhelming support from the 
members of the Liberal Party and the other three parties represented within the Canadian 
federal legislature, Canada’s strong support for the ICC – and its efforts to ratify the RS – 
would have been in jeopardy.  In particular the fact that the members of the Canadian 
Alliance / Reform Party voted against the ratification of the ‘International Criminal Court 
Bill’ suggests that a government formed by the ‘Official Opposition’ of the day would 
have not signalled such an active support for the Court from Canada.  It is further 
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conceivable that a government led by the Canadian Alliance/Reform Party would have 
not ratified the RS, and would have been more sympathetic to the position of the United 
States.  In general terms, members of the Canadian Alliance / Reform Party envisioned 
state sovereignty as a function of territorial and national sovereignty.  In their conception, 
securing the safety and security of an individual still rested within the confines of the 
territorial state.  The notion that an international criminal court with an independent 
Prosecutor would conceivably be able to prosecute Canadians and Canadian soldiers – or 
other military or civilian personnel – was seen as too great a juxtaposition to Canada’s 
national and territorial sovereignty.   
The case of the United Kingdom (UK) also underpins the crucial importance of 
domestic political actors and interests in ratifying the RS, thereby effectively helping to 
establish the ICC and the independent Prosecutor.  The case of the UK is further 
important because it is one of the five permanent members of the UNSC, with equal veto 
powers with those of the US, China, Russia and France.  The fact that the UK, while still 
maintaining some solidarity with the so-called P-5 of the UNSC prior to, and in, Rome, 
abdicated from this grouping of states, and supported the establishment of the ICC and 
the independent Prosecutor in general, affords it a critical and crucial piece within the 
explanatory puzzle of the establishment of the Court and the Prosecutor, in general.   
The main reason why the UK joined the ‘Like-Minded Group’ was in no small 
part because of the success of the New Labour Party led by Tony Blair in winning the 
elections in 1997 and forming the government of the day.  Blair’s emphasis on the 
importance of the international community and solidarity – along with an ‘internationalist 
foreign policy’ – provided the conceptual and ideational motivation for the UK to break 
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ranks with the P-5, join the ‘like-minded group’ and support the establishment of an 
independent Prosecutor.  The more ‘statist’ conceptions of national sovereignty 
advocated in both houses of parliament by the Conservative and Independent Members of 
Parliament were hollowed out by calls from among the ranks of the New Labour and 
Liberal Democratic Party members of Parliament to ratify the RS which included the 
independent Prosecutor.  A government represented by the Conservative Party would 
have been less than enthusiastic in joining the Court with an independent Prosecutor.  
The debates in the houses of parliament in the UK reveal that – once again, as in the 
Canadian case – members of the opposition were more in line with notions of ‘inward 
looking’ views of national sovereignty which placed tremendously more emphasis on 
national security by placing UK nationals – and, as an extension, British territorial 
sovereignty – as objects of national sovereignty.  In addition, these more ‘inward’ 
looking notions of national security and sovereignty were certainly more in line with the 
views expressed and the arguments put forth, by certain groups within the US domestic 
political forum as well.               
Constructivism further adds to the explanatory calculus.  It places an emphasis on 
the ‘socially constructed’ nature of – in this case – international relations.  In this sense 
actors within a social realm, through their repeated interactions create common meaning 
of different practices, principles, norms and values.  At the very same time, through this 
repeated interaction new principles, norms and values are created as well. In this sense 
then ‘sovereignty’, ‘human rights’, ‘security’, ‘humanitarian intervention’, are 
constructed and the most prevalent form of the meaning will be accepted (Barnett, 165).      
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 In the case of Canada the general foreign policy directive of the Liberal Party of 
Canada – mirroring the longstanding view of Canadian foreign policy as a function of 
multilateralism, occupying the position of a ‘middle power’ in global affairs, and also 
occupying a mediating role in international relations – along with an emphasis on ‘human 
security’, advocated by Lloyd Axworthy, can all be explained via constructivism.  The 
primacy of the protection of individuals as opposed to states, which in essence included a 
re-defined notion of state sovereignty, resonated not only with the basic mandates of the 
Court but also conjured up a broad consensus in Canadian political life.  This emphasis 
on the protection of individuals as opposed to other ‘subjects’ resonated very well with 
the way in which Canadians viewed themselves and their place in the world.  This ability 
to self-identify with the basic tenets of the Court – not least with the institution of an 
independent Prosecutor free to initiate investigations on his or her own accord without 
being inhibited by a state – provided Canada with the ability to play a central role in 
establishing the Court.  Identification with the fundamental tenets of the Court also 
provided for a fairly rapid and uninhibited ratification of the necessary legislation which 
helped Canada to accede to the Rome Statute and become a State Party to the Court.    
Members of the Liberal Party of Canada along with the other three out of five 
parties represented in the House of Commons at the time shared in this view of Canadian 
foreign policy.  This particular formulation of foreign policy saw the national interests 
and Canadian national sovereignty being intimately tied to the protection of individuals, 
not only within the territorial borders of Canada but across the globe.  In a number of 
speeches, Lloyd Axworthy rightly pointed out that the protection of individuals from 
harm, but also the prosecution of those individuals who cause harm irrespective of the 
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role they occupy within a national governance structure, was very well tied to the safety 
and security of Canadians within Canada.   
On the other hand, the arguments put forth by Official Opposition of the day, the 
Canadian Alliance / Reform Party were very much juxtaposed to an individual-focused 
foreign policy.  In their formulation, the ‘status quo’ conception of state sovereignty and 
the Canadian national interest was sacrosanct in the case of the independent Prosecutor 
and the ICC in general.  In this more ‘traditional’ or ‘conservative’ view, Canadians 
should have been more concerned with what takes place within the Canadian territorial 
borders as opposed to what takes place ‘far afield’, on the other side of the globe.  In 
particular, Canada should ascertain that it protects its own personnel and that it also 
prosecutes criminals within its own borders.  ‘Contracting out’ Canada’s sovereign right 
to prosecute individuals – Canadians and those of other nationalities – to an international 
organization over which Canada would have very little direct control did not bode well 
with the Official Opposition.  In fact this formulation stood in stark contrast to what the 
Official Opposition conceived of as upholding Canadian sovereignty and the national 
interest.   
In the case of the United Kingdom a similar pattern emerged.  The Labour Party 
of the UK which formed the government envisaged a new role for the UK within the 
international realm.  With the ‘Blair government’s’ embedding of an interventionist 
foreign policy with an ‘ethical dimension’ within a larger ‘doctrine of international 
community’, it was quite clear that support for the ICC and the independent Prosecutor 
was a natural extension of policy.  The often cited change in the view of the UK after the 
change in government in London in 1997 further shows that had another party been in 
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power – mostly likely the Conservative Party – the position of the UK on the matter 
would have been significantly different, especially given its position on the UNSC.  
Similarly, the final parliamentary vote in the House of Commons – where all the 
Conservative Party members along with the Independents voted against the bill by which 
the UK ratified the RS – further shows that had the Conservative Party been in power, the 
UK would not have had such an overwhelming support for the Court and the Prosecutor.     
Deviating from the P-5 in Rome therefore was very signification not only for the 
UK and its support for the ICC but also for the entire process of establishing the Court 
and the independent Prosecutor.  With a splintered P-5 of the UNSC the support for a 
state-controlled ICC and Prosecutor was very much weakened.  It was therefore a 
completely reformulated foreign policy initiative originating from the New Labour Party 
and the Blair government that enabled the UK to support the Court and the Prosecutor.  
The fact that the UK was willing to support an independent Prosecutor despite the fact 
that the UK is a permanent member of the UNSC showed that there was a fundamental 
departure not only in policy but also in thinking about the proper role of the UK in 
international affairs.  Unlike the US, the UK did not hang onto giving the UNSC the final 
say regarding which situations would be referred to the Court.    
  
Conclusion 
Canadian and British activism and support were crucial for the adoption of the Rome 
Statute as well as helping the Statute come into force after ratification.  The Canadian 
delegates were intimately instrumental in ensuring that the Rome Statute was adopted in 
Rome.  The position and work of the UK delegation was also instrumental, primarily 
141 
 
because of the UK being one of the permanent members of the UNSC.  Yet it was the 
ideas the parties in power had about human security, multilateralism, and overall foreign 
policy in both, in Ottawa and London, which served as the nucleus of the positions of 
Canada and the UK.  Lloyd Axworthy, supported by members of the Liberal Party in 
Canada, and Tony Blair and Robin Cook, supported by the New Labour Party in the UK, 
were instrumental in providing the conceptual backdrop for the work of the Court. 
Without their conceptual and principled commitment, and no less with a Conservative 
government in power in both legislatures, the outcome of the domestic ratification 
processes would have been in considerable jeopardy. 
Assessing the possibly of a more symbolic aspect of the ratification process in the 
UK – and later, in Canada – given the UK’s position on the UNSC, if it had not passed 
implementing legislation, and had either stalled the process or would have not even 
ratified the Statute, would in essence have signalled a triumph for, and a return to, 
calculations of ‘realpolitik’ in international criminal justice and humanitarian law.  
Observers and commentators could then argue that power politics ruled the day even 
within this realm of international relations which required a necessary rising above 
considerations of power, posture and might.  In a similar vein, with respect to Canada – 
and the crucial role it played in the adoption of the Rome Statute – stalling or ‘repealing’ 
the implementing legislation would have signalled to other states that perhaps the initial 
commitment was more superficial and related to posture within the international realm as 




CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING OPPOSITION TO THE INDEPENDENT 
PROSECUTOR: THE CASES OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA AND JAPAN  
 
Multilateral diplomacy cannot be conducted with delayed decision making or with spin 
control or military strong-arm tactics (Remarks by Ambassador Scheffer, pg. 229). 
 
Above all, we should avoid being influenced by parochial considerations and insisting on 
viewpoints narrowly circumscribed by our respective national institutions.  After all we 
are not here to decide which of our respective systems of criminal law is the best; we are 
here to work together for the creation of the most appropriate system for an international 
criminal court (His Excellency, Mr. Hisashi Owada, the Head of the Japanese delegation 
at Rome, 1998). 
 
The aim of this chapter is to outline and explain the positions – and therefore opposition – 
of the U.S. and Japan to the independent Prosecutor.  These two states were intimately 
involved in the process that culminated in the establishment of the ICC.  Both the U.S. 
and Japan were fully involved in the PrepCom sessions taking place before the Rome 
conference.  Japan even supplied the Rapporteur for the Committee of the Whole at 
Rome. Yet despite their involvement, both states were opposed to the establishment of an 
independent Prosecutor, and envisaged a substantially different Court than was 
established in 1998.     
 What explains US preference formation – and opposition – to the establishment of 
a Court with an independent Prosecutor? In a similar vein, why did Japan, sporting a 
fairly conciliatory role in Rome, take nearly a decade before it ratified the RS? These 
questions will animate the narrative in this chapter.  The cases of the US and Japan are 
significant because although entertaining somewhat different policies on the Prosecutor 
and the ICC – and given that Japan later ratified the Rome Statute (RS) – they exhibited a 
number of policy aims which clearly indicated their opposition to the Prosecutor.   
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 The nucleus of the US policy regarding the ICC and the Prosecutor was the 
determined aim of policymakers and lawmakers within the domestic political realm to 
protect and shield US service members and civilian leaders from the reach of the Court.  
These aims lay at the heart of not only the US policy during the PrepComs and the pre-
Rome process, but also during the Rome conference as well.  This policy stance also 
serves as a reason for the numerous objections of the US, and lies at the heart of a 
number of concessions it bargained for, and received, at Rome.  Ultimately, the 
objections originated from within US domestic policy, bureaucratic and legislative 
circles.   
In the case of Japan, Japanese diplomats were quite intimately involved 
throughout the process of establishing the Court.  However, when the matter was 
transferred into the hands of domestic law makers and the Japanese bureaucracy, the 
process of acceding to the Court all but went subterranean in Tokyo.  It was not until 
nearly a decade later, when the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, urged by members of the 
Democratic Party of Japan in both houses of the legislature, finally tabled the bill, which 
was unanimously accepted in both Houses of Parliament.   
In the cases of the US and Japan, the sources of opposition and delay in accession 
were very much domestic political actors.  In the US, at the heart of opposition to the 
Court was the Pentagon – or the Department of Defence – along with certain members of 
the US Senate and the US House of Representatives.  In addition one finds a lack of 
policy coordination by a number of departments within the US bureaucracy and, finally, 
the ‘unavailability’ of President Clinton. In the case of Japan, the lengthy delay – 
attributed by some to a very careful legal examination of the proper conditions for 
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accession to the RS – finally ended with the members of the Democratic Party of Japan 
pressing the government to table a motion in both houses of parliament.  The unanimous 
acceptance of the bill in both Houses signalled that the delay by the party in power was 
unnecessarily long, and that perhaps the bill could – and should – have been proposed 
and accepted earlier.   
In order to undertake the discussion and analysis, the narrative will focus on the 
time frame beginning with the 1994 ILC draft for an international criminal court, 
continuing with the ‘ebbs and flows’ of the Rome conference, and culminating with the 
domestic political and policy debate in both states.  The discussion will encompass a 
description of the sources of US and Japanese policy towards the ICC and the 
independent Prosecutor, as well as a description and discussion of the US and Japanese 
strategies in Rome.   
The United States and the Pre-Rome Process 
The US position regarding the independent Prosecutor – and the Court as a whole – was 
underpinned by a ‘state consent regime’ involving the type of jurisdiction the Court could 
exercise.  This so-called ‘state consent regime’ – meaning that the jurisdiction of the 
Court over a situation or an individual would have been contingent on a state giving its 
consent as opposed to the Court automatically assuming jurisdiction – was vehemently 
insisted upon by US domestic policy and political actors. The insistence on state consent 
– cloaked in rhetoric regarding the sanctity of state sovereignty – was quite consistent 
throughout the process of establishing the Court, certainly to the detriment of US success.   
Michael Scharf notes that once the proposal of Trinidad and Tobago was voiced 
at the UN in 1989 to establish an international criminal court, some in the US State 
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Department were charged with making the proposal ‘go away’ (Scharf, 8).  The 
government “proposed that the issue be assigned to the International Law Commission, a 
UN body known for taking several decades to complete its projects. The plan was to stall 
any international debate on the issue” (Ibid.).  By the same token, and referring to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) “there was hope among U.S. policy makers that 
Security Council-controlled ad hoc tribunals would be established elsewhere in the world 
to prosecute crimes against humanity” (Ibid.).  UNSC-controlled ad hoc tribunals would 
not prosecute US servicemembers in any shape or form.  
At this stage, the three government agencies involved, namely the Departments of 
Defence, State and Treasury, were all opposed to a permanent international criminal 
court.  Michael Scharf noted that the State Department was opposed to the initiative 
because of “the International Court of Justice’s adverse ruling in the Nicaragua case, 
which resulted in the United States’ withdrawal from the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court” (Scharf, 98).  The Justice Department was opposed because of “a belief that the 
establishment of an international criminal court (ICC) would undermine the Department’s 
existing international law enforcement efforts, including its controversial unilateral 
authority to apprehend international criminals abroad” (Ibid.). The Department of 
Defence was opposed to the Court due to “the concern that an international court might 
attempt to prosecute U.S. military commanders for internationally controversial action 
such as the 1989 invasion of Panama or the 1986 bombing of Tripoli, both the subject of 
widespread international condemnation”69 (Ibid.).  
                                                     
69
 The Pentagon’s anxiety outlined by Scharf was later reflected in a comment by Senator Jesse 
Helms during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting, held after the Rome conference, and 
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Given, however, the overwhelming support for the Court at the UN and across the 
globe, the US did adjust its perspective on the establishment of the Court.  David 
Scheffer, the head of the US delegation at the Rome conference and the then-Ambassador 
at Large for War Crimes, noted that “on October 13, 1993, the first full-scale meeting 
took place in the State Department to discuss policy toward an International Criminal 
Court.  Almost two weeks later the U.S. National Security Council convened a high-level 
interagency meeting to examine the options” (Scheffer, 169).  The Department of 
Defence wanted to make sure that national prosecutions were by and large prior to the 
jurisdiction and prosecutorial action the Court would or could undertake.  As Scheffer 
noted, if US concerns were addressed, and if the Court would be subordinate to national 
legal jurisdictions then the Pentagon could support the Court (Ibid.).  A month later, 
during a joint Defence and Justice Department meeting, “the lawyer from the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff saw the court as a last resort after the failure of national prosecutions.  
Jurisdictional arrangements must be fixed, he said, but he reconfirmed that in principle 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted an international criminal court” (Ibid.).   
 In 1994 – coinciding with the publication of the ILC draft – the Pentagon had two 
primary aims and objectives with respect to the ICC: first, the so-called Status of Forces 
Agreements (SOFAs) 70  needed to be respected and upheld.  Second, the Pentagon 
supported President Clinton’s positive approach towards the Court as long as the UNSC 
could refer situations to the Court, the primacy of national prosecutions would be 
                                                                                                                                                              
during which Ambassador Scheffer, the head of the U.S. delegation in Rome, was called to testify. 
Weschler noted that Senator Helms was “going to be damned if any so-called International Court was ever 
going to be reviewing the legality of the U.S. invasion of Panama or Grenada or of the bombing of Tripoli 
and to be holding any American president, Defence  secretaries, or generals to account” (Weschler, 111).  
70
 As Scheffer notes, “Criminal investigations and prosecutions of American soldiers deployed overseas are governed 
by the SOFAs, which ensure that U.S. military or federal courts will handle such cases and not the courts of the county 
where the crime allegedly was committed” (Scheffer, 171).  
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sacrosanct, and as long as “genocide would stand apart from war crimes” (Scheffer, 171).  
In the fall of 1994, the draft statute published by the ILC – according to Scheffer – was 
unsatisfactory to US interests. At the same time, however, a number of US concerns were 
in fact addressed by the draft (Scheffer, 173).  During the next phase of the development 
of the Court – from the fall of 1995 onward “the intent of the US was to once again, stall 
the negotiating process until its interests could be accommodated” (Scheffer, 177).    
At this time, both President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeline Albright 
spoke in support of the Court.  President Clinton noted at the opening of the Thomas J. 
Dodd Research Center in Storrs, Connecticut that  
By successfully prosecuting war criminals in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, we can send a strong signal to those who would use the cover of 
war to commit terrible atrocities that they cannot escape the consequences 
of such actions.  And a signal will come across even more loudly and 
clearly if nations all around the world who value freedom and tolerance 
establish a permanent international court to prosecute, with the support of 
the United Nations Security Council, serious violations of international 
law (Scheffer, 177 – 178).  
 
Later on in 1996, Madeline Albright, while testifying before the House of 
Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee, noted the US’ support of the Court but, as 
she explained “‘we are not going to buy a pig in a poke…We will not accept a raid on our 
sovereignty.  The United States is very conscious about our sovereign rights.  The key 
agencies have to feel comfortable” (Scheffer, 179).  In the meantime, an interagency 
meeting took place, organized by the National Security Council, at which it was decided 
that the US would advocate for a diplomatic conference in 1998.  The US supported state 
referral of an ‘atrocity situation’, yet this referral could not come in conflict with a UNSC 
decision (Scheffer, 178). 
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  In 1997, Walter Slocombe, the then-Undersecretary of Defence for Policy, 
reiterated the general US position that a treaty agreed to in Rome would not be accepted 
in the US if it would leave US military or civilian personnel vulnerable to its jurisdiction  
(Scheffer, 184). The reasons for the insistence of the Pentagon on this point were because 
“there [had] been six emergency embassy evacuations in Africa during the prior two 
years; 200,000 American troops were stationed overseas in forty countries; the United 
States was party to almost one hundred Status of Forces Agreements; enforcement 
operations with heavy U.S. commitments had been undertaken against Iraq, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and in Haiti during recent years” (Ibid.).  Mr. Slocombe also suggested that 
he will attempt to drum up the support of ‘foreign militaries’ for the US position (Ibid.). 
 This effort by the Pentagon drew considerable attention in the popular media 
shortly before the Rome conference.  The New York Times reported that “the Pentagon 
urgently called in more than 100 foreign military attaches from embassies” for a 
briefing.71 During the briefing, a memorandum was distributed to the attendees, noting 
that “the U.S. is committed to the successful establishment of a court.  But we’re also 
intent on avoiding the creation of the wrong kind of court” (Ibid.). More specifically, the 
Pentagon warned against the independent powers of the Prosecutor, and it also warned 
against a too broad of a definition of war crimes (Ibid.).  As a follow-up, a team of 
personnel were sent to Europe to further advocate for the US position in key European 
capitals (Ibid.).  Military attaches stationed in Washington also sent messages to their 
respective capitals.  However, Ambassador Scheffer remarked that he “never saw any 
evidence that any government bent its will towards the Pentagon’s demands as a result of 
                                                     
71
 Schmitt, Eric. “Pentagon Battles Plan for International War Crimes Tribunal.” The New York Times, 14 Apri. 1998, 
On-line. http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/14/world/pentagon-battles-plans-for-international-war-crimes-tribunal.html    
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the cable.  Indeed, from what foreign negotiators conveyed to me, the cable only 
strengthened their opposition to us” (Scheffer, 190).   
 Even though the US delegation during the sixth Prepparatory Committee meeting 
declared that it “had not yet taken a position on any state consent regime [and] atrocity 
situations must be made by the Security Council or with council approval if a state party 
referred a situation that the Council already was addressing on its agenda,” President 
Clinton endorsed, once again, the creation of the ICC (Scheffer, 186).  As a result the late 
Senator Jessie Helms, (R-SC) sent a letter to Ms. Albright noting that the statute would 
be ‘dead on arrival’ in the U.S. Senate unless Washington could veto its decisions” 
(Ibid.).  In the letter, Senator Helms placed the ICC on an equal footing with the UN, and 
also sought a US veto of situations being referred to the Court.  Yet, this is not a 
characteristic of international treaties.  The effect then of Senator Helms’ letter was that it 
“alienated 99 percent of the world when he put it that way” (Ibid.).  The nearly permanent 
damage of Senator Helms’ public comments was felt immediately after his statement was 
released: delegations did not see the US as a ‘serious’ participant during the negotiations.  
These delegations equated the opinion of Senator Helms with that of President Clinton on 
the matter.  Participants simply thought that the Senator spoke on behalf of the US 
government, and that his comments on the matter carried near-equal weight to those of 
President Clinton (Scheffer, 188). 
   
The United States at the Rome Conference 
In order to better prepare for the Rome conference, Ambassador Scheffer designed a new 
strategy.  The first point of the strategy was that state consent was required only if the 
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state whose citizen is being charged is not a member of the Court. A UNSC referral 
would override this requirement (Scheffer, 191).  The second aspect of the US strategy 
before the Rome conference was that “the state party that had custody of the suspect 
would not be required to transfer him or her to the court unless the court had determined 
that the case pertaining to the individual was admissible under the complementarity 
regime” (Scheffer, 190).  The purpose of this aim was that the US could in fact ‘refuse to 
cooperate’ with the Court (Ibid.).  The third strategy point was that the US would 
blatantly refuse to cooperate with the Court – even if it ratified the RS – because then the 
matter would be sent to the UNSC where the US would, again, be able to shield itself 
from the reaches of the Court (Ibid.).  
 Prior to leaving for Rome, instead of meeting with the President, who would 
approve the new strategy, Ambassador Scheffer met with Hilary Clinton along, with 
James E. Baker, who was the legal advisor at the National Security Council.  At the 
meeting Baker represented the interests of the Pentagon.  The discussion was moderated 
by Eric Swartz, the multilateral affairs director at the National Security Council 
(Scheffer, 195). At this time, President Clinton was not available for consultations as he 
was preoccupied with the Monica Lewinsky issue, and his upcoming visit to China 
(Scheffer, 195).72 Baker informed Hillary Clinton that the US should hold to its earlier 
position on the Court.  Ambassador Scheffer retorted that holding steadfast to these 
positions would in fact damage the ‘credibility’ of the US.  Ambassador Scheffer also 
                                                     
72
 Ambassador Scheffer notes that the Lewinsky affair and President Clinton’s visit to China in 1998 essentially 
“overshadowed the endgame of the International Criminal Court negotiations, which may not have seemed as important 
at the time in his (or his chief of staff’s) calculus but would prove critical in the coming years in terms of America’s 
standing in the world” (Scheffer, 195).  In fact, Ambassador Scheffer notes that “the Lewinsky scandal grievously 
impaired U.S. national interests because Clinton and his closest aides did not focus enough on matters of state” 
(Scheffer, 195).   
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noted that it was impractical to aim for full immunity of US personnel (Scheffer, 197).73  
However, following this meeting, the instructions for the US delegation heading to Rome 
stayed the same.  This particular position was supported by the Pentagon and was not 
supported by the other two agencies involved in the inter-agency negotiations (Ibid.).  
 At Rome, the US delegation decided that, as a strategy and as its first move, it 
should spell out its opposition to the Prosecutor in no uncertain terms.  Ambassador Bill 
Richardson delivered the initial speech of the US delegation outlining the US position.  
Meanwhile, back in Washington, the age-old resistance was still present: the US would 
support the establishment of the Court only if a total guarantee could be obtained that US 
citizens would not come under its jurisdiction.  Ambassador Scheffer’s words reflected 
the overall US position at the outset of the conference.  He noted in an interview with 
Lawrence Weschler of The New Yorker that:  
 
The American armed forces have a unique peacekeeping role, posted to 
hot spots all around the world.  Representing the world’s sole superpower, 
American soldiers on such missions stand to be uniquely subject to 
frivolous, nuisance accusations by parties of all sorts.  And we simply 
cannot be expected to expose our people to those sorts of risks.  We are 
dead serious about this.  It is an absolute bottom line for us (Weschler, 
92).     
  
During the second week of the conference, the US delegation advocated – with 
certain success – the ‘complementarity proposal’.  According to this proposal, the Court 
would be ‘complementary’ to national jurisdictions in that national jurisdictions would be 
given the first attempt to bring perpetrators to justice.  If the national jurisdictions were 
                                                     
73
 Ms. Clinton’s last words to Ambassador Scheffer were an acknowledgement that Abassadors Scheffer’s work in 
Rome will be a difficult one.  Ambassador Scheffer correctly interpreted this as support for the position of the Pentagon 
as opposed to his position.  Later on, as Senator from New York, Ms. Clinton voted for the American Service-
Members’ Protection Act “which was a blunt assault on the International Criminal Court that penalized (e.g., by 
withholding economic or military assistance). 
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deemed to be ‘unable or unwilling’ to prosecute, that would then trigger the jurisdiction 
of the Court through appropriate legal processes.  Complementarity in essence became 
one of the cornerstones of the RS (Scheffer, 202).  
During this week, the US delegation also circulated a ‘detailed paper’ discussing 
its objection to the independent Prosecutor.  In this document the US laid out its main 
objections not only to the ability of one individual to initiate investigations, but also to 
the position of states which supported the establishment of an independent Prosecutor.  
The so-called ‘Statement of the United States Delegation Expressing Concerns Regarding 
the Proposal for a Proprio Motu Prosecutor’ published and disseminated on June 22nd, 
1998 began with a discussion regarding the type of referrals that should be made in the 
first place.  The US delegations noted that cases as such should not in fact be referred to 
the Court by states, nor the UNSC, nor any other organization.  The delegation called for 
the referral of ‘situations’ instead.  In their view, “it must lie with the Prosecutor to 
determine whether a crime has been committed and by whom.”74  The statement then 
focuses on one of the foundational aspects of the Rome Statute.  Namely, it notes that in 
the preamble of the Rome Statute, the mandate of the ICC is “to exercise jurisdiction only 
over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.” 
Given the fairly ambiguous definition of some of those crimes, the US delegation was of 
the opinion that there had to be a firmer benchmark regarding what constituted such a 
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 The US delegation at this point was aiming to convince other delegations that the way the Prosecutors of the ad hoc 
tribunals were functioning was the proper way to proceed with respect to the role of the Prosecutor of the ICC as well.  
In the case of the ad hoc tribunals, the particular situations – given the territorial and temporal parameters of the 
conflicts – were referred to the Prosecutor via the UNSC.  Then the Prosecutor – on his or her own accord – was able to 
decide on and pursue cases against individuals he or she deemed most appropriate to prosecute.  In the case of the ICC, 
the jurisdictional parameters are not limited at all.  The Court has territorial and personal jurisdiction all across the 
globe.  Therefore, the ability of the Prosecutor of the ICC to initiate investigations on his or her own accord – 
especially with respect to the position of the US – was seen as a grand departure from practices observed at the level of 
the ad hoc tribunals (US Statement June 22nd 1998).  
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crime.  In their opinion one individual cannot, and should not, be made responsible for 
determining such a definition (Ibid.).   
 The US delegation then attempted to dismiss at least two particular arguments for 
the institution of a proprio motu Prosecutor.  First, and as noted by Ambassador 
Wenaweser, a number of state delegations opined that states in the past were less than 
willing to refer other states to international human rights bodies due to fears of 
retaliation.  The US delegation noted that this argument is ‘entirely cynical’, and that “the 
United States and other States…worked hard to establish and support the work of the ad 
hoc tribunals, and which are in Rome to facilitate future prosecutions through the 
establishment of a permanent court” (Ibid.).  In further stressing its point, the US 
delegation pointed to a “variety of legal, political, practical and resource difficulties” 
which will enable states – unlike in the past – to “take on national prosecutions of 
atrocities committed thousands of miles away” (Ibid.).  Second, the US delegation also 
addressed the concern of some states that UNSC referrals would politicize the work of 
the Court, and that the institution of an independent Prosecutor would in fact be more 
impartial (Ibid.).  According to the delegation, there were no possible ways to guarantee 
that international organizations – such as the ICC – or states for that matter will not in 
fact act based on political calculations and place undue political pressure on the 
Prosecutor (Ibid.).   
The delegation then turned the proverbial ‘tables’ on the issue of the politicization 
of the work of the Prosecutor and noted that state and UNSC referral “has a ‘political’ 
component which is beneficial’, if not essential, to the work of the Prosecutor” (Ibid.).    
If states would be able to provide referrals to the Court then they will be showing – and 
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‘signalling to other states’ – that they are ‘concerned’ about the issues, and that they are 
‘committed’ to the capacity of the Prosecutor to take the appropriate measures.  With a 
Prosecutor who possesses proprio motu powers, in essence, states would be able to ‘pass 
on’ their responsibility to “individuals, organizations, and the Prosecutor himself” (Ibid.).  
The Prosecutor will need the “political will and commitment only States can provide” 
(Ibid.).  Without such state support, the Prosecutor would not be able to properly operate 
within the international realm (Ibid.).  In essence, the US delegation noted that 
politicization of the work of the Prosecutor is necessary and indispensible.    
 The US delegation also saw the institution of the Pre-Trial Chamber as a potential 
function of inappropriate and misplaced politicization.  In their view, due to the fact that 
it would be rare that the Prosecutor’s decisions would be unlawful under the Statute,” the 
US delegation noted that “the judges’ review would simply substitute their own personal 
or policy preferences for that of the Prosecutor” (Ibid.).  This exercise would then “find 
perceptions of their impartiality and fairness undermined” (Ibid.).    
 Finally, the US delegation was also concerned about the number of resources that 
would have to be used in the event the Prosecutor is ‘bombarded’ with the sheer ‘volume 
of complaints’.  The US delegation pointed to the number of communications forwarded 
to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in 1997 totalling 30,000, with an 
additional 1,200 sent to the Commission in the same year.  They also pointed to the 
European Commission of Human Rights which received 1500 applications in 1998 – 
from January 1st, 1998 to the beginning of the Rome Conference.  In order to process 
these potential referrals the resources of the office of the Prosecutor would have to be 
expanded at a great financial cost (US Document). In addition to the expanded resources, 
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the Prosecutor – in order to meet the demand to process the number of purported 
communications – “will be turning to States for information to determine the credibility 
of allegations and whether they are being handled at the national level.  Thus the costs 
and frustrations that will come with the proprio motu scenario will in the long run fall on 
States as well” (Ibid.).   In the final analysis, the US delegation noted that the ‘benefits’ 
of the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor “are significantly outweighed by the costs 
involved in diminution of the Prosecutor’s focus and efficiency” (Ibid.).              
 By July 6th – and well into the second half of the conference in Rome – 
Ambassador Scheffer seemed to have been receiving even less support from the State 
Department and The White House with respect to the three primary concerns of the US: 
“how to control referrals to the court, on the right of reservations, and on the role of the 
independent prosecutor” (Scheffer, 207).  At that juncture, Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright asked “what can we do to blow up the entire conference?” (Ibid.).  The two 
options presented were to simply walk out of the conference or lobby for an extension.  
The later strategy was chosen.   
 On July 8th, President Clinton sent new instructions to the negotiating team in 
Rome (Schwartz, 208).  Yet before receiving them, the US delegation met with its P-5 
counterparts where the US proposed that the Prosecutor should – instead of initiating 
investigations on his or her own accord – brief the Assembly of States Parties with the 
hopes of ‘at least’ one government referring the situation to the Court (Scheffer, 208).  
This proposal did not present a common ground on the role of the Prosecutor.  The 
Russian and Chinese delegations were very much against an independent Prosecutor.  
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France75 and the UK were very much in favour of it, with France believing that the 
oversight offered by the Pre-Trial Chamber was sufficient (Scheffer, 208).  
 The new instructions from President Clinton included the following: i) the 
citizens of non-party states would not come under the jurisdiction of the Court, unless the 
UNSC referred the situation to the Court, or the ‘non-state’ party provided its explicit 
consent;  ii) automatic jurisdiction should only be exercised over nationals of states 
parties, and only with respect to the crime of genocide, iii) the US delegation was to 
signal that they could potentially accept the Singaporean compromise but only in return 
for support for the their “primary objectives in the negotiations,” iv) if the main 
objectives of the US are met, then the US would publicly note that it is considering 
signing the RS”76 (Scheffer, 209). Yet again, there was no substantial change in the US 
position.   
 During the last week of the conference, the US saw even more opposition to its 
‘bottom line.’  During that final week, “Austria delivered the statement of the European 
Union governments and expressed their unified support for an independent prosecutor 
who could refer situations to the court. Berman [of the UK] fully endorsed it for the 
United Kingdom.  With that…any further U.S. opposition to an independent prosecutor 
would prove futile” (Scheffer, 213).  On July 17th, a vote was called on the statute.  
Following last-ditch efforts by India and then the US to make further consensus-breaking 
amendments to the treaty involving the exclusion of the UNSC and the exemption of non-
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 Interestingly enough the position of France at this stage of the process was very much in opposition to its earlier 
stances on the matter.  Simply, France changed it stance on the proper role of the Prosecutor within the Court.  During 
the first Preparatory Commission session, on April 3rd, 1996, France noted that  complaints should be referred to the 
court both by States parties and by the Security Council operating under Chapter VII. The court prosecutor should not 
be able to initiate prosecutions on his own.” Coalition for the International Criminal Court. History of the ICC.  
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory [accesses January 31, 2011]. 
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 “The final step of formally ratifying the Rome Statute (following signature), and thus obliging the United States 
under it, likely would have to wait many years before the constitutionally required two-thirds of the Senate would 
endorse it” (Scheffer, 209). 
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parties from the jurisdiction of the Court, Norway introduced a ‘non-action motion in 
both cases (Scheffer, 223). Then the final vote took place: 120 delegations voted for the 
statutes, 21 delegations abstained and 7 voted against (Scheffer, 224). Ambassador 
Scheffer remarked that besides “Israel and China, which publicly acknowledged their 
opposition…it appeared that the rogue’s gallery of Iraq, Cuba, Syria, and Yemen also 
registered ‘no’ votes” (Scheffer, 224).  At the end of the conference, the US delegation 
found itself among very curious company. 
 On December 31st, 2000, Ambassador Scheffer did sign the treaty at the UN 
headquarters on behalf of the Clinton Administration.  When President Clinton signed the 
Statute, the statement released by the Administration “retained its serious concerns about 
jurisdictional issues in the Rome Statute” (Schwartz, 229). Nonetheless, the statement 
argued that “signature is the right action to take at this point,” as it would put the United 
States “in a position to influence the evolution of the Court” (Ibid.). More specifically, 
with respect to the independent Prosecutor, “the Clinton Administration feared that an 
independent ICC prosecutor might become (in the words of one U.S. official) an 
‘international Ken Starr,’ bedevilling U.S. military personnel and officials” (Ibid.).  The 
incoming Bush administration ‘unsigned’ the RS as soon as that was possible.  On May 
6th, 2002 a declassified diplomatic cable, a ‘demarche’, was sent from the Secretary of 
State to US Ambassadors noting that “the United States Government sent a formal notice 
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as depositary for the Rome Statute, 
declaring the United States will not become a party to the treaty establishing the 
International Criminal Court” (Demarche, AMICC).  
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The Case of Japan 
The case of Japan is further illustrative of not only why certain states have been 
‘lukewarm’ at best with respect to joining the ICC, but also what the role and impact of 
domestic actors and dynamics was in debates, deliberations and struggles to join the 
Court.  Japan was closely involved in the process of establishing the Court.  Its diplomats 
played key roles during the PrepCom process and at the Rome conference. Even though 
Japan voted for the Rome Statute of the Court, it took nearly a decade to accede to the RS 
and join the ICC. In the discussion below the aim will be to outline the sources of the 
Japanese position and opposition with respect to the independent Prosecutor and the 
particular institutional design the Court took in 1998.  It seems to be the case that a very 
careful – if not too careful – analysis of the impact of the Rome Statute on Japanese law 
by the government in power at the time, led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), was 
at the heart of the delay.  The unnecessary length of delay is illustrated by the fact that, 
after the insistence of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), both houses of parliament 
unanimously accepted the legislation which enabled Japan to accede to the Rome Statute 
and join the ICC.  At the very same time, the seeming quite rapid change of course in 
2007 coincided with not only an election in Japan, but also with the coming to an end of a 
nearly-fifty year ‘uninterrupted’ rule of the LDP and an electoral victory of the DPJ 
(Lipscy and Scheiner, 311).     
Japan During the Pre-Rome Process 
Japan was intimately involved with the creation of the ICC from the very beginning of 
the process, starting with the so-called ‘ad hoc’ committees established in1995.  Hirofumi 
Ryu, a member of the DPJ noted on March 20th, 2007, in the General Assembly of the 
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Diet, that Japan occupied the key position of the Vice Presidency during the Ad Hoc 
committee meetings, and Japan was very active during the preliminary processes (Ryu, 
House of Representatives).  During the first PrepCom meetings on April 3rd, 1996, on the 
topic of inherent jurisdiction of the Court, Japan noted that the ‘consent’ of the state 
where the individual was arrested, along with the state of which the individual is a 
national, and the consent of the state where the alleged crime took place, should all be 
required.  Japan also noted that states should be able to trigger the jurisdiction of the 
Court, and refer cases to it.77  During the very same PrepCom, on April 4th, 1996, Japan 
noted that the proposed statute of an international criminal court should not override the 
UN Charter, which outlines that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can make 
the determination if the ‘peace and security of mankind’ is endangered.  Japan, at this 
juncture, preferred that the UNSC refer cases to the Court (Ibid.).  Overall, despite 
Japan’s quite active role during the pre-Rome process some observers and NGOs pointed 
to the fact that Japan, at that juncture of the negotiating process was not entirely certain 
that there was an explicit need for the establishment of the Court (Luckner, 96).             
Japan in Rome 
Kerstin Luckner notes that there seemed to have been a change in Japan’s approach 
towards the Court at Rome.  As opposed to a generally neutral stance on the overall 
utility of a Court, Japan, at that juncture openly supported the establishment of the Court 
(Luckner, 97).  At the very first meeting of the ‘Committee of the Whole’ in Rome, Mr. 
Yasumasa Nagamine of Japan was elected by acclamation to be the Rapporteur.  In 
                                                     
77
 “International Criminal Court Should Not Have Inherent Jurisdiction, Preparatory Committee Told.” Preparatory 





addition, His Excellency Mr. Hisashi Owada, the head of the Japanese delegation, noted 
explicitly that “the Government of Japan fully supports the establishment of an 
international criminal court at this juncture… the establishment of the international 
Criminal Court is par exelance a problem of primordial political significance” 
(Ambassador Owada, Speech).  Japan also seemed to be quite prepared for the 
negotiations at hand.  John Washburn and Fanny Benedetti noted that “Japan… came to 
each session with long instructions worked out through elaborate internal decision-
making” (Washburn and Benedetti, 13).  Overall, Japan was a no mere bystander in 
Rome.  Its diplomats were readily and actively involved in the process of establishing the 
ICC.    
Later on, however, while providing a full-fledged exposition of the position of the 
Government of Japan on the establishment of the ICC at Rome, Ambassador Owada very 
much supported a Court built on a more conventional conception of state sovereignty, 
which led him to ask what role, if any, the Prosecutor should play in triggering the 
jurisdiction of the Court.  Ambassador Owada outlined four ‘basic principles’ which 
underpinned the position of Japan.  First, Japan wanted an “independent and impartial 
organ of the international community.” Second, Japan envisioned an “international 
organization capable of carrying on its task effectively” in such a way that “the Court 
must ensure cooperation of all the countries concerned, so that it may work effectively in 
dealing with the cases brought before it.”  Third, Japan was a very strong supporter of the 
principle of ‘complementarity’, arguing that “the jurisdiction of the Court must be 
established only when the national system of criminal justice is not operational or 
effective in relation with the case concerned.”  Lastly, Japan advocated for ‘universal 
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participation’.  Without a universal acceptance of the Court, “the Court’s significance 
will be greatly diminished” (Ibid.).          
In the second part of his speech, Ambassador Owada focused on issues of key 
importance to Japan.  Among these issues were the crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, the formulation of war crimes, the Court’s relationship with the UNSC, the notion 
of complementarity, the issue of the trigger mechanisms – or what organ may trigger the 
jurisdiction of the Court – cooperation with the court and surrender, and the Court’s 
relationship with the United Nations.   
Two particular issues were key for the discussion at hand.  With regards to the 
issue of trigger mechanisms, Ambassador Owada noted that only states and the UNSC 
should refer cases to the Court.  Accordingly, the Ambassador noted that due to the 
gravity of the position of the Court within the international realm, a proper ‘balance’ 
between the interests of the Court and state parties must be maintained.  In light of this, 
he noted that “Japan…considers it inappropriate to give the prosecutor the right to initiate 
investigations proprio motu” (Ibid.).   
The second key issue relevant for this discussion was Japan’s stance on the role of 
the UNSC with respect to the crime of aggression.  Ambassador Owada remarked that 
“Japan would support including the crime of aggression provided its definition was 
acceptable and there was a Security Council screen for determining whether an act of 
aggression had occurred” (Scheffer, 200). In more specific terms, Ambassador Owada 
noted that even though there was a compulsion to disaggregate the act of aggression 
committed by a state from an act of aggression committed by an individual, the key was 
to focus on the ‘act’ itself.  The only organ, according to Japan, that was suited to 
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determine if an ‘act’ of aggression was committed was the UNSC.  Therefore, it is clear 
from this position that Japan envisioned a central role for the UNSC which underpinned 
the tension at the heart of the establishment of the ICC and the work of the Prosecutor as 
well.   
  During the conference, Japan was a frequent participant in the debates taking 
place in the ‘Committee of the Whole’ (CW) commenting on nearly every part of the 
Rome Statute.  Japan’s position regarding the independent Prosecutor and the 
institutional design the Court took did not change substantially.  Japan continued to insist 
on the central role of states in the work of the Court.  At the 10th meeting of the 
‘Committee of the Whole’ on June 22nd, 1998, while discussing the role of the 
Prosecutor, Mr. Matsuda of Japan noted that “allowing the Prosecutor to launch 
investigations ex officio would upset the balance between State parties and the Court by 
making the latter a kind of ‘supra-structure’ with authority over States” (Bassiouni, 178).  
Mr. Matsuda noted that outside pressure to consider a case could damage the credibility 
of the Prosecutor and the Court (Ibid.).  With regards to the role of the UNSC, Mr. 
Matsuda, in the same debate, noted that due to the fact that the crimes which the Court 
would have jurisdiction over are crimes of ‘international concern’, and because the 
UNSC was the organ responsible for ‘maintaining international peace and security’, the 
UNSC should be involved in referring cases to the Court (Bassiouni, 183).   
 Japan’s stance, however, seemed to have shifted somewhat during the second part 
of the Rome conference.  On July 8th, during the “finalization and adoption of” the RS, 
Ambassador Owada spoke once again.  His comments further underpinned the overall 
position of Japan with respect to the Court and the independent Prosecutor.  At this 
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juncture, however, Ambassador Owada seemed to have put forth a more conciliatory tone 
with respect to the overall design of the Court, as opposed to the one displayed at the 
beginning of the conference.  Commenting on the ‘crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court’, Ambassador Owada noted that Japan sought a sense of flexibility on these 
matters.  He noted that the RS should preserve the balance between “existing national 
judicial systems and the Court’s international mechanisms” (Bassiouni, 269).  The very 
next day, on July 9th, 1998, Ambassador Owada, referring specifically to the issue of the 
ability of the Prosecutor to refer situations to the Court, noted that the Prosecutor “should 
act strictly in accordance with the law and that he or she should be totally free from any 
influence by a country or group” (Bassiouni, 308).  In addition, Ambassador Owada 
noted that the Prosecutor of the ICC would function within a very different legal context 
with respect to accountability; different from those in national jurisdictions.  Within the 
international realm, the Prosecutor needs to consider the “legal interests of the 
international community” and therefore a mechanism should be included in the RS which 
would ‘legitimize’ the Prosecutor’s actions (Ibid.).  Then, Ambassador Owada, unlike his 
previous comments about the ability of the Prosecutor to initiate investigations proprio 
motu, noted that “Japan would continue to seek a formula acceptable to all” (Ibid.). 
Ambassador Owada’s comments on July 13th in fact came after the Japanese 
delegation organized a key meeting between Japan, the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, Australia, Italy and Canada.  During the private meeting, Ambassador Owada 
described the state of the Rome conference at that point as a ‘divided house’ between 
those delegations which thought of the Court as an instrument which was to directly 
impinge on state sovereignty on every possible turn, and a Court which was to ‘prosecute 
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the culprits’ across the world.  In his view, achieving the latter, “might involve some 
departure from the traditional notion in international law of obtaining the consent of the 
engaged governments” (Scheffer, 211). Overall, this meeting can be seen as an attempt 
by Japan not only to act as a mediator in the ‘divided house’ but also to convince the US 
to support the establishment of the ICC with an independent Prosecutor.   
The Japanese Ambassador proposed two particular ideas.  First, Japan proposed 
that the Court should not have jurisdiction over individuals who are citizens of a state 
which is not a party to the RS (Ibid.).  This notion in fact flew in the face of universal 
jurisdiction of the Court which a number of governments, including those in the ‘like-
minded camp’, held onto.  Instead of universal jurisdiction, Ambassador Owada noted 
that if a crime was committed on the territory of a state which is a party to the RS, or if 
the state that apprehended the individual is a party to the Statute, then the Court would 
have jurisdiction in the matter, unless the state of which the individual is a national joined 
the Court, or unless this state has given its consent to the Court to proceed (Ibid.).  In 
return for this jurisdictional regime, the US would, among other considerations, “accept 
an independent Prosecutor with ‘checks’ on his or her power” (Ibid.).  With respect to the 
UNSC, it could refer any case to the Court – under its Chapter VII powers – which would 
involve a state which was not party to the Statute.  This would be done with or without 
the consent of the state in question (Ibid.).  As comments and reaction to this proposal 
“came fast and furious” Japan was very much insistent that a state which is not a party to 
the statute should be given the right to consent to a prosecution of its citizens. By the 
same token, Japan hoped that this initiative would bring the US on board in regards to the 
independent Prosecutor whose powers would be checked by the proposed Pre-Trial 
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Chamber (Ibid.). Unfortunately, despite the nobility of Ambassador Owada’s intentions 
and ideas, his proposals were not accepted.  
Overall, even though not all of Japan’s proposals were accepted, they were very 
much indicative of Japan’s willingness to compromise and mediate during the 
Conference.  However, the conciliatory tone and attitude at the Rome conference – not to 
mention the fact that Japan voted for the Rome Statute of the Court – did not translate 
into a rapid accession to the Statute by the Diet or the House of Councillors in Tokyo.   
   
The Post-Rome Legislative Debate and The Accession Process in Japan  
The aim in this section is to describe the domestic political debate in Japan within the 
context of relevant Japanese domestic political developments. The debate ended with 
Japan acceding to the Rome Statute in 2007, nearly a decade after it voted for the 
adoption of the Statute.  By acceding to the RS, Japan became the 105th state to join the 
Court.  The discussion below will outline the general thrust of the debates along with the 
contents of these debates which will shed light on Japan’s preferences with respect to 
joining the ICC.  This discussion will provide the basis for the analysis which will focus 
on an explanation of Japanese policy preferences, along with an explanation as to why 
Japan needed almost a decade to join an institution which it was intimately involved in 
establishing. 
 Unlike the party systems in the other cases under consideration in this work, 
Japanese politics are characterized by frequent elections, coalition governments and an 
often changing party system where new parties are often formed out of parties coalescing 
for a variety of reasons.  Overall, Japan is described as a “robust two-party system” 
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(Lipscy and Scheiner, 315).  The two of the most well-represented parties in both Houses 
of Parliament are the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which occupies a center-right 
position on the political spectrum – and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which 
occupies a more center-left position.78     
 The LDP was established in 1955 with the joining of two ‘conservative’ parties, 
the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party (Crespo, 200).  In 2005, it celebrated nearly a 
half-century rule (Ibid.).  It is dubbed by observers as a conservative, right-of-center 
party.  The LDP remained in power for thirty-eight years – from 1955 until 1993.  
Following a short absence in 1993, it then swiftly returned to power until the House of 
Councillors election in 2007 and the House of Representatives election in 2009 when the 
DPJ enjoyed a short-lived victory (Lipscy and Scheiner, 311).  The party once again 
returned to power in 2010 (Ibid.).  
 During the long tenure of the LDP, it established very close relationships with the 
state bureaucracy and the business elite.  Policies, for the most part, originate within the 
bureaucracy.  The Diet – or the House of Councillors – then “passes, rejects of more 
commonly, modifies [policies] according to the criteria for the make up of its different 
committees” (Crespo, 201).  The bureaucracy enjoys a certain degree of autonomy in 
policy making due to its ‘specialized technical knowledge’ (Ibid.).  The business elite, on 
the other hand, is – and was – the LDP’s ‘principle’ client, along with farmers.  The 
relationships between the governing party – in this case, the LDP – the state bureaucracy 
and the business elite is characterized by agreement and accommodation, mostly due to 
the lengthy tenure of the LDP in power.   
                                                     
78Other parties represented in the legislature are the Japan Restoration Party, New Komeito Party, Your Party, Japanese 
Communist Party, People’s Life Party, Social Democratic Party, New Party Daichi – True Democrats, New 
Renaissance Party and the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party.  
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 The overall policy aims of the LDP – via the state bureaucracy – may be 
characterized as ‘conservative’ and based on the ‘conservative capitalist model’ (Crespo, 
207).  In general terms, the LDP has succeeded for a number of decades to oversee “a 
national project of economic growth and income distribution” (Ibid.).  It has also catered 
to its biggest interest groups and clients, which are big business and farmers (Ibid.).  With 
respect to foreign policy, during the rule of the LDP, Japan maintained strong and close 
ties with the United States, not least because of the US “providing Japan with far-
reaching security guarantees” in the wake of China’s growth as a military power, and the 
threat emanating from a ‘nuclear’ North Korea (Luckner, 102).           
 The Democratic Party of Japan is the second most prominent party in the 
Japanese parliament, and occupies the center-left of the political spectrum.  It came to 
power in 2007 in the Diet and in 2009 in the House of Representatives, ushering in the 
end of a nearly half-a-century rule of the LDP.  The DPJ campaigned “on a platform of 
change,” which included scaling back of the power of the bureaucracy.  The party also 
sought to “enact generous new programs such as child allowance and elimination of 
highway tolls, reduce fiscal waste and pursue a foreign policy that is more independent of 
the United States” (Lipscy and Scheiner, 312).  What is further interesting is that, as 
Krauss and Pekkanen noted, the DPJ sought “a more equal relationship with its military 
ally, the United States” (Krauss and Pekkanen, 14).  For the discussion at hand, the DPJ’s 
wish to enact foreign policy more independently of the United States is of crucial 
importance.  As will be seen below, certain members of the Japanese parliament 
commented on this very issue.   
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 With respect to discussions in the Japanese parliament, secondary documents 
show that the bill required for Japan’s accession to the Rome Statute – entitled 
‘Cooperation with the International Criminal Court’ – was discussed on a total of six 
working days in the House of Representatives – the ‘lower’ house – spanning form 
October 2005 to March 2007.  These debates took place in the assembly as well in 
committee meetings.  The House of Councillors – the ‘upper’ house – discussed the issue 
on four working days between April 13th, 2007 and April 27th, 2007, both in the assembly 
and during committee meetings.  The lower house unanimously adopted the bill on 
March 29th, 2007.  The upper house followed suit on April 27th, 2007 (Hein, 303).   
In LPJ/New Komeito coalition government-led legislatures, the most active 
members of the debates were members of DPJ.  One of its members, Senator Tadashi 
Inuzuka of the Nagasaki prefecture, was credited by many as the individual who did most 
to urge the government of the day to join the Court.  He was considered as the “driving 
force within the Diet to support early ratification of the Rome Statute” (Hein, 303).  In 
addition to the members of the DPJ, members of the New Komeito party, the Communist 
Party and the Social Democratic Party also spoke.   
 The legislators participating in the debates noted a number of key issues – and 
perhaps even explanations – relevant for Japan’s accession to the ICC.  These issues may 
be divided into two categories: ‘legal-technical’ and political.  The main issue the 
legislators contended with was the legal-technical issues dealing with Japan’s accession 
to the ICC.  The debates in both the Japanese House of Representatives and in the House 
of Councillors may be characterized as interchanges mostly between members of DPJ 
and the parties forming the government LDP/New Komeito coalition.  In the General 
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Assembly of the House of Representatives, an intervention by Hirofumy Ryu of DPJ is 
illustrative of the general thrust of the debates.  His intervention, occurring on March 20th 
2007, began with an inquiry as to why Japan had not acceded earlier to the RS, and why 
the governing coalition had hesitated on the matter.  He noted that the DPJ actively 
worked on accession.  Ryu also noted that Japan, by joining the ICC, would continue to 
occupy a leading role in the international community as it did during the negotiations 
process.  Yet, he cautioned that Japan should not follow in the footsteps of the US on the 
matter.  With respect to more substantive matters, Ryu inquired if the ICC may shield 
against North Korean abductions and ‘forced disappearances’.   
The reply from the governing coalition, delivered by Maruya Kaori of the New 
Komeito Party, was that if the discussion went well in the Diet, then Japan could accede.  
He also noted issues relating to child soldiers, weapons of mass destructions and 
terrorism as being key in this debate as well.  In his conception, Japan could stand as a 
model for such ‘naysayers’ as India, China, the US and the Russia on the matter.  In the 
foreign relations committee, Mr. Kaori once again noted that Japan could take a leading 
role in the Asia-Pacific region when it came to ratifications, as the Asia-Pacific region 
had the lowest number of ratifications in the world.  He particularly took note of 
Canadian initiatives in helping other nations accede to the RS.   
 The discussion in the House of Councilors on the matter of cooperating with the 
ICC was led by Senator Tadashi Inuzuka of the DPJ.  During his intervention during the 
166th plenary session of the House of Councillors, spanning from April 13th – 19th, 2007, 
Senator Inuzuka noted that by joining the ICC Japan may be a strong advocate of human 
security.  Next, he further noted that as there were two vacancies for sitting judges at the 
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ICC Japan could nominate an individual and seize the opportunity to lead in this regard 
as well.  Lastly, Mr. Inuzuka drew parallels with Japan’s relationship to the Trust Fund 
for Victims of the ICC, and noted the connection between the ICC and the ‘responsibility 
to protect’ doctrine. Overall, Mr. Inuzuka noted that, by joining the Court, Japan would 
be able to capture a leading role not only within this international institution but also in 
the Asia–Pacific realm, and with respect to the notion of human security as well.  Mr. 
Inuzuka’s comments were addressed to the then-Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Taro 
Aso, who then deliberated on the legal-technical aspects of joining the Court.  All future 
discussion in the House of Councillors focused on the legal-technical dimensions of 
joining the Court.   
On the legal-technical front, Motoo Noguchi, now the Chair of the ‘Trust Fund 
for the Victims’ of the Court, noted that there were four overarching legal-technical 
issues at stake with respect to Japan’s accession to the ICC.  First, Japan needed to make 
fundamental changes to its Constitution in order to join the ICC.  Japan had not taken part 
in any regional or international conflict since the end of the World War II, mostly 
because of its experience in that World War.  In Professor Yasushi Higashizawa’s words, 
Japan “has long been able to keep distance from armed conflicts and atrocities in 
neighbouring regions.” 79  Japan did not want any mention of armed conflict in its 
foundational legal document.   
In particular, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution placed large “constraints…on 
her ability to adjudicate war crimes under the auspices of the ICC” (Ko and 
Meierheinrich, 237).  In essence, Article 9 of the Constitution outlaws war and armed 
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conflict, and makes them illegal.  This meant that there was a “lack of domestic 
legislation dealing with matters of international humanitarian law and the possibilities 
and limits of the deployment of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces (SDF) abroad” (Ibid.).  
Therefore, a “very strong political initiative” was required to change the Constitution in 
order to help Japan accede to the ICC.  Second, Mr. Noguchi noted that the elements of 
criminal law enumerated in the RS – such as “individual criminal responsibility, the 
responsibility of commanders and other superiors (Article 28), and non-applicability of 
statute of limitations (Article 29)” – did not have “direct equivalence in Japanese law”   
(Noguchi, 600 – 601).   
The third legal issue was the notion that Japan had to decide to “criminalize the 
core crimes under the jurisdiction of the of the Court, i.e., whether to have domestic penal 
provisions that are equivalent to each and every category of crimes as provided for” in 
the RS, “or to deal with them with existing domestic provisions” (Noguchi, 601).  Lastly, 
at issue was cooperation with the Court (Noguchi, 602).  Japanese law – up until 
acceding to the RS – dealt with cooperation with states and not international 
organizations.  In essence, Japan needed to enact legislation – or modify existing statutes 
– which would allow Japan to cooperate with the Court (Ibid.).   
 In order to join the ICC and undertake the necessary legislative changes, Japan 
passed the so-called Yujihonsei – or “the legal dispensation legislation applicable in the 
event of an armed attack,” (Babovic, 3) which contained a “package of seven laws that 
made possible, among other things, the country’s long delayed accession to the 1977 
Additional Protocols of the 1949 Geneva Conventions” (Ko and Meierheinrich, 237).  
Without the Yujihonsei, Japan would have not been able to accede to the RS.   
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 In addition to the above-outlined legal-technical issues, Japan also needed to 
consider financial matters as well.  The budget of the Court is made up of donations from 
state parties to the RS.  The amount each state contributes “is based on that of the United 
Nations’ regular budget with necessary adjustments to reflect the differences in number 
and the composition of States Parties” (Ibid.).  This essentially meant that budget of the 
ICC is carried by the major financial donors to the UN.  Yet, because the US did not join 
the Court, this meant that Japan bore a larger financial burden – and perhaps the largest, 
after Germany – at 19%.  According to Itsunori Onodera, a member of the Justice 
Committee in the House of Representatives, Japan’s financial obligations were 
approximately “several billion yen” (Onodera, House of Representatives). 
 Overall then, joining the Court in essence helped Japan further advocate its 
“human security” agenda, and further signal to the international community that it is a 
“responsible member” (Babovic, 3).  Legislators noted that Japan’s accession to the RS 
would bring international prestige in the form of being able to nominate and appoint 
judges to the bench of the Court.  In addition, the changed security environment in the 
post-Cold War era, and with it, “a greater possibility of an armed attack and involvement 
in humanitarian crisis abroad” by the SDF brought further attention to “debates about war 
and Article 9 revision” (Babovic, 3).  Second, and quite pointedly, joining the Court 
would put the US-Japanese security alliance in jeopardy.  In 1952, Japan had concluded 
the so-called Administrative Agreement with the US.  The agreement notes that “the US 
should have criminal jurisdiction over its military personnel stationed in Japan and that 
Japan has the obligation to surrender its military or other personnel to the US military 
authority and cooperate in evidence finding and criminal proceedings” (Babovic, 4).  Due 
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to the fact that the Agreement did not contain the issue of extradition to the ICC, the US 
pressured Japan to sign additional BIAs.  However, Japan withstood this pressure and did 
not sign the additional agreements.   
 It is also important to address the most pressing issue when it comes to 
institutions of international criminal justice and Japan’s role in atrocities committed 
during World War II.  The so-called ‘Tokyo trials’ of the IMTFE were often treated with 
‘apathy and frustration’.  Joining the ICC “raised debates with respect to still unresolved 
issues of Japan’s war responsibility,” including the use of Chinese and South Korean 
‘comfort women’ during the war (Babovic, 5).  Sexual slavery is punishable by the ICC 
and is included as a crime within the RS.  Yet if Japan joined the ICC, it needed to 
recognize these acts as crimes, and heed rights of reparation to the victims of these 
crimes.  In essence, then, Japan “risked being retroactively blamed” for these acts (Ibid.).  
By joining the RS, Japan would undertake “indirect diplomatic apology to its neighbours 
and international community for the past crimes and the opportunity to ‘avert the 
syndrome of the Tokyo Trial” (Ibid.).   
 In sum, Japan’s accession to the RS included overcoming significant legal – and 
constitutional – hurdles.  Yet the prospect – and seeming prestige – of joining the Court 
seemed to have provided Japan with the necessary motivation.  Overall, this motivation 
was fuelled by individual actors within the domestic Japanese domestic political sphere, 
namely members of The Democratic Party of Japan and Senator Tadashi Inuzuka in 




Analysis: Explaining the Policy Preferences of the US and Japan 
In this section, the aim is to understand which international relations theory is best able to 
explain the policy preferences of the US and Japan.  Neorealism, neoliberal 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism, liberal pluralism and constructivism – but 
more precisely, liberal constructivism – will be considered.  Following a brief description 
of each theory, and the way in which these theories are able to explain the policy 
preferences of the cases under consideration, it will be argued that liberal pluralism and 
liberal constructivism seem to best explain the preferences of the US and Japan in regards 
to the International Criminal Court with an independent Prosecutor.   
 Neorealism attempts to address issues of “security, conflict and cooperation” 
(Lamy, 207).  States are the most relevant actors within the neorealist conception of 
international relations, and are afforded causal relevance. States are thought to be unitary 
actors – meaning that they act similarly regardless of who forms the government and 
what the ideological underpinning of the government in power is.  States are also thought 
to be rational actors seeking to “maximize benefit and minimize losses” (Lamy, 210).  
The way in which states seek to achieve these goals is through the accumulation of 
material power.  The main determinant of state behavior is the anarchic nature – or the 
structure – of the international realm.  The lack of central governing structure within the 
international realm prompts states to seek and maintain power within the system, and to 
be selfish (Ibid.).   
 Cooperation within the neorealist conception is not possible due to the 
competitive and survival-focused nature of states.  Within the neorealist conception, 
states are thought to be concerned with ‘relative gains’, meaning that they are “concerned 
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with how much power and influence other states might achieve … in any cooperative 
endeavour” (Ibid.).  Therefore, international organizations, international institutions or 
regimes are only established with the help and aid of the most powerful actors within the 
system, and only for these actors’ own benefit.  These international actors are not 
afforded causal primacy, nor are thought to have significant effect on the way in which 
international relations are conducted.  They are merely tools within the material ‘arsenal’ 
of the powerful.   
     Neorealism, given its emphasis on state-level analysis, on material power 
capabilities and the inability of states to cooperate effectively due to the anarchic nature 
of the international realm,  does not explain why the ICC was established, nor why it 
employs a Prosecutor who may be able to initiate investigations on his or her own accord.  
Based on the core assumptions of neorealism, the United States, and possibly China, – 
the hegemons within the international realm – should have been the most important 
actors initiating the process, and only for their own benefit.  This, in fact, was not the 
case.  The empirical record shows that, from the very beginning of the process of 
establishing the Court – reaching back to 1994, and to the initial discussion on the subject 
of establishing the Court at the United Nations – the United States was ‘lukewarm’ at 
best, and vehemently opposed to, at worst, in aiding to establish the Court and the 
independent Prosecutor.  The US was opposed to establishing the ICC and the 
independent Prosecutor because the Court was envisaged as an international organization 
which would detract from the sovereign right of the US to be able to prosecute 
individuals on its own.  By the same token, US service members and civilian leaders 
could have come under the Court’s jurisdiction which, once again, was unacceptable to 
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the US.  Much more support was shown for establishing tribunals which came under the 
auspices of the UNSC, where the US enjoys veto power.  Curiously enough, the 
empirical record also shows that the US was not successful in attaining all it wished for 
during the negotiation processes.  Nor was the US successful – during the administration 
of George W. Bush, beginning in 2000 – in turning global public, legal, political and 
military opinion against the Court.  Simply, the US failed to ‘get all it wanted’ when it 
came to the establishment of the ICC and the independent Prosecutor in particular. 
 Now that the Court is in fact functioning, neorealists would argue that the Court, 
due to the very low number of trials completed, the few individuals apprehended, and, 
simply, due to the lack of any sort of ability to apprehend and arrest individuals on its 
own, lacks tangible force and relevance in international relations.  Further, neorealists 
would argue that some of the most important situations – as well as individuals – sought 
by the Court did come with some sort of, albeit indirect, help from the US.  The US 
abstained in the UNSC from referring the case of Sudan to the ICC which led to the 
indictment of President Al-Bashir.  The US also voted in the UNSC to refer the case of 
Libya to the ICC.  Finally, Congolese warlord Bosco Ntaganda surrendered at the US 
Embassy in Kigali, in Rwanda, before being transferred to The Hague for trial.80  In 
essence, those subscribing to neorealist thought would argue that even without explicitly 
ratifying the Rome Statute and becoming a State Party to the Court, the help of the US 
was necessary for some of the most significant situations and individuals to be transferred 
to the Court.   
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 While the above-outlined arguments seem valid, the empirical record shows that 
the ICC was established without explicit US support, and often in the midst of US 
maneuvering to shield itself from the legal reaches of the Court.  The US asked a number 
of its ‘allies’ to sign so-called ‘Bilateral Immunity Agreements’ (BIA) which would 
assure the US that its service members would not be arrested and transferred to the Court  
by these allies in exchange for continued military and other aid.  Some states signed these 
agreements, but some others did not.  Notably, Japan, a long term US ally, did not sign a 
BIA, nor did Germany or Canada, for that matter.  Therefore, power-based considerations 
were not enough to change the minds of states, or even dissuade states, from effectively 
participating in the work of the Court.   
 In addition, and most importantly, the focus on a state-level analysis misses a 
crucial point.  The US policy-making establishment – including the White House, the US 
Congress, and the various departments and councils – were considerably divided on the 
issue of the Court, and more importantly on the shape the Court as an institution should 
take.  The White House with President Clinton in the Oval Office, certain Democratic 
members of the US Congress, along with the State Department, were supportive of the 
Court, and most of its institutional design features.  On the other hand, the Pentagon, the 
National Security Council, the Treasury Department and some members of the 
Republican Party occupying key posts on key committees – such as the former Senator 
Jesse Helms who headed the Council on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, – very 
much opposed the Court as a whole, and the independent Prosecutor in particular.  The 
independent Prosecutor was opposed on the grounds that upon its institutionalization, the 
UNSC would not be the final arbiter in regards to which situations would be referred to 
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the Court. Therefore, the US would not have a direct say in who is referred to the Court 
and who is not.  Further, the Democratic Administrations of Presidents Bill Clinton and 
Barack Obama were – and are – much more supportive of the Court then was the 
Administration of President George W. Bush.  It seems to be the case that Democratic 
leaders and legislators are more supportive of the Court than are their Republican 
counterparts. 
 With respect to the case of Japan, at least one neorealist explanation could be – at 
the very least – entertained, yet with not much success.  Kerstin Luckner noted that 
Japan’s will to join the Court did not surface until the middle of 2006.  The mantra of 
Japanese officials was that Japan had to undergo a very “complex and time-consuming 
domestic legal adjustment process” in order to be able to join the ICC (Luckner, 101).  
Luckner notes, however, that despite the purported complexity of this process, the 
appropriate ministries did not begin considering the issue until 2006.  An alternative 
explanation is that “Tokyo appears to have deliberately delayed decision-making 
regarding its ICC membership, in order to circumvent confrontation with the US” 
(Luckner, 102).  Japan closely observed Mexico’s accession process, and once Japan saw 
that the US did not vehemently oppose the Mexican accession, it went ahead and began 
its own accession process.  The US’ approach towards Mexico’s accession, in other 
words, gave Japan the confidence to pursue its own accession to the Court.  Although this 
explanation is quite plausible, as Luckner herself notes, it is “difficult to prove” (Luckner, 
102).  Further, the reference to Mexico’s accession process does not explain why Japan 
supported the independent Prosecutor in the first place.    
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 Neoliberal institutionalism, for its part, “subscribes to a state-centric perspective, 
which like [neorealism] considers states to be unitary, rational, utility-maximizing actors 
who dominate global affairs” (Sterling-Folker in Dunn, et al., 117).  According to 
neoliberalism, “states are treated as unified entities with particular, specifiable goals, 
rather than composites of many different domestic actors and competing interests” 
(Ibid.).  States are thought to be self-interested actors which seek to maximize their own 
utility-functions.  However, neoliberal institutionalism places greater emphasis than does 
neorealism on “increased interaction and informational exchange among self-interested 
individuals…” (Ibid.).  Institutions, therefore, are very well suited for the purposes of 
cooperation.  Jennifer Sterling-Folker notes that “the structure or design of international 
institutions plays an important role in determining the extent to which collective goals 
can be realized” (Sterling-Folker in Dunn, et al., 118).  In her conception, actors are able 
to establish institutions in order to “more effectively obtain collective interests” (Ibid.). 
 In the case of the US, the primary objective was to establish a Court which could 
not, in any fashion or form, indict US service personnel, military or civilian leaders.  
National self-interest as a function of self-preservation therefore played a larger role 
among US policy makers than the establishment of an institution which would allow for a 
more efficient forum for cooperation.  In the case of Japan, once again, protecting the 
national interests seems to have played a larger role than establishing the Court. Further, 
in either case, it was sub-state actors who provided the policy directives for their 
respective delegations.  Therefore, neoliberal institutionalism is not particularly well 
suited to explain policy preferences in either one of these cases.   
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 Turning the attention to historical institutionalism, institutions which have been 
developed over time are given causal primacy over particular actors.  The earlier stages in 
institution-building, in particular, will have long lasting effects and will have causal 
relevance in the operation and longevity of institutions.  In historical institutionalist 
analysis, domestic and international institutions matter more than agents who may have 
established these institutions.    
 The US was very actively involved in establishing prior incarnations of the 
institutions of international criminal justice.  The US was at the forefront of establishing 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), as well as the International Military Tribunal 
(IMT) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE).  There are a 
number of institutional continuities between these institutions and the ICC – including the 
role and functioning of the Prosecutor. Yet, just as there are continuities, there are 
disjunctures as well.  In particular, the ICC is an independent Court, especially 
independent from the UNSC.  All of the tribunals, on the other hand, were established via 
UNSC resolutions or through cooperation and agreement with a number of other states 
actors, as was the case with the IMT and, to a lesser extent, the IMTFE.  More 
importantly, the Prosecutor of the ICC is independently able to initiate investigations on 
his or her own.  The work of all the other Prosecutors was curtailed, at the very least by 
the temporal and territorial parameters of the conflicts they addressed.   
Turning to a discussion regarding domestic institutions, the US is often heralded 
as bastion of liberal democracy, the rule of law, due process in litigation and a state 
which places great emphasis on seeking justice for past and present wrondoings.  When 
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the process of establishing the Court and the Prosecutor was viewed from a purely 
geopolitical and geo-strategic perspective, it was clear that the US would, at most, be a 
reluctant participant. However, the fact that the US was so vehemently opposed to the 
establishment of the Court seemed to run contrary to the political and legal values and 
ideals underpinning its own institutions.  Viewed from an institutional perspective, the 
democratic and legal institutional tradition in the US reaching back at least a few hundred 
years did not seem to have weighed heavily on the minds of those policy and law makers 
who were deciding US policy in regards to the ICC.    
 In the case of Japan, the liberal democratic institutional tradition and the respect 
given to the rule of law did not seem to have swayed the Japanese bureaucracy, nor the 
government of the day headed by the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, to accede more 
rapidly to the ICC.  In an institutional sense, it was, however, significant that the delay in 
accession was a function of ascertaining that Japanese law complies with the tenets of the 
RS, which, in and of itself, required significant and foundational Constitutional – and 
even legal-cultural – changes.  Viewed from this perspective, the institutional aspects of 
accession were, in fact, to be blamed for the delay in accession to the RS.  Japanese 
institutions did not seem to allow for a rapid accession.  It was therefore domestic actors 
such as key members of the Democratic Party of Japan, especially in the persona of 
Senator Tadashi Inuzuka, who were instrumental in ensuring that Japan finally acceded to 
the RS.       
 Liberal pluralism and liberal constructivism seem to provide the most plausible 
explanation for the particular policy preferences of the US and Japan.  Liberal pluralism 
rests on the notion that it is domestic actors – parties, government agencies, civil society 
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groups – that are at the forefront of government policy-making.  These actors would 
compete within the domestic political forum to represent the interests of a particular 
‘state’.  State preferences then are a function of the policy preferences – representing 
particular interests – of those domestic actors which are dominant in the domestic 
political sphere.   
The US opposition to the independent Prosecutor – and other institutional features 
of the ICC – can most certainly be explained by appraising the role played in the policy 
making process by domestic actors.  In the case of the US, the White House with 
President Clinton at the helm, the Departments of Defence, State, Treasury and Justice, 
along with certain key members of the US Congress were the key actors in setting, and 
then later helping to steer, US policy with respect to the independent Prosecutor and then 
the ICC as a whole. The White House, certain members of the Democratic Party and the 
State Department were very much open to the idea of the US joining the Court.  Members 
of the US State Department were involved in the work of the Preparatory Commission 
following the Rome conference where such documents as the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (ROPE) of the Court were negotiated.  In addition, President Clinton outright 
noted in a speech to the UN General Assembly on September 22nd, 1997 that “before the 
century ends, we should establish a permanent international criminal court to prosecute 
the most serious violations of humanitarian law (Ferencz 1997, 18). However, it seemed 
to be the case that the final arbiter on US policy with respect to the Prosecutor, but more 
importantly, the ICC as a whole, was the Department of Defence.  Michael Scharf notes 
that “it was no secret that the serious dissension within the U.S. delegation was ultimately 
overruled by William Cohen, Secretary of Defence and former Republican congressman” 
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(Scharf, 102).  Scharf further notes that “there has been conjecture that Cohen was 
influenced by Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), a vocal opponent of the ICC” (Ibid.).81   
Further, members of the US Congress and House of Representatives – and in 
particular the late Jesse Helms, and Bob Carr – were in vehement opposition to 
Prosecutor and the ICC.  The New York Times reported on July 20th, 1998, that “the real 
reason for the U.S. position may have been Senator Jesse Helms, who said any treaty 
exposing Americans …[to] a court will be ‘dead on arrival’ (Lewis, New York Times). 
Lawrence Weschler also contended that during the Rome conference:  
 
The U.S. delegation seemed increasingly gripped by a single overriding 
concern.  Senator Jesse Helms, the Republican head of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, had already let it be known that any treaty emerging 
from Rome that left open even the slightest possibility of any American 
ever, under any circumstance, being subjected to judgement or even 
oversight by the Court would be ‘dead on arrival’ at his committee 
(Weschler, 91). 
 
Policy and lawmakers from Canada and the United Kingdom were of the same opinion.  
Lloyd Axworthy, the then-Foreign Minister of Canada noted during a testimony in front 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the American position was centred 
around the issue of complementarity.  He further noted that an ‘exemption’ is sought by 
the US on the matter, which is “driven in part by the Congress.”82  Axworthy noted that 
“Senator Helms has introduced a bill that is outlandish in terms of its provision of cutting 
off assistance to any country that ratifies the statute, with the exception of NATO allies.”  
Axworthy further noted that this bill is in line with “that very right-wing Republican 
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attitude that does not believe in the UN, international institutions or anything else.”  
Senator Reynell Andreychuck, a Conservative Senator, noted on June 27th, 2000 during 
the proceedings of the Canadian Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, that in 
the US, the issue of the ICC “has been in the hands of one department”  (Ibid.). 
In the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, Lord Moynihan noted similarly 
that “in a sharply-divided Congress, where Republicans have vowed that they will never 
ratify the treaty and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator 
Jesse Helms, has promised to work to erase ‘swiftly and surely’ President Clinton's 
signature, the ICC and the international system of justice is likely to become a pawn in a 
vicious game of partisan politics in which clashes over the court's impact on US national 
interests and the President's constitutional powers to conduct foreign policy will raise the 
stakes sky-high.”83    Lastly on this matter, Lord Lester of Herne Hill noted that the fact 
that the US Senate must approve international treaties is an impediment to the US joining 
the Court.  In his conception, “it is precisely that which has caused a prevailing 
conservative majority in the Senate,…to tack on to international treaties amendments of 
their own in order to frustrate the purpose of government in entering into them on the 
international plane.”84 
 A further reason why Clinton’s views did not prevail was the seeming 
preoccupation of President Clinton with trade and personal matters that detracted from a 
balanced attention to the merits and drawbacks of the Court for the US.  The other 
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departments involved in policy making all throughout the process – namely the 
Departments of Justice and Treasury – showed positive or negative interests to particular 
aspects of the Court.  Due to their very specific interests in the certain institutional and 
legal aspects of the Court, these departments gave way to others, namely the Pentagon.  
With respect to the Department of State, it seemed to have only played the intermediary 
role between the different organs of the US government in Washington.   
The Pentagon’s perspective on the Court in general, and the Prosecutor in 
particular, can very well be explained by taking a close look at the changed security 
environment the US found itself in after the end of the Cold War.  As the only remaining 
‘superpower’ – or hegemon – within the international realm, the US was compelled to be 
involved in a number of different military as well as international criminal justice 
initiatives.  The US was intimately involved in conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda and, to a 
lesser extent, Somalia.  With respect to institutions of international criminal justice, the 
US – through the UNSC – was closely involved in the setting up of both the Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda tribunals.  In the midst of talks regarding military overextension, and 
‘tribunal fatigue’ in terms of monetary issues involved in establishing functioning 
institutions of international criminal justice, it is, to an extent, understandable why the 
Department of Defense – or the Pentagon – was less than inclined to support the 
establishment of a Court which would be able to – at least theoretically – investigate its 
own civilian and military personnel.  
 Japan’s hesitance with respect to acceding to the Rome Statute and joining the 
Assembly of State Parties can also be explained by a focus on domestic political actors.  
In the case of Japan, the Foreign and Defence Ministries, the government represented by 
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the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, and the Democratic Party of Japan were the main 
actors involved in the process of determining if, and when, Japan would join the Court.  
The key puzzle with respect to Japan’s hesitance to accede to the Rome Statute is 
centered around, on the one hand, Japan’s very active involvement in the process of 
establishing the Court within the international forum, and on the other, stalling for nearly 
a decade to join the very same institution it was so intimately involved in establishing.  In 
order to explain this puzzle one must consider the key role of domestic political actors in 
Japan, and, to some extent, the domestic processes of acceding to an international 
organization.  It seemed to have been the case that the governing coalition needed the 
insistence and the proverbial ‘push’ from the Democratic Party of Japan and one of its 
key Senators, Tadashi Inuzuka, to table the bill in the lower and upper houses of 
parliament.  The unanimous acceptance of the bill clearly shows that Japan was more 
than ready to accede to the RS.  The vote also alludes to the fact that the governing 
coalition and the relevant bureaucracy waited perhaps too long to join the Court.   
 Finally, constructivism and liberal constructivism also add to the explanatory 
calculus.  Constructivists emphasize that social reality is constructed by the individuals 
navigating this reality.  The intelligibility and comprehension of social facts then gives 
meaning to these facts within particular temporal contexts.  The meaning of social 
‘objects’ will be ‘imbued with social values, norms, and assumptions rather than being 
the product of purely individual thought or meaning” (K.M. Fierke in Dunn, et al., 179).  
By focusing on temporal context, constructivists are able to better explain social – or 
political – change in particular. Overall, then, “international politics is a ‘world of our 
making’” (Onuf in K.M Fierke, 180). Constructivists emphasize agency in international 
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relations, where “actors make choices in the process of interacting with others and, as a 
result bring historically, culturally, and politically distinct ‘realities’ into being … states 
and other actors do not merely react as rational individuals but interact in a meaningful 
world” (K.M. Fierke, in Dunn, et al., 180).  In essence, international relations are “a 
social construction rather than existing independently of human meaning and action” 
(Ibid.).   
 In the case of liberal constructivism, Harmes notes that ‘ontological priority’ is 
given to individual actors.  Liberal constructivism then focuses on “how ideas shape the 
preferences of actors; both by framing how they perceive their interests and values as 
well as by constructing identities which, in turn, further frame these perceptions. 
Therefore, in contrast to liberal-pluralists, ideas are not simply viewed as an extension of 
material interests” (Harmes, 24).  In other words, and in opposition to a more liberal-
pluralist explanation outlined above, ideas are central to the constructivist explanatory 
calculus because ideas shape the interests and values of actors.  The preferences of actors, 
then, will be made up – or constructed – of ideas about actors’ interests and values.    
 Constructivism – but more importantly, liberal constructivism – provides a quite 
accurate explanation as to why states established an independent Prosecutor and the ICC 
in general.  Liberal constructivism would note that the ideas particular actors had about 
the Court and the independent Prosecutor were a function of the self-perceived identity of 
actors and the meaning these actors attributed to establishing the Court and the 
independent Prosecutor.    
In the case of the US, it viewed itself as needing to survive in a besieged 
international realm, needing to protect itself – and its personnel – in an environment 
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which was seen as nothing less than hostile to its national interests – especially viewed 
from the vantage point of the Department of Defence.  This conception of the national 
interest was also a function of a self-image which was inward-looking, protectionists and 
‘exceptionalist’ as opposed to ascribing to an identity which would be more global or 
‘cosmopolitan’ in kind. The latter formulations of national identity were more in line with 
an identity which held the rule of law as sacrosanct and which viewed the US as the 
bastion of democracy and democratic global citizenship.  At issue here is that the former 
vision of ‘exceptionalism’ and ‘protectionism’ was supported by key government 
agencies such as the Pentagon as well as the Republican-dominated Congress.  The latter 
vision was more supported – or was seen as more viable – by a Democrat-led US 
Administration, the White House, the State Department and certain Democrat members 
of the US Congress and House of Representative.   
It must be pointed out that the idea of the ICC as a whole was always supported in 
the US but not in the institutional form in which it was presented initially, or at the end of 
the Rome Conference.  It was never accepted wholesale by any domestic actor.  At issue, 
however, is the fact that certain actors – such as the State Department, the White House 
led by President Clinton, and the Democratic members of the US Congress and House of 
Representatives – were more inclined to accept the ICC than members of the Pentagon 
and the Republican members of the legislatures.  The actions of President Bush on the 
one hand in actively opposing the Court during his tenure in the White House, and later 
the actions of the Obama Administration in directly and indirectly supporting the work of 
the ICC, on the other, shows the difference in the ideational and valuational differences 
between the two Administrations on the subject of the Court and the Prosecutor.  
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Finally, in the case of Japan the Liberal Party of Japan and the Democratic Party 
of Japan had significantly different views on the subject of the Court.  The delay and the 
overtly cautious stance taken by the Liberal Party of Japan underpinned the fundamental 
difference in stances taken between the two domestic actors.  The Democratic Party of 
Japan was more concerned with Japan’s international image and its ability to exert its 
influence internationally as opposed to ensure, for example, how close Japanese foreign 
policy is to that of the US on the matter, or if the ICC could in fact be used to shield 
Japanese citizens from the reach of the North Korean regime.  In other words, in the case 
of Japan it is also clear that the actors supporting accession had fundamentally different 
views in regards to Japanese foreign policy, how Japanese national interests were 
conditioned by joining the Court or not, and even in regards to state sovereignty.  The 
government of the day saw the national interest as a function of a well- protected and 
nearly inward-looking policy regarding the ICC.  Japan did join the Court, though it 
might have missed a number of opportunities – including the opportunity to be a leader in 
the Asia-Pacific in its respect for international criminal justice – by joining nearly a 
decade later.  Had Japan joined the Court earlier, it could have provided valuable 
financial backing for the Court at the initial stages of the Court’s establishment, a time 
period which is crucial in the development and establishment of any international 
organization.      
Conclusion 
In the case of the US and Japan, it was domestic political actors who were responsible for 
policy formation regarding the ICC with an independent Prosecutor.  In the US, it was the 
Pentagon and certain members of the US Congress whose views were constantly being 
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reflected in US policy regarding the Court.  In the case of Japan, the government formed 
by the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan seemed to have dictated Japanese policy with 
regards to the Court.  Yet, in the case of Japan it was another individual, Tadashi Inuzuka 
of the Democratic Party of Japan who continued to advocate – successfully at last – for 
the Japan’s accession to the Rome Statute.  Therefore, liberal pluralism and liberal 
constructivism, with their emphases on the role of agents and ideas, seem to provide the 
best explanation for the position, and opposition of the US and Japan in regards to the 
ICC with an independent Prosecutor.     
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CHAPTER 6: WHY DID THE SUPPORTERS WIN IN ROME? 
 
The establishment of the ICC with an independent Prosecutor was an “extraordinary 
development in a very short time”.  
 
The Rome conference was the “most document intensive conference ever held by the UN 
– over 700 documents were translated into the official UN languages (Hans Corell, the 
former Under-Secretary General of the United Nations, July 11, 2011).  
 
Do you realize how long the world has been straining towards this moment – since after 
World War I, and after World War II.  It’s extraordinary.  Who’d have thought it, even 
ten years ago, that you could get one hundred twenty countries to vote for holding their 
militaries personally liable before a Prosecutor with even a limited degree of independent 
initiative? I mean, it’s unprecedented, it’s absolutely unprecedented.  One day it may 
even be seen to have been a birth of a new epoch (Michael Posner of the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, in Weschler, 109).  
 
The aim of this chapter is to explain why the supporters of the ICC with an independent 
Prosecutor won the diplomatic, political and legal battle in Rome.  The emphasis will be 
placed on such elements of the negotiations as cooperation and coalition-building – or the 
lack thereof – in explaining why the supporter won, and why the opponents lost the legal 
and political battles in Rome.  In broad theoretical terms, the discussion will juxtapose 
agency – as a critical ingredient of coalition-building – and structure as a function of 
historical, legal, institutional factors and the distribution of power affecting the outcome 
of the negotiations.  For the purposes of this analysis, five particular theories of 
international relations will be utilized, namely neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, 
historical institutionalism, constructivism and liberal pluralism.  Neorealism would posit 
that the Court with an independent Prosecutor would not come into existence without the 
support of the hegemon, the United States.  Neoliberal institutionalists would posit that 
state cooperation in establishing a Court with an independent Prosecutor was the 
initiative of states in order to decrease coordination issues, increase information flow and, 
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in essence, built continuous trust.  Historical institutionalists would argue that the Court 
with an independent Prosecutor was established by ‘like-minded’ states which had prior 
domestic legal, political, and institutional experience with such an institutional design.  
Constructivists would argue that the Court was established within a social realm which 
contained a number of fundamental norms which have been institutionalized and 
accepted as appropriate. Finally, liberal pluralists would argue that the Court and its 
Prosecutor were established with the coalescence, agency, and initiative of individuals 
representing ‘like-minded’ governments whom had a number of convergent interest-
based and norm-based stakes in the establishment of the ICC with an independent 
Prosecutor.       
In order to provide an answer to the research question posited above, the chapter 
will begin with a discussion on the pre-Rome negotiating process.  Second, emphasis will 
be placed on the institutional arrangements which preceded the establishment of the ICC, 
as well as on the development of human rights, and other norms, which provided the 
valuational backdrop. Emphasis will further be placed on the negotiation process and 
dynamics in Rome which will provide valuable insight into the reasons why the ICC with 
an independent Prosecutor was established.  Lastly, the five different international 
theoretical explanations will be entertained in order to discern which one provides the 
best narrative for the establishment of the Court.   
The ICC with an independent Prosecutor was established by individuals who, by 
the virtue of their actions, signalled a deep-seated and principled commitment to the 
establishment of the Court.  These individuals originated from states that were 
represented by governments which shared in these principles and beliefs.   It will be 
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argued in this chapter that, given the activism, effort and skill of individual actors during 
the pre-Rome and Rome process, IR theories such as liberal pluralism and liberal 
constructivism provide the most appropriate explanation – and answer – for the question 
posed in this chapter, namely, why the supports won.  
Predicting the Victors via International Relations Theories 
The aim in this section is to discern how the five theories mentioned above would predict 
why states were able to establish the ICC with an independent Prosecutor.  The 
overarching conceptual dichotomy within this discussion is between explanations – or 
theories – which emphasize the primary importance of structural explanations, and those 
theories and explanations which point to the initiative and agency of particular actors as 
primary causes.     
 Neorealism posits that international institutions are established if and when it is in 
the interest of hegemonic actors.  Neorealism points to the overall distribution of power 
as dictating outcomes of the negotiations.  In this conception, great powers should 
generally get their way. Therefore, neorealism does not seem to be able to provide a 
coherent explanation.  In fact, neorealism is better positioned to provide an explanation as 
to why the US, China and even Russia did not join the Court.  The two institutional 
theories – neoliberal institutionalism and historical institutionalism – point to the 
importance of institutional factors when predicting why states were able to establish the 
ICC.  Neoliberal institutionalist theory would point to the shadow of the future as well as 
to path dependence from the tribunals in the 1990s as explanatory variables.  They would 
also point to what issues were discussed during the negotiations, issue-linkage as well as 
the procedural ways in which the negotiations took place in Rome (Sterling – Folker in 
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Dunne, 124). This theory would further point to the motivation of state actors to establish 
more cost-effective means by which individuals would be brought to justice as an 
explanatory factor (Ibid., 126).  Historical institutionalists would also point to path 
dependence and to particular states as being the catalysts in establishing the ICC, states 
which led the charge in fashioning the ICC to their own institutional preference. 
 In contrast to the more structural and institutional explanations briefly outlined 
above, liberal constructivism and liberal pluralism provide additional and deeper 
explanations as to why certain states, represented by key individuals, were successful in 
bringing the Rome conference to a successful conclusion.  Liberal pluralism points to 
agency of individual and states representatives during the negotiations, as well as to the 
persuasive role of NGOs.  Constructivist theory would point to the role of norms and the 
socialization of key actors as key components to the explanatory narrative.  In the final 
analysis, with their emphasis on the activism and the identity and socialization of 
individual agents and actors, liberal pluralism and liberal constructivism provide the most 
complete answer to the questions posited above.  
The Outcome: Who Won and Who Lost 
At the end of the fourth week of the conference, on July 17th, 1998, Ambassador Philippe 
Kirsch of Canada, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole (CW) “brought the 
meeting to order at 7:15…and presented the Draft text as a whole, hoping to fend off 
amendments of any sort” (Weschler, 109).  India and the United States both proposed 
strategic amendments which could have brought the success of the entire conference into 
jeopardy.  India wanted to ensure that the use of nuclear weapons was criminalized 
(Ibid.).  If successful, this would have meant that none of the states that possess nuclear 
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weapons would vote for the Statute.   The United States wanted to introduce language 
whereby non-State Parties would be completely shielded from the reach of the Court.  In 
both cases, Norway – as a strategic initiative of the ‘like-minded group” – tabled ‘non-
action’ motions and both amendments were voted down with overwhelming majorities.  
Thirty minutes later, state delegations voted 120 to 7, with 21 abstentions, to accept the 
Rome Statute of the very first International Criminal Court, which would employ an 
independent Prosecutor. Despite US and Chinese opposition, the majority of states voted 
for the establishment of the Court.85  Irrespective of US objections, along with diplomatic 
and political maneuvering - and the attempted revisions – the Statute was adopted.   
 Overall, then, the adoption of the Rome Statute and the establishment of the ICC 
with an independent Prosecutor despite US, and - to a lesser extent – Chinese opposition 
presents a substantial challenge to realist, but more importantly, neorealist theory.  The 
Court should have not been established without explicit US – or hegemonic – support.  
Further, according to neorealism, the Court should not be – even if established – a 
relevant actor within the international realm.  However, not only is the Court a permanent 
and relevant fixture within the international realm, but it has also enjoyed indirect US 
support, even through the UNSC, as was the case when the Council referred the situations 
of Sudan and Libya to the Court.  
   
Context and Norms: Old, New, Domestic and Global 
In order to investigate the importance and significance of the establishment of the 
permanent International Criminal Court with an independent Prosecutor, an exposition of 
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the global political and normative context is warranted.  The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials 
at the conclusion of World War II seemed to have provided a blueprint and momentum 
for a permanent Court. However, the bipolar power struggle between the United States 
and the Soviet Union prevented the international community from making progress on 
the issue.  As Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon notes, “the creation of the International Criminal 
Court would have been impossible during the Cold War because of great power 
opposition” (Riddell-Dixon, 1090).  The fall of the Berlin Wall, along with the 
fundamental changes within the international realm, provided an opportunity to establish 
the Court. 
 The end of the Cold War, and the thawing of the relations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States, can be seen as the key catalysts which enabled the 
international community to consider purposefully the establishment of an international 
criminal court.  William Schabas and late Christopher Keith Hall of Amnesty 
International noted in interviews that this period can be characterized as a “new political 
landscape” and in the “afterglow of the Cold War” (Schabas and Hall, Interview).  In 
addition, Benjamin Ferencz, one of the Prosecutors at Nuremberg and a strong supporter 
of the ICC, remarked that, as the ILC was considering the notion of establishing an 
international criminal court at the beginning of the 1990s, “Iraq had completed the 
unlawful annexation of its peaceful neighbouring state of Kuwait.  Iraqi troops were busy 
murdering, torturing, raping, pillaging, burning and committing every conceivable war 
crime and atrocity against innocent civilian.  At the same time, terrorism, drug trafficking 
and other crimes against humanity continued unabated” (Ferencz, 385).86 International 
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public opinion deeply condemned these actions.  Simultaneously, the US President at the 
time, President Bush Sr., “warned Iraq to remember Nuremberg; Britain’s Margaret 
Thatcher (as well as Mrs. Bush) had been more explicit in calling for prosecution before a 
Nuremberg-type tribunal” (Ibid.).  In addition, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Foreign 
Minister of Germany at the time told the UN General Assembly, ‘We call for an 
international court of justice of the United Nations where crimes against humanity, 
crimes against peace, genocide, war crimes and environmental criminality can be 
prosecuted and punished” (Ibid.).  Even though there were calls for international 
prosecution of individuals at this time, these calls were made with the sanctity of state 
sovereignty in mind.   
 Underpinning, supplementing and motivating these calls for action with regards to 
Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait – and later its use of chemical weapons against the Iraqi 
Kurd population – was the realization that, on the one hand, a change in the nature of 
conflict had also occurred in the post-Cold War era.  A further realization was that 
citizens of certain states needed explicit protection from agents of the governments who 
were traditionally thought to protect them.  A number of so-called ‘failed states’ and 
‘failing states’ came to exist – and were labelled as such – where governing was either 
impossible for the governments in power, or the government itself was endangering the 
safety and well-being of citizens it was commissioned to protect.  
In key terms, the traditional notions of state security and state sovereignty as 
guiding principles were fundamentally altered.  An alternative principle of state security 
was needed, a principle that would be able to encompass the protection of individuals, 
especially in situations where their safety was endangered by the state.  In 1994, the 
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notion of ‘human security’ was brought to the fore via the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP).  Later on this principle came to animate the foreign policies of 
Canada, Norway and a number of other states.  The developing norm of ‘human security’ 
was later one of the guiding principles and norms which was institutionalized with the 
establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court.  
The sacrosanct nature of state sovereignty came to be challenged in direct ways in 
the post-Cold War international realm.  Hans Corell, the Under-Secretary of the United 
Nations from 1994–2004, noted in an interview that in general terms, those who were 
being ruled needed protection from those who ruled over them (Corell, Interview).  
Supplementing the more general notion of human security was the additional doctrine of 
the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P), and these two principles were operationalized via 
the notion and praxis of intervening on humanitarian grounds – or humanitarian 
intervention.  Humanitarian intervention was undertaken via the notion that the 
international community – in some cases – is justified in overriding the principle of non-
intervention on the territory of a sovereign state if and when that state is ‘unwilling or 
unable to’ govern and protect its citizens. This exact notion of intervening when a state is 
‘unwilling or unable to do so’ came to be enshrined in the preamble of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court.  This principle also guides justifications with respect 
to what situations warrant triggering the jurisdiction of the Court.      
Learning from Prior Institutions  
Prior to the establishment of the ICC, there existed – and still exist – a number of so-
called ad hoc institutions of international criminal justice.  These institutions were 
dubbed ‘ad hoc’ as they were established to address a specific conflict and at a specific, 
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determined and finite period in the past.  Starting from the conclusion of World War I 
and the mid-1990s, “there were five ad hoc international investigative commissions, four 
ad hoc international tribunals, and three internationally mandated or authorized national 
prosecutions arising out of World War I and World War II” (Bassiouni, 11).87 These 
institutions were set up “to appease public demand for a response to the tragic events and 
shocking conduct during armed conflicts” (Ibid.).  From the middle of the 1990s, there 
were seven international criminal tribunals created (Artz, 226).88  
 The 1919 Commission was established by the Allies at the 1919 Preliminary 
Peace Conference in Paris.  On the agenda was the “surrender of Germany and a peace 
treaty” as well as the possible prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany and Turkish 
officials thought to have been responsible for war crimes and violations of the customs of 
war (Bassiouni, 14 -15).  Articles 227, 228 and 229, respectively, set out an ad hoc 
tribunal to prosecute King Wilhelm II, as well as German military officers for acts 
committed during the war (Ibid.).  Out of this preliminary conference emerged the 
“Treaty of Versailles – or the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers 
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and Germany – signed on June 28, 1919” (Bassiouni, 14 – 15).  The commission 
establishing the Treaty of Versailles investigated war crimes allegations and it “submitted 
a list of 895 alleged criminals” in 1920.  It also sought to charge Turkish officials as well 
for ‘crimes against the law of humanity’ based on “the Preamble of the 1907 Hague 
Convention” (Bassiouni, 16).  Although it did carry much weight, the prosecution 
stemming from the treaty did not come to fruition.   
The next institutional approach pursued by the Allies took place at the Palace of 
St. James in 1942 when the Allies established the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission (UNWCC).  This commission essentially led to the establishment of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) (Ibid., 21).   The intention of the 
Allies to prosecute war criminals was further cemented with the Moscow Declaration of 
1943, which was signed by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin.  At that point, there was less 
thought about an institutional approach, and more of capital punishment for the 
perpetrators.  Nearly all three sides agreed to this course of action, with the only dissent 
coming from the United States (US), even after President Truman replaced President 
Roosevelt.  Following the work of the commission and the Declaration, the IMT was 
essentially established on August 8th, 1945 by way of the London Agreement.  It was 
signed by the four major Allied powers as well as nineteen other states.   
The London agreement did contain the charter of the new tribunal as well.  The 
charter essentially reflected the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1929 Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Ibid., 25 – 26).   One 
additional Law – the Control Council Law No. 10 – further contributed to the 
codification of the prosecutions, as it allowed the Allies to prosecute German military 
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personnel within their own respective zones (Ibid., 29). The infractions subject to 
prosecution  were to be  i) crimes against peace; ii) war crimes; iii) crimes against 
humanity.   
Turning one’s attention to the Far East, the Tokyo trials were preceded by the Far 
Eastern Commission which was agreed to in Moscow in December of 1945.  It was 
comprised of eleven states89 and the Commission was based in Washington.  The Allied 
Council of Japan was the local governing body taking directives from Washington.  The 
Council was made up of the US, the United Kingdom, China and Russia.  Its mandate 
was more political as opposed to investigative, as it sought to establish the occupation 
policy in Japan.  The actual Tribunal – dubbed the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East (IMTFE) – and its Charter, issued as an order by General Douglas McArthur, the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers were issues and signed on January 19th, 
1946.  As far as the defendants were concerned, they did not, for example, include the 
Emperor Hirohito, whose prosecution and eventual trial were bypassed out of political 
considerations (Bassiouni, 35).   
Bassiouni dubs the years between the end of the Control Council Law No. 10 
proceedings in 1955 - as well as the end of the proceedings in Tokyo – and the 
establishment of the tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1992 as ‘The 
Years of Silence’.  During this period, according to the author, the ‘rules of the Cold 
War’ dominated.  There was very little progress toward a systemic approach to 
international criminal justice due to the political ‘tug of war’ displayed by the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union and their allies.  In addition, according to Michael P. Scharf, “there 
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were no wars in which a coalition, broadly supported by other members of the 
international community, had defeated an obvious aggressor and violator of the laws of 
war and humanity so decisively as to bring about its complete surrender and subjugation.  
The conventional wisdom was that only defeated war criminals were susceptible to 
international justice” (Scharf, 97).   
With the outbreak of the conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and 
later Rwanda – and the Cold War in the attic of history – the United Nations (UN) and 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) needed to act.  Hardships and setbacks 
notwithstanding, the Security Council did establish the Tribunal on May 3, 1993 when it 
passed Resolution 827, which also included a draft Statute of the Tribunal.  The ICTY 
officially came into existence on May 25th, 1993.  One must pay particular attention to 
the crimes the Statute of the ICTY is able to prosecute: “individual criminal 
responsibility, including that of Head of State…[as well as] … 1) grave breaches of the 
Geneva Convention of 1949; 2) violations of the laws or customs of war; 3) genocide; 
and 4) crimes against humanity” (Ibid., 43).  A further feature of the tribunal was that it 
applied to everyone who violated humanitarian law, as opposed to only a select few, as in 
the case of the IMT and the IMTFE.   
  The Rwandan Commission of Experts was established in July 1994 by the SC 
passing Resolution 935.  The Commission was charged with investigating possible 
genocide as well as ‘grave violations of international humanitarian law’ (Ibid., 46).  The 
Rwandan commission had a total of three weeks to complete its reports and very limited 
resources.  The Report submitted to the Secretary-General “was based on reports made by 
other bodies, and other media and published reports” (Ibid.).  It came into existence 
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temporarily during 1994 – from January 1st until December 31st – but it was not until 
1996 that the ICTR became fully operational.  Due to the nature of the conflict – a civil 
war fought between two ethnic groups within Rwanda – neither the Geneva Conventions 
nor the laws regulating customs of war could be appealed to.  The type of crimes 
prosecuted, therefore, were genocide and crimes against humanity.   
Certain other types of institutions of international criminal justice were set up by 
the UN should also be mentioned here.  The first one is the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, which was established on January 16, 2002.  The UN and the government of 
Sierra Leone established the Court to try individuals responsible “for crimes committed 
in Sierra Leone during the country’s violent conflict after 30th November 1996” 
(Chronology, ICC).  In the case of Cambodia, the negotiations between the United 
Nations, with Ambassador Hans Corell, as the chief UN negotiator, and the Government 
of Cambodia, represented mostly by Prime Minister Sok An, showed little progress.  The 
negotiations lasted from June 21st, 1997 until February 8th, 2002, yet a settlement could 
not be reached between the parties (Corell, Interview).  In the meantime, however, the 
leader of the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot, was brought to trial but in front of a national court.  
Ultimately, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal is administered by the government of Cambodia.   
In the case of East Timor, the UN established the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on October 25, 1999 in order to “administer the 
Territory, exercise legislative and executive authority during the transition period and 
support capacity-building for self-government.” 90    Once East Timor became an 
independent state, UNTAET was replaced by “United Nations Mission of Support in East 
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Timor (UNMISET) established by Security Council resolution 1410 of 17 May 2002 to 
provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political 
stability of East Timor” (Ibid.).  Therefore, the international legal process is administered 
by the UN and it unfolds within the UN authority in East Timor.  Lastly, one must also 
mention the Court of Kosovo.  It is administered by the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which was established by Resolution 1244 
of the SC on June 10th, 1999.  It was administered at first by the Representative of the 
Secretary-General of the UN, Dr. Bernard Kouchner, the then-Foreign Minister of 
France.  
The tribunals were established with resolution passed by the UNSC, and the 
hybrid tribunals were established between the UN and the national judicial institutions.  
Within the legal, territorial and temporal parameters provided for these institutions, the 
Prosecutors, in particular, enjoyed independence.  Yet, precisely due to the above 
mentioned territorial and temporal parameters, none of the ad hoc institutions may be 
dubbed as truly independent – not in the way the ICC and its Prosecutor came to be 
independent of state or UNSC power.  Kirsch and Oosterveld note that the reach and 
mandate of all the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals established thus far “have been limited to 
specific situations” (Kirsch and Oosterveld, 1147).  The number of instances where an 
‘international judicial intervention’ warranted were growing in the post-cold war realm.  
In addition, the most powerful states were – by the very nature of the ad hoc institutional 
arrangements – largely outside the reach of these institutions.  By this very same token 
then, the UNSC could not be seen at the final arbiter in international criminal justice 
(Ibid.).       
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The Pre-Rome Negotiations  
How did the international community establish the ICC with an independent Prosecutor? 
There were a number of international attempts to establish a permanent Court.  The 
international community went so far as to establish a number of ad hoc tribunals which 
addressed particular conflicts within particular time frames. Yet, as Ambassador David 
Scheffer noted, “…as the atrocity crimes of the early 1990s swamped the news and as 
tribunal fatigue undermined the will of the U.N. Security Council to reproduce an ad hoc 
tribunal with every mass killing, international lawyers and governments began to get 
serious about what a permanent court would look like and how it would function in the 
legal jungle of both national and global laws” (Scheffer, 168).  
The calls for establishing a permanent international criminal court originated with 
the UN.  It was via international drug trafficking – on the suggestion of Trinidad and 
Tobago in the General Assembly – that the ILC came to establish the Draft Statute of an 
International Criminal Court.  This first draft statute limited the ICC’s jurisdiction in 
cases that formed the subject of a complaint by a state party or were referred to the Court 
by the Security Council.  It did not allow the Prosecutor to initiate a case absent either of 
these conditions, principally out of fear that an independent prosecutor would lead to 
“politically motivated or frivolous proceedings” (Ibid.).  In 1994, the International Law 
Commission (ILC) declared a Prosecutor with proprio motu powers to be premature “at 
the present stage of development of the international legal system” (Ibid.).  Once the 
negotiations turned to the Preparatory Committee, delegates suggested that the Prosecutor 
should have the ability to initiate investigations based on information received from non-
state sources, such as individuals and NGOs” (Ibid.). Keith Hall noted that during this 
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time “a significantly larger group of delegations than in the Ad Hoc Committee argued 
that the prosecutor should have the power to initiate investigations ex officio or on the 
basis of information obtained from any source, particularly governments, UN organs, and 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations” (Hall 1997, 178). 
Prior to the Rome conference, an additional significant event took place which 
reaffirmed the international legal community’s support for an independent Prosecutor.  
The Max-Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, based in Freiburg 
im Breisgau, Germany, in conjunction with Madame Justice Louise Arbour, the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), organized a two-day workshop, 
from May 28th – May 29th 1998, entitled “The Independence and Accountability of the 
Prosecutor of a Permanent International Criminal Court”.  The aim of the conference was 
to bring together prosecutors from different national jurisdictions across the globe, and 
“identify fundamental principles relating to the independence and accountability of 
prosecutors, as recognized and applied in international instruments and in national 
criminal justice systems, which should also be reflected in a criminal justice institution at 
the international level” (Ambos, 301).   
In essence, according to one of the convenors of the conference, Professor Albin 
Eser of the Max-Planck Institute in Freiburg, Germany, the workshop was organized in 
order to strengthen calls for the independent role of the Prosecutor.  The general fear 
among observers was that the independence of the Prosecutor of the ICC could be greatly 
curtailed.  On the other hand, independence was important because that aim was to have a 
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Prosecutor who is independent from political influence, including the strategic 
calculations of the ‘Permanent 5’ members of the UNSC (Eser, Interview).  
At the end of the workshop, the participants “reached unanimous agreement, and 
issued” a 10-point declaration stating, among other items, that at a ‘minimum’ “the 
international criminal court should have a prosecutor that is separate and independent of 
the court” (Ambos, 302).  In general terms, the declaration also provides a blueprint for 
the powers and responsibilities that the Prosecutor could be endowed with in order to 
function as an independent organ of the Court.   
The Negotiations: Navigating Multilateral Complexity  
There are three key questions which will be addressed in the ensuing discussion.  First, 
faced with a nearly insurmountable task, how did state actors organize for the 
negotiations? Second, how did it come to be that the provision for an independent 
Prosecutor was contained, and later remained, in the Rome Statute? Third, this section 
will also address what the negotiations reveal about why the supporters of the ICC with 
an independent Prosecutor won the diplomatic, political and legal ‘battle’ in Rome? The 
discussion will begin with a narrative about the origin of the idea of an independent 
Prosecutor, and then will touch on the Argentine-German proposal which provided the 
institutional safeguards against an over-politicized Prosecutor.  Then, emphasis will be 
placed on the actors and processes in Rome who were instrumental in ensuring that the 
proprio motu provisions were kept in the Rome statute during the negotiations. It will be 
argued in this section that the way in which key actors took the lead on a number of key 
provisions relating to the independent Prosecutor of the ICC on the one hand, and the 
procedural and leadership novelties by which the negotiations unfolded on the other, 
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show that the establishment of the ICC with and independent Prosecutor was a result of 
individual and group effort by key actors at the Rome conference.   
Actors  
Kirsch and Oosterveld note that the negotiations at Rome should be viewed through a 
‘multilateral negotiations’ model which is “a process of mutual persuasion and 
adjustment of interests and policies which aims at combining non-identical actor 
preferences into a single joint decision” (Kirsch and Oosterveld, 1153).  The authors note 
that “the complicating factor is that common ground not only needs to be found among 
hundreds of states, but also between groups of states” (Ibid.).  The way in which this 
process was simplified at Rome – yet had origins in the pre-Rome negotiations as well – 
was through the formation of a number of state groupings.  The authors note that “the 
Like-Minded group, the Arab group, the Non-aligned Movement, the European Union, 
and the Southern African Development Community,” comprised the key groupings 
during the conference.  These groupings of states “assisted in the resolution of many 
difficult issues, as hundreds of different state approaches were reduced to a handful of 
proposals” (Ibid.).  Of the above mentioned groupings, the Like-Minded Group (LMG) 
was the most influential.  Erik K. Leonard notes that “the Like-Minded Group was 
literally the authors of the Statute. It was their vote that was counted at the end of the 
Rome Conference” (Leonard, 137). It is also important to note that, due to it having a 
clear strategy, the LMG “was the moving force behind the conference’s successful 
conclusion” (Sadat, 43).  The LMG was the group which lobbied on behalf of the final 
package on July 17th, 1998 and adopted a successful defensive strategy against possible 
procedural saboteurs on the last day.    
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 The LMG was founded during the PrepCom sessions, and as opposed to 
dispersing, it was still intact during, and beyond, the Rome conference (Washburn, 367).  
With Canada, Australia, Germany, The Netherlands, Argentina and Norway and South 
Africa at the helm, the group consisted of over sixty states, virtually from all continents, 
save Asia (Ibid., 368). Contributing to the success of the LMG was the fact that “its 
members shared and agreed on a set of principles, arrived at in Rome, which expressed a 
detailed vision of the nature and values of the Court.”   These principles explicitly 
contained a provision for an independent Prosecutor for the Court (Ibid.).         
At Rome, the LMG had a very close relationship with the Bureau, the UN staff, as 
well as with participating NGOs, under the umbrella of the Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court (CICC), the NGO Coalition with “800 member organizations”, which 
“accredited to Rome over 200 institutions and 450 representatives” (Washburn, 367).  
During the conference, the LMG and the CICC worked extremely closely together.  The 
work included the exchange of “information, expertise, strategies, and moral support” 
(Washburn, 368).  One of the reasons why this tri- or quadripartite collaboration took 
place was because these individuals “knew each other personally or by reputation at the 
start of the negotiations, remained in the negotiations through the diplomatic conference 
in Rome, and [were] at the work in the PrepCom in New York” (Washburn, 364).  This 
sense of familiarity and “knowledge of each other’s styles, personalities, and abilities - 
both strengths and weaknesses – provided confidence, predictability and mutual 
forbearance” (Ibid.).91 
                                                     
91
 Some NGO members, in order to show their determination, decided to partake in a hunger strike during the last 4 
days of the conference.  The fear was that if a statute would have not been accepted at the end of the Rome conference, 
the entire project would be in jeopardy. (Interview with Mr. Niccolo Figa-Talamanca.)    
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Washburn notes that “the coordination and support of [the UN staff, members of 
the Bureau and the LMG] by the CICC and its worldwide computer network and 
information system, profoundly influenced every aspect of the Conference and deserved 
much of the credit for its success” (Ibid.).   The NGO community was able to intimately 
observe the negotiations by being present in rooms where the working groups operated.  
Some NGO delegates were even serving on key national delegations.  Mr. Niccollo Figa-
Talamanca, of “No Peace Without Justice” served as the deputy head of the delegation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in Rome.  The aim of this NGO in particular was “to provide 
legal and technical assistance to delegations – through the provision of legal experts who 
worked as a part of these delegations.” This particular NGO alone had approximately “35 
delegates or experts which were seconded to delegations” (Talamanca, Interview).     
In general terms, a further coalition developed between the LMG, the UN, the 
Bureau and the CICC.  In the case of the ‘Non Aligned Movement’ this group was quite 
active throughout the conference.  However during the last day of the conference, when 
India – a key member of the Movement – introduced amendments to divert the 
acceptance of the ‘final package’, and when other members of the Movement itself did 
not support these amendments, it because clear that Non-Aligned Movement did not 
seemed to have a “formal position on [those] proposals” (Ibid.).  This dynamic also 
showed that it was a ‘less-than-cohesive’ negotiating block.   
With respect to the ‘Permanent 5’ members of the UNSC, they did not nearly 
seem to exhibit the cohesiveness of the LMG.  The United Kingdom drew away from the 
group when, in 1997, and with the election of the Blair Labour government in London, it 
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“swung around the Singaporean 92  proposal,” along with supporting an independent 
Prosecutor for the ICC (Weschler, 93).  With this move by the UK, “Britain became the 
first and only Permanent Five member to join…the ‘like-minded’ group …” (Weschler, 
93).  France was not a member of the LMG, but it did vote – and later ratified – the RS 
after it “[cut] a last-minute deal with Kirsch on their main concern: a seven-year opt-out 
clause, inside the treaty itself, limited on war crimes alone” (Weschler,105). Russia, 
China and the US seemed to have been on the same diplomatic wavelength.  Russia even 
organized “an exclusive private dinner” on July 13th, during the last week of the 
conference to “pressure…renegade Britain,” but to no avail due to the “impressive 
lobbying blitz” of the NGO community (Weschler, 105).  Later on, Russia voted for the 
‘final package’ and signed the RS signalling that ‘in principle’ it supported the Statute.   
The US and China were the only two members of the ‘Permanent 5’ which voted against 
the RS, in the midst of quite curious company: “Libya, Iraq, Yemen, Qatar, and Israel…” 
(Weschler, 108).  Both Libya and Iraq were still ruled at this time by dictators, Colonel 






Where does the idea of an independent Prosecutor originate from, and by what processes 
and dynamics was it included in the final draft of the Rome Statute? The origins of the 
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 The ‘Singaporean proposal’ enabled the UNSC to request a stay of proceedings for a renewable 12 month period.  
This proposal involved a proverbial ‘slight-of-hand’ because in the event that the UNSC could request such a stay, its 
permanent 5 members must agree to the proposal to do so.  With the UK and France in the ‘yes’ camp, a unanimous 
agreement of the P5 could be quite difficult at best.  
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idea of an independent Prosecutor can be traced back to a document published by 
Amnesty International in 1994 in response to the draft statute that originated within the 
International Law Commission (ILC).  The document, entitled Establishing a Just, Fair, 
and Effective International Criminal Court, noted that “the Prosecutor should be able to 
initiate investigations on his own initiative or after receiving a complaint by or on behalf 
of an individual with respect to any crime where the Court has jurisdiction over the 
suspect and the crime” (Document, Amnesty International, 25).   The document lists three 
particular reasons why an independent Prosecutor is preferable to a Prosecutor which 
would receive cases or situations solely from states or from the UNSC.  First, 
investigations originating from states could be “for political reasons.”  Second, referrals 
from the UNSC “may put pressure on the Prosecutor to initiate investigations in a 
particular case.” Finally, and a reason which is echoed by observers and practitioners 
alike, “there is also a risk that few states will bring complaints against nationals of other 
states because such complaints might be viewed as infringing the sovereignty of those 
states or as interfering with political relations with those states” (Amnesty International, 
25).  Lloyd Axworthy noted that, if the Prosecutor was subject to the demands of the 
UNSC, the court would not be an independent court because the ‘permanent 5’ of the 
UNSC would use the court for their own interests (Axworthy, Interview).  The document 
noted that “not many states have used the state complaint procedures in human rights 
treaties” (Amnesty International, 26).   
 Yet the draft statute only contained provisions for states and the UNSC to trigger 
the jurisdiction of the Court.  Silvia A. Fernandez DeGurmendi, member of the Argentine 
delegation at Rome, and later a Judge at the ICC, noted that “at the 1996 session of the 
213 
 
Preparatory Committee, some governments expressed the view that developments in 
international law had not yet reached a stage where the international community as a 
whole was prepared to empower the Prosecutor to launch criminal investigations proprio 
motu” (DeGurmendi in Roy, 177).  From this perspective, if a “widespread acceptance of 
the Court was to be achieved,” it was quite ‘unrealistic’ to call for the proprio motu 
provisions (Ibid.). 
During the later stages of the negotiations in the PrepComs, Argentina and 
Switzerland introduced an expanded version of the powers of the Prosecutor, expanded 
from the original draft originating from the ILC.  During the same PrepCom, in August, 
1997, Argentina first put forward “orally a proposal to the effect that, while still at an 
early stage of the proceedings, the decision of the Prosecutor would be subject to another 
organ of the Court” (Ibid., 183).  During the last PrepCom in April, 1998, Argentina and 
Germany proposed the institution of the Pre-Trial Chamber before the Prosecutor would 
proceed with a proprio motu investigation (Ibid.).  This proposal “received favourable 
responses from some delegations,” which signalled that the institutional safeguards could 
motivate other states to support the establishment of an independent Prosecutor.93  An 
anonymous participant at the Rome conference noted in a conversation that the 
establishment of the independent Prosecutor “was possible because of the existence of the 
pre-trial chamber.”94 
The negotiations at Rome – held between June 15th, 1998 and July 17th, 1998 at 
the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) headquarters – were undertaken partially 
in the so-called ‘Committee of the Whole’ (CW) chaired by Ambassador Phillippe Kirsch 
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 Conversation in New York, December 13th, 2011 
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of Canada (Washburn, 363).   Ambassador Hans Corell, the then-Under-Secretary 
General of the UN, noted in an interview that the CW was a “key element in creating a 
collaborative political atmosphere”(Corell, Interview). 95   Ambassador Kirsch was 
assisted by members of the so-called ‘Bureau’ which “in practice involved all elected 
officials of a UN body or conference.  These [were] members of state delegations” 
(Washburn, 363).  Members of the Bureau were assisted by “members of the Secretariat 
assigned to assist the officials and other persons they may appoint as Conference 
secretaries, rapporteurs, coordinators, drafters and the like” (Ibid.).  In conjunction with 
state delegations, NGO support and advocacy, the conference personnel were entrusted 
with attaining consensus – or  at least a favourable outcome – out of a draft text which 
initially contained “116 articles with 1700 brackets containing disagreed language” 
(Ibid.).  The negotiators met in the COW, in ‘coordinator-working group processes’, in 
informal meetings as well as in so-called ‘informal-informals’96 as well.     
 Within this quite familiar set of arrangements, “the structure, organization and 
operational process of the negotiations had several unique characteristics” (Washburn, 
366). Washburn notes that the “negotiations were always conducted on an existing text, 
not on accumulations of proposals” (Ibid.). This meant that debates on particular issues 
could be completed within the context of the entire draft statute (Ibid.).  Every proposal 
by a state “appeared as a separate U.N. document.  Following negotiation of this 
document, a revised text was issued indicating any suggested changes that had been 
proposed.  This made clear to the participants that changes were encouraged and should 
be negotiated” (Ibid.).  States which paid special attention to certain provisions in the text 
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 Interview with Dr. Hans Corell, the then-Under-Secretary General of the UN, July 11, 2011 
96
 The so-called ‘informal-informals’ were off-the-record, behind closed doors-type of consultations between 
delegations.   
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were called on by the Chairman to connect with states which were ‘dragging behind’.  In 
this way, states were brought ‘on board’ with provisions in the text (Ibid.).   
A further benefit of this process was that it encouraged state delegations to pool 
their ideas and so the resulting text included the proposal of not only one but many 
delegations all at the same time (Ibid.).  An additional benefit of this strategy was that it 
encouraged state delegations to find common grounds on important issues.  At the end 
then, “once the negotiation of a document was complete, a final draft would be issued 
and incorporated into the integral, but constantly changing draft text of the whole statute” 
(Ibid.).   
Procedurally, Washburn notes, “the formal working groups in both the 
Commission and the Conference were supported by coordinators appointed by the 
respective bureaus who facilitated the discussion of individual issues”97 (Washburn 368).  
The chairpersons of the working groups were asked to only submit text to the CW which 
has been agreed upon (Ibid.).  The Bureaus were also engaged in “wide and intense inter-
sessional activities to maximize the effectiveness of formal meetings” and processes 
whereby “during formal sessions, simultaneous work on large and small pieces of the 
rolling text by very numerous groups and sub-groups ranging from formal working 
groups that were part of the established structure of the PrepCom and the Rome 
Conference to negotiating parties of all sizes” (Washburn, 366 – 367).  If at any point in 
time the negotiations slowed down because of too wide a gap with respect to state 
positions, Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the UN would contact high level decision 
makers in the appropriate capitals (Corell, Interview).  
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 The exceptions to these dynamics were the negotiations dealing with Part 2 of the Statute which dealt with 
jurisdictional issues and the trigger mechanism, and which included the role of the Prosecutor as well.   
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The negotiations on Part 298 of the statute – which included the provision for the 
proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor – were exceptional because it was understood by 
the participants that “the final form of this section of the Statute would determine the 
eventual effectiveness and viability of the Court” (Washburn, 369).  Finally, these 
participants also “had to address these issues individually and in their complex 
interconnectedness with each other” (Ibid.).  In the words of the then-Foreign Minister of 
Canada, Lloyd Axworthy, the issue of the independent Prosecutor was a ‘deal-breaker’ 
(Axworthy, Interview).   
During the negotiations, the issue of the independence of the Prosecutor was 
discussed – in the Committee of the Whole – over five working days and spanned across 
nine working sessions – out of a total of forty-two.  Yet, if one considers Session 7 where 
the issue of the proprio motu powers was included, along with Session 15 where the 
Office of the Prosecutor was discussed, and finally Session 25 where the first Bureau 
paper was introduced, then it is quite clear that over 25% of the entire discussion during 
the month-long negotiations was spent discussing the issue of the proprio motu powers of 
the Prosecutor in some fashion or form.    
At Rome, there were 82 states commenting in favour of the proprio motu powers 
of the Prosecutor (Bassiouni, 167 – 401).  Virtually all of them belonged to the ‘like-
minded’ group.  States such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, the 
Nordic states all favoured the establishment of an independent Prosecutor.  It is also quite 
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 Part 2 contains “the crimes it may try and their basic elements, the limited ways that cases may reach it, the place of 
the Security Council in its work, the duties and prerogatives of the prosecutor, and the rules and procedures for the 
Court’s determination of the admissibility of cases” (Washburn, 369).   
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clear that states with a more authoritarian past and present – along with outliers such as 
the US, Israel and Japan – were quite vehemently opposed to such a proposal.99  
In general, there were three central issues debated during the negotiations that 
seem to have been crucial for the establishment of an independent Prosecutor.  The first 
one, the German-Argentine proposal regarding the role of the Pre-Trial chamber – as an 
institutional ‘check’ – was widely supported in Rome (Wenaweser, Interview).  Out of 82 
states which supported the notion of an independent Prosecutor, 34 states favoured the 
notion that the Prosecutor must make his/her case before the Pre-Trial Chamber before 
proceeding with an indictment.100  The gravity and importance of this institutional feature 
was so strong in fact that at the very end of the negotiations, when further safeguards 
could have been added to the Statute, these safeguards were left out.  This particular 
feature seems to have assured the negotiators that the Prosecutor would have additional 
checks and balances on his or her conduct.   
The second issue that was debated – and accepted – in Rome was the issue of how 
the Prosecutor would learn of possible situations.  A number of ‘like minded’ states along 
with the NGOs were arguing – in Rome and in the PrepComms – that information should 
be accepted by the Prosecutor from any source: individuals, victims, or NGOs.  Out of 82 
states, 16 supported information provision from any source.101     
The third key issue debated quite widely in Rome – an issue which was 
necessarily tied to the success of establishing an independent Prosecutor – was the role of 
the UNSC in the process (Schabas, 2011).  In particular, the issue seemed to be the veto 
power of the ‘permanent 5’.  In other words, not only referrals by the UNSC were at issue 
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but also in what manner – if at all – the UNSC could block a prosecution at the Court.  
Overall, the aim by the ‘like minded group’, other groupings, and the NGOs, was to limit 
the possibility that the UNSC could block the pursuit of a particular case at the ICC.  The 
Singaporean proposal seemed to have persuaded many.  The ‘like minded’ group along 
with the NGOs were successful in ascertaining that there are as few barriers to access to 
the Court as possible.   
One additional comment is warranted here regarding the negotiations.  As  is 
evident from APPENDIX I and APPENDIX II, those states that were in support of an 
independent Prosecutor argued for a much narrower set of provisions with respect to the 
Prosecutor.  In fact there were five issues areas on which 82 states commented – or 
converged.  In the case of those that did not support an independent Prosecutor, they 
commented on 10 different issues.  Not only due to their sheer number, but the 
convergence around a small set of issues may in fact have assured success for the states 
that argued for an independent Prosecutor.  In the case of those that did not support an 
independent Prosecutor, they were not united in any loose sense of the word.  This latter 
group also made a wider range of comments that showed more individual interest as 
opposed to any will for convergence or concerted effort.     
In order to navigate this labyrinth of positions on the issue of the independent 
Prosecutor, and on countless other issues as well, the Chairman of the Conference, 
Ambassador Kirsch, resorted to bilateral and private meetings in order to gauge the ‘real’ 
position of the participants.  This endeavour did not bring any further progress to the 
negotiations on this part of the Statute.  The negotiating positions of the delegations were 
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too divergent for a consensus (Washburn, 369).  This also meant that, most likely, 
delegations would have to vote on the Statute, as opposed to accepting it by consensus.  
Ambassador Kirsch hosted a meeting on July 5th at the Canadian Embassy in 
Rome to “to explore possible areas of compromise and to analyze the reactions of 
delegations” (Kirsch and Holmes, 5).  The positions of the delegations at this point on 
Part 2 of the negotiations were still very divergent.  The Bureau then decided on July 6th 
that it must “take the lead in moving the negotiations forward” (Ibid.).  It issued a 
discussion paper on Part 2 of the negotiations and made it available to the negotiators the 
following day (Ibid.).  The paper “incorporated the texts of articles that had already been 
substantially negotiated but, despite the strong trends in the debate, maintained several 
options” (Kirsch and Holmes, 6).  The authors note that the structure of the paper was 
accepted but there were still great divisions with respect to the substance of the paper.  At 
this point, state delegations were very much holding onto their entrenched negotiating 
positions (Ibid.).  During bilateral meetings with delegations, the Chairman of the 
conference noted that some delegations were willing to compromise on certain issues in 
private but not in a public setting (Ibid.).  On July 10th, it was decided that the Bureau had 
to continue the building of common grounds on as many issues as possible. (Ibid.). As a 
result, the Bureau issued yet another proposal to state delegations (Ibid.).  The reaction of 
delegations to this second paper was, on the one hand “strong, almost confrontational,” 
but, simultaneously, “previously difficult issues became surprisingly muted” (Ibid.).  The 
participants noted at this stage of the negotiations that “the end game was near,” and 
delegations needed to focus on “key priority concerns” (Ibid.). Discussion on these issues 
was opened on July 9th in the CW, where states were asked to only address issues that 
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were noted by the Bureau (Washburn, 370).  The importance of these discussions was 
that the Bureau was able to note which delegations supported the provision in the paper, 
and which delegations did not.  In essence, it was a ‘virtual vote’ before the final vote on 
the statute. 
Dealing with issues contained in Part 2 of the Statute, the second Bureau paper 
“maintained two alternatives for the Security Council’s ability to defer cases before the 
court and also contained an option that no such provision be included” (Kirsch and 
Holmes, 8). Only some delegations resisted the involvement of the Security Council, but 
this resistance remained up until the final days of the conference.  With respect to the 
Prosecutor, the paper “retained the provision of permitting the prosecutor to initiate cases 
proprio motu with no ‘zero option’.  However, to balance this approach, reference was 
made to the possibility of “adding safeguards before the prosecutor could act on his or 
her own” (Ibid.).  The initiative of the Bureau in relation to the Prosecutor elicited very 
few comments and discussion, which meant to many that “the battle against an 
independent prosecutor had been lost” (Ibid.).   
As the final days of the conference drew near, agreement was still lacking on key 
issues.  The Bureau had two options: to ask the delegations to vote on a ‘final package’ or 
to note to the delegations that a second negotiating conference was needed due to a lack 
of agreement on the statute (Kirsch and Holmes, 9-10).  It was decided that the first 
option would be attempted.  Members of the Bureau and the Chairman met with a 
number of delegations in the days before July 17th (Ibid.).  The Bureau then submitted the 
‘final package’ to the CW on July 16th, and on the next day, the last day of the 
conference, state delegations received it.  In the final package, “the bureau maintained the 
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approach it had taken since the beginning of the conference: it sought to attract the 
broadest possible support for the statute” (Ibid.).  The Bureau viewed that “a strong court 
required more than strong provisions in the statute.  The court would also need 
widespread political and financial support to ensure its credibility and effectiveness in the 
world” (Ibid.).  The fear with the final package was that delegations would not accept the 
final statute via procedural machinations (Kirsch and Holmes, 11).  Surprisingly, this was 
not the case.   
During the final hours of the conference, the ‘like-minded group’ continued its 
advocacy, and “developed a strategy to counter procedural challenges to the adoption of 
the package as a whole” (Ibid.).  This foresight was invaluable when India introduced a 
motion to limit the role of the UNC and to criminalize the use of nuclear weapons.  In 
turn, Norway introduced a ‘non-action’ motion which was supported by a majority of the 
delegations.  Similarly, Norway introduced a further ‘no-action’ motion against 
amendments introduced by the US that would have shielded non-party states from the 
jurisdictional reach of the Court.  The overwhelming majority of states supported the 
second ‘no-action’ motion as well.  With amendments which could “unraveled the final 
package” out of the way, the stage was set for the adoption of the Rome Statute.  
The US and the Negotiations 
In this section, emphasis will be placed on the role and negotiating tactics of the US 
delegation during the conference.  Attention will be paid to the positions put forth by the 
delegation, the negotiating tactics, and on the reasons why the US did not vote for the 
final package.  It will be argued that the main culprit for the US failure was the absolutely 
rigid stance held by the delegation – echoing the positions of the Pentagon and key 
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members of the US Senate – with respect to the way in which US service members 
needed to be shielded from the legal reaches of the Court.102   
Before the US ‘unsigned’ the RS and opposed the Court during the first 
Administration of George W. Bush,103 not only did the US initially sign the RS but it also 
played a necessarily key role during the Rome negotiations.  Lawrence Weschler noted 
that US was represented by a “forty strong, and easily the best prepared and most 
professionally disciplined [team] at the Conference” (Weschler, 91).  The head of its 
delegation was Ambassador David Scheffer, who had enourmous expertise in 
international criminal jurisprudence.  The US did also “chair one of the Committee of the 
Whole’s working groups.  The US was also the vice-president of the entire conference, 
and a member of both the Committee of the Whole and the Drafting Committee” 
(Washburn, 373).  In simple terms, the US delegation was ‘front and center’ during the 
negotiations.     
 The US, however, was not a part of the ‘private meetings’ between the LMG, the 
UN team, the Bureau, and the CICC.  Washburn however noted that “it was through these 
private meetings that the Chairman was provided with essential parts of his strategy, and 
the discussions in them were an indispensable instrument for pursuing these strategies” 
(Washburn, 374).  The US belonged to “no group or bloc in the negotiations” (Ibid.).   
The US was left to its own devices, with no real negotiating partner.  What is further 
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important is that the “US began from a position of extreme scepticism” (Washburn, 
Interview).104   
 During the negotiations, the US’s ‘bottom line’ was absolutely rigid, and it 
reinforced Senator Jesse Helms’ and the Pentagon’s view that no US service member 
could be brought under the jurisdiction of the Court under any circumstances.  David 
Scheffer noted that “[r]epresenting the world’s sole remaining superpower, American 
soldiers … stand to be uniquely subject to frivolous, nuisance accusations by parties of 
all sorts.  And we simply cannot be expected to expose our people to those sorts of risks.  
We are dead serious about this.  It is an absolute bottom line for us” (Weschler, 92).  
 In order to ensure this ‘bottom line’, the US did lose a number of significant 
battles, including the battle against the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor, as well as 
the battle of over the jurisdiction of the Court.  The US was adamant that the Court 
should not have jurisdiction over an individual citizen of a state that is a non-party to the 
statute.  David Scheffer and the US delegation insisted that “when it came to the question 
of jurisdiction, … not only … would the United States refuse to sign any treaty that dealt 
with jurisdiction in any other manner, but it ‘would have to actively oppose’ any resultant 
Court” (Weschler, 99). The delegation noted however that if its conditions are met then it 
“could seriously consider favourably recommending that it sign the ICC Treaty at an 
appropriate moment in the future” (Ibid.).  The message was quite clear: “defy us and 
we’ll kill the baby; accede to our terms and, well, we’re not sure; we’ll see” (Ibid.).   
 This negotiating tactic did not seem very reasonable to other delegations, while 
some, such as Botswana outright noted “the breathtaking arrogance” of the US position.  
It was also clear that, due to the fact that key domestic political actors on the issue, such 
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as Senator Jesse Helms and the Pentagon, were vehemently opposed to the Court, giving 
in to US demands would not bring it any closer to joining the Court.  David Matas, a 
member of the Canadian delegation, noted that “David Scheffer could draft the entire 
document, every single word of it…and the Senate would never ratify it.  It took America 
forty years to ratify the Geneva Convention.  The United States still hasn’t even ratified 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. So one has to wonder: why even bother trying 
to meet such demands?” (Weschler, 100) 
Despite all the above, the US was kept in the ‘negotiating game’ so-to-speak, as it 
was in constant contact with the Bureau and the Chairman of the Bureau as well.  The US 
delegation was “consulted almost every day by Kirsch, members of the U.N. team, 
leaders of the LMG and NGOs and by representatives of the various negotiating groups 
and caucuses” (Washburn, 374).  Some delegations openly expressed their wish for the 
US to come on board, and that without US support, the Court could not be a ‘workable’ 
Court (Weschler, 104).  Some observers noted – and feared – that in the final days and 
hours, the US would keep asking for concessions, especially on the proprio motu powers 
of the Prosecutor.  However, the US delegation seemed to have been fixated on “that 
Helms/Pentagon imperative – that there be explicit language in the Treaty guaranteeing 
that no American could ever fall under the Court’s sway even if the only way to 
accomplish that was going to be by the U.S. not joining the treaty” (Ibid.). The Bureau 
offered to restrict the power and reach of the Prosecutor by “requiring the Prosecutor to 
attain a unanimous vote of a five-judge panel if there was going to challenge the efficacy 
of any given country’s complementary efforts” (Weschler, 105). However, there was no 
‘give’ from the US delegation.  In Weschler’s comments, “they seemed on an incredibly 
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short leash. Clearly, they had their instructions from back home – and very little room to 
maneuver” (Ibid.).   
Battle Lost 
Ambassador Scheffer points to five overarching issues which shed light on the failure of 
the US negotiating strategy in Rome.  These issues also influenced the US position with 
respect to the independent Prosecutor. First, he points to the Pentagon’s “reluctance to 
describe its changing role in the world following the Cold War” (Scheffer, 227). Second, 
the constant presence of Republican Senator Jesse Helms’ staff – as well as the damaging 
ideas regarding the Court – did, according to a number of different sources, provide an 
unnecessary inertia to the more pro-ICC perspectives shared by some members of the US 
delegation as well in Washington. Third, Ambassador Scheffer pointed to “the 
Washington bureaucracy[‘s]…inability to make policy decisions on complex treaties in a 
timely manner” (Ibid.). The fourth issue was President Clinton prioritizing his visit to 
China over the issue of the ICC, and his entanglement with the Monica Lewinsky case, as 
well as the political fall-out that followed.  Lastly, Ambassador Scheffer also points to a 
“mysterious set of ‘talking points’ reportedly prepared for then-Defence Secretary 
William Cohen” which appeared in the New York Times as critical and key for the US 
failure in Rome (Ibid.).  
However, at the heart of the US failure to negotiate a successful outcome with 
respect to the independent Prosecutor, and the ICC as a whole, was its insistence on the 
involvement of the UNSC in triggering the jurisdiction of the Court.  As Ambassador 
Scheffer noted, “we undermined our own position by sticking so fervently to the Security 
Council as the controlling factor for referrals” (Scheffer, 2010).  This negotiating position 
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originated from within the Pentagon.  Lloyd Axworthy, Canada’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs at the time, remarked that even though “the US under President Clinton had been 
one of the most ardent backers of the International Criminal Court…once into the 
negotiations, [members of the US delegation] found themselves bracketed by opposition 
from the US military, who were concerned about their soldiers being prosecuted” 
(Axworthy, 203).   
 Further connected to the issue of the independent Prosecutor was the issue of 
states ability to provide their consent to one of their citizens being brought in front of the 
Court.  This issue was also deeply connected to not only the proprio motu powers of the 
Prosecutor but also to the US position on this issue as well.  Once again, the Pentagon’s 
role was key.  During a meeting with Hillary Clinton prior to leaving for Rome, 
Ambassador Scheffer noted that James E. Baker, a legal advisor at the NSC stated that 
“since the President finally understood the role of the military, if he were to support the 
Pentagon position President Clinton would earn the military’s permanent respect and 
allegiance.  And that meant that he needed to back the current U.S. insistence on full 
immunity from prosecution by the court as both a nonparty state and as a possible future 
state party to the court” (Scheffer, 197).  Ambassador Scheffer later remarked that that “is 
exactly what he did” (Scheffer, 197).  Even after the conclusion of the Rome conference, 
“only intense objections from the Pentagon prevented the Clinton administration from 
advocating a permanent world criminal court.”105  
The second factor which deeply influenced not only the rigidity of the US 
position on the independent Prosecutor but also the Court as a whole – and which really 
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hamstrung the US in Rome – was the rhetoric, and later actions, of the former US Senator 
Jesse Helms of South Carolina.  Axworthy commented that “with the Republicans in 
control of the senate, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse 
Helms, was exploiting his power to hold up appointments and determine budgets in order 
to blackmail the administration on crucial issues, especially multilateral ones” 
(Axworthy, 203).  Anthony Lewis further noted that “the real reason for the U.S. position 
may have been Senator Jesse Helms, who said any treaty exposing Americans even 
theoretically to such a court would be ‘dead on arrival’ in the Senate.”106 Ambassador 
Scheffer himself stated that even with a treaty fully addressing US concerns, one would 
not be able to predict if, and when, the US Senate would ratify the treaty (Scheffer, 
Speech, 1999).   
  Senator Helms – along with Senator Ron Grams of Minnesota – directly sent 
staffers to the Rome conference.  These staffers were a part of the US delegation.  
Ambassador Scheffer remarked that he was “under instructions to accommodate them as  
courtesy to the legislative branch” (Scheffer, 229).  The presence of these staffers “was 
very destructive [and] undermined my authority as a negotiator and, in my view, US 
interests” (Scheffer, 229).  The dynamic that was created in Rome – as well as prior to 
Rome – gave the appearance of a delegation in discord at best, and a confused one at 
worst. In essence, Senator Jesse Helms’ rhetoric about the treaty being ‘dead on arrival’ 
in the US Congress gave the impression to other governments that “he was Washington 
speaking to them” (Scheffer, 229).       
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       The third major issue that led to the US failure in Rome was the inability of key 
decision-makers on this issue in Washington to provide precise and accurate instructions 
to the negotiating team, and do so in a timely manner.  In essence, the US delegation did 
not learn in time “how to make hard decisions, of considerable complexity, early enough 
to transform the negotiations” (Scheffer, 229).  The ‘nowhere to be found’ instructions 
were echoed by John Washburn who noted that the US “had neither the flexible but 
detailed instructions, nor the timely backstopping and responsiveness from its capital, 
enjoyed by other delegations from comparable countries” (Washburn, 373).   
  The fourth factor in US failure was the President Clinton’s preoccupation with 
the fallout from the Lewinsky affairs and his upcoming visit to China.  Perhaps the lack 
of attention to the negotiations by President Clinton was indeed a function of ‘bad 
timing’.  However, as Ambassador Scheffer noted, he did not have access to, nor did he 
have private audience with, President Clinton immediately prior to, nor during the Rome 
Conference. 
 Lastly, Ambassador Scheffer notes that a curious set of ‘talking points’, allegedly 
prepared for Defence Secretary William Cohen, were published in the New York Times.  
The ‘talking points’ “threatened that the United States might withdraw its troops from 
Europe if Germany kept pressing for universal jurisdiction for the court” (Scheffer, 227).  
Naturally, the Department of Defence noted that it did not have knowledge of such a 
document, and the document could have not originated from the Pentagon (Scheffer, 
227).  In any case, the existence and publishing of these ‘talking points’ underscore 
Ambassador Scheffer’s point about the perceived role of the Pentagon in the post-Cold 
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War World: the Pentagon in essence was ‘stuck in the past’ on the one hand, and on the 
other, it was incapable of clearly articulating its position in the ‘new world order’.   
Why did the Supporters Win: Explanations via International Relations 
Theory 
How might theories of international relations explain why the supporters of the ICC with 
an independent Prosecutor won in Rome?  In this section, emphasis will be placed on the 
tenets – and explanatory prowess – of neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism, constructivism and liberal pluralism in order to provide a satisfactory 
answer to the question posed above.  The emphasis will placed on discerning whether 
agency or structure – as general theoretical notions – help explain the formation of the 
ICC with an independent Prosecutor.  It will be argued in this section that liberal 
pluralism and liberal constructivism – with their emphasis on the activism of actors – are 
equipped to provide the best explanation.  Agency, in other words, carried the day in 
Rome, as opposed to the structural factors of the negotiations.   
 In the case of the ICC with an independent Prosecutor, neorealism is at a loss to 
explain why the Court was established with its particular institutional design features. 
The US, while being intimately involved in the process of establishing the Court – and 
even winning a number of different concessions – did not vote for the final draft statute.  
It did sign the treaty yet later the US government withdrew from – or ‘unsigned’ – the 
statute, and actively opposed the ICC.  Neorealists would further note that the Court, 
without explicit major power support, would be ineffective.  Yet at the same time, the 
Court is functioning and it is supported – albeit indirectly – by the US.  In sum, the basic 
tenets of neorealism cannot explain why an international organization such as the ICC 
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was established, not only without the explicit support of the US, but also despite its 
opposition to the work of the Court.  
Neoliberalism does provide, yet only at most, a satisfactory explanation.  States 
cooperated to establish a permanent Court in order, once and for all, to provide a venue 
for, and establish a process, to bring to justice individuals who have committed certain 
type of crimes during international or intra-national conflicts.  States further cooperated 
at Rome in order to establish a more legally robust institution which would not only 
become a permanent fixture in the fight against impunity but would also be a more 
logistically and financially efficient institution as well.  Dealing with ‘tribunal fatigue’, 
states were then willing to join forces to establish a permanent institution which would 
bind all of its members to the same legal and procedural standards.  In general terms, 
neoliberal institutionalism places explanatory emphasis on inter-state cooperation to 
mitigate the opacity of what the future may hold.  Within this institutional forum, states, 
along with the hegemons, will be persuaded to cooperate for mutual benefit.   
Even though neoliberal institutionalism provides a satisfactory explanation for the 
establishment of the Court with an independent Prosecutor, by focusing on state-level 
analysis, a substantial amount of nuance is neglected. First and foremost, it was not only 
states but individual actors – representing individual states, nonetheless – who were 
responsible for advocating and later compelling other state participants and delegations to 
vote for the final draft.  Second, not all states cooperated to establish the Court.  The 
statute did not receive unanimous support in Rome.  Some states, such as the US, China 
and Russia, which, due to their stature within the international realm had very little to 
fear from the Court, chose not to cooperate.       
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 Historical institutionalism would suggest that the ICC with an independent 
Prosecutor was established as a function of ‘path dependence’ originating within the 
earlier institutional manifestations of international criminal justice.  In other words, the 
ICC was designed based on the institutional blueprints provided by the tribunals, and 
even national judicial institutions.  In certain ways, the institutional design of the ICC 
does reflect certain institutional continuities with the design features of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. More specifically, the 
Prosecutors of the tribunals – or even Prosecutors in most domestic legal systems – are 
thought to be independent in some regard.  The Prosecutors are independent in that they 
are able to determine who gets brought in front of justice and for what reasons; but only 
within well defined territorial, jurisdictional and even temporal parameters. However, the 
scope of the ICC – its global reach, unabated by most temporal and territorial constraints 
– bestows certain independence on the Prosecutor of the ICC which is not enjoyed by the 
Prosecutors of the tribunals or by Prosecutors in national legal systems.  In legal and 
legislative terms, the Prosecutor of the ICC may initiate investigations into any situation 
where crimes which fall under the jurisdiction of the Court are committed.  Therefore, in 
the work of the Prosecutor, there is much more institutional innovation as opposed to 
institutional continuity.  The entire notion of establishing an independent Prosecutor 
rested on institutional innovation.  Mme. Louise Arbour, Dr. Albin Eser, along with the 
organizers of the Freiburg conference, aimed to ensure that the idea of an independent 
Prosecutor received substantial support prior to the Rome conference.  Further, the aim of 
the German-Argentine proposal was also to ensure that the institution of an independent 
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Prosecutor became much more independent than Prosecutors of the tribunals were, and 
more independent than what certain delegations suggested.   
Turning the attention to liberal pluralism, the utility of this theory is such that it 
places causal importance on not only individual actors but on domestic interests groups 
as well. With the theoretical tenets of this theory then one may argue – and quite 
successfully at that – that it was individuals and groups who established the ICC with an 
independent Prosecutor.  Individuals representing different governments, key state 
groupings during the Rome conference, along with the key conference organs such as the 
Bureau, were central to the establishment of the Court, even though their role is often 
‘underestimated.’107  Dr. Morten Bergsmo, a member of the Norwegian delegation at 
Rome, noted in an interview at the United Nations in New York that Article 15 of the RS, 
which contains the provisions for an independent Prosecutor, was in fact single-handedly 
negotiated by representatives of France, Germany and Argentina, in the persona of 
Gilbert Bitti of France, the late Hans-Peter Kaul of Germany, and Fabricio Guareglia of 
Argentina (Bergsmo, Interview).108 
More specifically, and for the most part, it was liberal democratic states and their 
representatives who helped establish the Court.  Starting with the LMG, it was led by, 
and was made up of, liberal-democratic, social democratic and newly democratizing 
states.  More specifically, the leaders of this group, such as Canada, Norway, and the 
United Kingdom, were represented by delegates who had vested interests in establishing 
the Court.  Lloyd Axworthy, the then-Foreign Minister of Canada, along with the 
Chairperson of the Committee of the Whole, Ambassador Philippe Kirsch were 
                                                     
107
 Schabas, Dr. William. Personal Interview. New York. 05 April 2011.  
108
 Bergsmo, Morten. Personal Interview. United Nations Headquarters. New York. December 2011. 
233 
 
instrumental in ensuring that state representatives – at Rome and on a global scale – 
understood what is at stake in establishing this institution in the particular form it took.  
Further, Rolf Einar Fife of Norway and his delegation had a very significant impact on 
the negotiations when, at the very end of the Conference, Norway blocked attempts by 
the US and India to bring the conference to a less-than-successful conclusion.   
Liberal pluralism further affords explanatory clout to NGOs as well.  NGOs were 
very well represented at the Conference.  Some observers, such as Christopher Keith 
Hall, noted that the establishment of the Court itself was a ‘triumph of civil society’ 
(Hall, Interview).109  William Pace, for example, the Convenor of the ‘Coalition for The 
International Criminal Court’ (CICC) worked tirelessly to ensure that the Court was 
established with an independent Prosecutor.  Overall then, liberal pluralism is able to 
point to the individual actors who were more than influential in bringing the Rome 
conference to a successful conclusion. 
Constructivism, in general terms, lends itself more to an ideational and normative 
explanation, which is also fitting in the ensuing analysis.  It emphasizes social 
interactions as the conditioning factor and explanatory element of the behavior of states.  
Repeated interactions between states are then the key to how states act, and based on 
what values, ideas and norms.  Liberal constructivism, however, further affords more 
explanatory power to individual actors.  It places causal relevance on the ideational and 
valuational elements of individual political actors.  Politics and political change in 
particular is then initiated by individual political actors who use their normative, 
ideational and valuational arsenal to establish institutions or initiate change.   
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As mentioned above, the negotiations in Rome took place in a historical context 
where the changed nature of conflict within the international realm required new 
approaches – logistical and normative.  The notions of human security, humanitarian 
intervention and the ‘responsibility to protect’ all ushered in an era of a new type of 
‘security’ – the security of the individual prior to the security of the state – and a 
widening of the notion of state sovereignty.  Individuals needed to be protected, and state 
sovereignty was not to stand in the way of this protection.   
Evidence compiled by observers does give credence to this argument.  Many 
participants were naturally not new to negotiations within the UN system.  John 
Washburn notes that “the U.N. as a venue, institution, and community was also the 
primary shaper of the psychology of the negotiations” (Washburn, 364).  He further noted 
that “experience in the U.N. system gave many participants a strong, often emotional 
commitment to the ideals and purposes of the ICC” (Ibid.).  Interestingly enough, as Dr. 
Bruce Broomhall and Assad Kiyani of the Liu Institute of Global Affairs at the 
University of British Columbia recalled, “young diplomats found themselves in 
incredible role and agency,” because, for the most part, “senior diplomats did not have 
the time” to spend in Rome (Broomhall and Kiyani, Interview).110  These diplomats then 
went on to pursue careers centered around on Court, or became key personnel at the 
Court, as is the case of the current Registrar of the Court, Ambassador Herman von Hebel 
of The Netherlands.111   
Similarly Lawrence Weschler noted while observing the negotiations in Rome 
that there seemed to have been a sort of ‘double vision’ so-to-speak with respect to the 
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negotiations.  On the one hand, delegations were very much in favour of establishing the 
Court – at least within their rhetoric.  On the other, however, states had no qualms with 
clearly entrenching their negotiating positions within their conception of what their 
national interests were at the time, broadly speaking “to protect sovereignty, reduce costs, 
and dodge obligations” (Weschler, 88). These ‘visions’ blended, however, when 
individual delegates became ‘”delegates of the ICC Conference back to their foreign 
ministry” (Weschler 88).  These delegates noted that they negotiated in the following 
way: “my minister says this, … but I think if you propose it this other way, he won’t 
notice, and we can still accomplish the same purpose” (Ibid.).  The interests of the 
delegates, in other words, changed while continually participating in the process of 
establishing the Court with an independent Prosecutor.  They were willing to shift the 
meaning of national interests – in certain ways – in order to accommodate support for the 
Court.       
In sum then, neorealism does not seem to be able to provide a satisfactory 
explanation of the outcome of the negotiations.  Neoliberal and historical institutionalism 
do explain particular components of the outcomes, but they fall short in that they 
emphasize the institutional – as opposed to the agential – components of the negotiating 
dynamics.  Liberal pluralism and constructivism, then, are best suited for the task at hand 
because they are able to account for individual agency and the establishment of the ICC 
with an independent Prosecutor as a function of the framing of national interests and 
national sovereignty.  These last two theories are further better able to explain the 




Leyla Nadia Sadat notes that “only a coincidence of positive political events (such as the 
end of the Cold War), strong committed leadership of key individuals and states, and the 
strength of global civil society made the ICC’s emergence possible at this time” (Sadat, 
32).  Yet, rather than a coincidence guiding ‘the hand’ of political actors, it was the 
initiative, activism and effort of individual actors – or delegates of states, and members of 
NGOs – seizing ‘the moment’ so-to-speak who were at the heart of establishing the ICC 
with an independent Prosecutor.  These political actors acted based on deep-seated 
convictions that a permanent ICC with an independent Prosecutor is the most appropriate 
way to ensure that the Court will not be politicized.  The will and activism of the actors, 
the processes put in place, and the outcomes achieved at the Rome conference signalled 
tremendous institutional innovation which cannot but be credited to individual 
diplomatic, political and legal actors who spared no effort or energy to ensure that the 
Court with an independent Prosecutor was established.  Some NGO members even went 
as far as holding a hunger strike near the end of the conference to signal the importance 
of establishing the Court.112  Agency – and to a lesser extent structure – played a key role 
in establishing the ICC with an independent Prosecutor.  In theoretical terms, liberal 
pluralism and liberal constructivism are much better suited to explain the establishment 
of such a revolutionary design feature of the Court, than are neoliberal institutionalism, 
historical institutionalism, and neorealism, which contain less of an explanatory relevance 
due to their overwhelming reliance on the structural and institutional elements of 
international relations.    
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
There are three key contributions of this work: theoretical, empirical and policy-related.  
The aim in this chapter is to provide an exposition of these broad contributions and 
finally comment on areas of further research.  The theoretical contributions focus on 
explaining why states establish international organizations and under what conditions.  
The empirical contributions of this work stem from the particular methodologies and 
methods used to shed light on empirical detail regarding state preference formation in 
regards to the ICC and the negotiations as well.  The practical contributions of this work 
then deal with the circumstances under which one could expect that states which have yet 
to join the Court would join.  Finally, and as a corollary of the above stated contributions, 
study of international treaty ratification – within international criminal justice and other 
international policy areas – are more than warranted, especially in light of an ever 
globalizing realm.  
The International Criminal Court (ICC) with an independent Prosecutor was one 
of the most significant – if not the most significant – institutions of the 20th century.  The 
ICC and its independent Prosecutor were established after nearly a century-long political 
and legal struggle.  The Court and its design features revolutionized international 
criminal jurisprudence by, among others, permanently institutionalizing such notions as 
‘complementarity’, or the primacy of national as opposed to international prosecutions.  It 
provided an international legal definition for ‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ 
– and later on ‘crimes of aggression’.  Lastly, it institutionalized an independent 
Prosecutor who is able to initiate investigations independent of state requests to do so.  
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The last provision, which ultimately concerns the subject matter of this work, is 
significant for one particularly important reason: it challenges a crucial concept in 
international law and politics, namely state sovereignty.  Due to the unprecedented role 
ascribed to the Prosecutor, the international bargaining and negotiations were 
contentious, to say the least.  This contention was not only experienced in state-to-state 
interactions nor only in state-to-civil society interactions.  The contentious bargaining for 
an independent Prosecutor originated from within the domestic realm of individual states.  
The will to establish an independent Prosecutor originated from domestic political actors, 
their interests, and their particular notions and views of state sovereignty. 
Yet the question remained: why would state representatives themselves agree to 
include a provision in the RS, and establish an international institution, which could 
potentially constrain state sovereignty? The answer to this question points to an expanded 
notion of state sovereignty.  This new conception lunged away from traditional notions – 
where security was a function of states security exclusively – and approached a notion of 
state sovereignty which held the protection and accountability of individuals as 
sacrosanct.  This expanded notion of sovereignty was shared by some states and was not 
shared by others.  Yet, the causal story does not end there.  The expanded notion of state 
sovereignty originated from the domestic political realm of particular states which were 
able to convince some others that a permanent and independent international criminal 
court necessarily requires its Prosecutor to be able to initiate investigations on his or her 
own accord.  
In order to explain the institution of the independent Prosecutor two critical issues 
were entertained in this work.  First, it was discerned how state preferences were set 
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within the domestic realm of key states – namely Canada and the United Kingdom along 
with the United States and Japan.  Second, using the same cases as explanatory nodes, the 
question was posited as to why those delegations which were represented by groups 
sympathetic to the expanded notion of state sovereignty were able to persuade others at 
the Rome conference in 1998. 
This work attempts to highlight not only the negotiating and bargaining elements 
of establishing an international organization, but it also delves deeper into the domestic 
political arenas of key states.  The theoretical aim here was to shed light on how domestic 
interests and their ideas help establish international organizations.  A further aim here 
was to show that the approach of governments towards establishing international 
organizations will be a function of which groups capture the most coveted political prize 
– that of forming the government in a particular state.  State preferences, therefore, are 
not fixed; they vary based on which group is in power.  
The existing explanatory literature on the topic of the establishment of the 
independent Prosecutor is very much wanting.  As it mainly focuses on the national 
interests of liberal democratic governments, it places too great of an explanatory 
emphasis on state and institutional variables and dynamics.  It is certainly true that it was 
states which established the ICC with an independent Prosecutor.  However, at the same 
time, states were also represented by groups which, on the one hand were pitted against 
others within their domestic political realms on the very issue of the establishment of the 
Court and Prosecutor.  On the other hand, these very same states navigated the 
international diplomatic realm in tandem with other groups representing states which held 
similar views.  Key variables, therefore, which were very much left out of the existing 
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explanatory calculus, yet which provides further depth and breadth to the scholarly 
discussion regarding the Prosecutor and the ICC as a whole, are domestic political actors 
within key states.       
This work also contains a number of empirical contributions.  Primary and 
secondary documents of the negotiations were consulted in preparing this work.  
Transcripts of parliamentary debates were consulted in order to capture to essence of 
state preference formation at the domestic level.  Further primary sources documents, 
such as a declassified diplomatic demarche, were also used in order to shed light on 
domestic policy making.  Lastly, a number of elite interviews were also conducted with 
former ministers, Ambassadors, former members of state delegations at Rome, and with 
representatives of key NGOs as well.  The aim with the above outlined empirical work 
was to bring to the fore more detail about an unprecedented event in contemporary 
history which deserves much further research and study.  
In order to shed light on the relevance of domestic actors, the methodology along 
with the case studies chosen for the study at hand were of critical importance.  
Comparative case study was chosen as the key methodological approach.  In addition, the 
particular techniques of process tracing and elite interviews were also employed in order 
to shed light and reconstruct the preference formation in key states and to gain further 
insight into the negotiating processes prior to, and in, Rome.  Interviews with high-level 
former and current government officials were indispensable in order to gain an 
understanding of the ideational and decision-making processes in play during the 
negotiations and the ratification processes.   
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In addition to the methodological approach employed and the techniques used, the 
particular time frame and historical period under investigation in this work is also 
significant.  The investigation began with the publishing of the first draft statute of the 
ILC in 1994 and commenced – in the case of Japan in particular – with the end of the 
ratification process in 2007.  The breadth of this time frame is very significant because 
prior studies dealing with the independent Prosecutor and the ICC in general did not 
include the time period after the conclusion of the Rome conference in July, 1998.  Much 
activity commenced after the Rome conference, including negotiations regarding 
additional protocols aiding the proper functioning of the ICC. During the meetings of the 
these so-called ‘Preparatory Commission” key documents such as the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence (ROPE) were developed, and with the participation of such states as the 
United States a that, a state which first signed but later ‘unsigned’ the RS.   
For the purposes of this study however, it was critical that the domestic political 
processes – mainly involving national legislatures – be investigated.  It was during these 
debates – sometimes shortly after, but also much later on after the conclusion of the 
Rome conference – that critical political, legal and societal processes took place.  These 
debates shed light, on the one hand, on the intrinsically contentious nature of accession to 
the RS within domestic political and legal realms.  On the other hand, the domestic 
political and legal dynamics highlighted the importance of the temporally contingent 
factors in, not only acceding to the RS but also, establishing the Court itself.  Echoing the 
opinion of practitioners and participants at the Rome conference, the Court would most 
likely have not been established in a different temporal period.  By focusing on the 
ratification process and the debates during these processes the temporally contingent 
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nature of the establishment of the independent Prosecutor and the ICC were also 
highlighted.   
The cases selected for this comparative case study were Canada, the United 
Kingdom (UK), along with the United States (US) and Japan.  Each case was carefully 
selected because the representatives of each of the states played critical roles during the 
international diplomatic and negotiating realms.  Further, the cases were fitting for the 
study at hand because the political and legal dynamics within the domestic realms in 
these states reveal the importance of sub-state and domestic actors in the debate of 
establishing the ICC with an independent Prosecutor.   
Canada and the United Kingdom were chosen from among those states which 
were supporting the provision for an independent Prosecutor in the RS.  Canada’s guiding 
foreign policy principle, namely human security, provided the conceptual and ideational 
support for establishing such an institution.  In general terms, Canada’s diplomatic 
tradition of multilateralism, assuming leading roles in international institutions, and 
acting as a ‘middle power’ with respect to geopolitics, fit very well with assuming a 
leading role during the Rome conference, and among the so-called ‘like-minded states’.  
Within the domestic realm, the Liberal Party of Canada – forming the government at the 
time – and the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the day, Lloyd Axworthy, were the 
main supporters of the establishment of the Court.  Parliamentary debates indicate that, 
for the most part, the ratification of the RS was supported by four of the five main parties 
represented in the House of Commons in Ottawa.  The official opposition of the day, the 
Canadian Alliance, did not however support Bill C-19, and would have ‘repealed’ it, had 
it been in power at the time.  In Canada, the parliamentary debate regarding the Court 
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with an independent Prosecutor mirrored the general societal debates as well.  The more 
liberal versus conservative divide – a divide centered on a more ‘statist’ conceptions of 
state sovereignty versus the more ‘globalist’ conceptions – very much played out among 
non-governmental groups as well, with the more conservative groups opposing the ICC 
and the RS, even with respect to gender issues.  The conclusion one is able to draw from 
the Canadian domestic debate is that, had the official opposition of the day – the 
Canadian Alliance – been at the helm of the government in the 1990s, Canada would 
have not been as much of a supporter of the Court, nor would in fact have ratified the RS 
in the form it held in 1998.   
Domestic political dynamics were also at the heart of why the UK, abdicating 
from a general consensus on the issue among the ‘permanent 5’ members of the UNSC, 
supported the ICC with an independent Prosecutor.  The critical event in the UK was the 
election in 1997 of the Labour Party lead by Tony Blair.  After these elections, there was 
a very clear shift in the UK towards supporting the ICC with an independent Prosecutor.  
In addition to the ‘change of guard’ in London, the Labour Party and Mr. Blair also 
advocated for an ‘ethical foreign policy’ with the ‘international community’ in mind.  
Within the parliamentary debates – as was the case in Canada – there seemed to have 
been a very clear division between a more liberal and internationalist conception of state 
sovereignty and a more conservative and state-centric conception of state sovereignty.  In 
addition, the conservative right in the UK also advocated the pegging of the UK policy – 
and law – with regards to the ICC to that of the US.  At the end, the ‘International 
Criminal Court Bill’ was adopted with all of the Conservative and Independent members 
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of the House of Commons in London voting against the bill, and with all of the Labour 
Party and Liberal Democratic Party members voting for the bill. 
In the case of the US and Japan, the research showed that domestic actors and 
processes were also responsible for the formation of policy preferences.  Domestic 
political actors and process were also responsible for the continued opposition to the 
Court in the US, and to the eventual accession to the Court in Japan.  The policy 
preferences of the US on the matter of the Prosecutor – and the jurisdictional regime of 
the ICC – seemed to have mirrored the preferences of the Pentagon.  Out of the relevant 
departments involved – such as the State, Justice and the Defence Departments – it 
seemed to have been the case that the position of the Pentagon carried the day.  The 
relentless and rigid insistence that the RS must include provision which would shield US 
service members and civilian leaders from the reaches of the Court did not only originate 
from the Pentagon but was also the reason why at the end of the Rome conference the US 
delegation lost the final vote.  Within the US domestic political arena, the voice of the 
late Senator Jesse Helms, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, seemed to 
have echoed the loudest.  His insistence that the RS would be ‘dead on arrival’ in the US 
Senate not only signalled to the negotiators in Rome that it will nearly be impossible to 
get the US on board, but also compelled the delegations to attempt to establish the Court 
– with an independent Prosecutor – without explicit US support.     
Lastly, Japan played a very involved role all throughout the negotiations.  Its 
diplomats occupied key positions all throughout the negotiating process, with Japan even 
playing a conciliatory role among the ‘permanent five’ members of the UNSC who were 
split on the Court by organizing a meeting at the Japanese embassy in Rome.  Japan 
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signed the RS at the end of the conference in Rome.  However, it took the Japanese 
bureaucracy and the Liberal Democratic Party / New Komeito coalition nearly a decade 
to bring the statute in front of parliament.  It seemed to be the case that within domestic 
political circles, the Democratic Party of Japan, and the leadership of Senator Tadashi 
Inuzuka, tipped the scales in favour of a unanimous acceptance of the bill named the 
‘Cooperation with the International Criminal Court’. 
At Rome, particular political actors seemed to have carried the proverbial ‘torch’ 
for the acceptance of the RS.  In tandem with well-motivated and well-represented 
members of global civil society, key members of the ‘like minded group’ aided with not 
only reconciling opposing views but also in ensuring that on the final day of the 
negotiations states could not derail the final vote.  Members of the ‘Coalition for an 
International Criminal Court’ (CICC), a global NGO representing hundreds of other 
global civil society groups – and whose members even served as members of state 
delegations – ensured that legal and technical advice to smaller state delegations was 
available.  This advice – and advocacy in general – was geared towards establishing the 
Court with an independent Prosecutor.  In fact, the very origin of the notion that the 
Prosecutor should be independent of states and UNSC control originated from a policy 
paper authored and published by Amnesty International – a member of the CICC Steering 
Committee.   
With respect to state delegations and their members, members of the ‘like minded 
group’ were responsible for the victory and institutionalization of the independent 
Prosecutor.  It seemed to have been the case, that the Argentine – German proposal for 
the establishment of a pre-trial chamber, as a check on the power of the Prosecutor, 
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seemed to have ‘tipped the scales of interests’ towards the inclusion of a Prosecutor with 
proprio motu powers in the RS.  Canada – supplying the chairperson of the Committee of 
the Whole – and later Norway, whose delegation ensured that neither India nor the US 
would introduce motions which would deem the RS unacceptable to many delegations 
before the final vote on July 17th, 1998, played key roles in this respect.   
It was established that it was individual political actors who were responsible for 
setting states preferences and ensuring that the RS is passed with a provision for an 
independent Prosecutor.  Therefore out of the five theories surveyed in this work, liberal 
pluralism and liberal constructivism as international relations theories provide the most 
plausible explanatory clout.  In chapters four, five and six, neorealism, neoliberal 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism, liberal pluralism and liberal constructivism 
were surveyed in order to explain state preference formation and the final outcome in 
Rome.  Neorealism seemed the least well equipped to provide an account as to why states 
insisted on establishing an independent Prosecutor, and why those states were victorious 
in Rome.  Neorealism within this realm espouses that cooperation within the international 
realm will be a function of the most powerful states’ able to persuade others to cooperate 
within institutional fora.  In the case of the ICC, therefore, neorealism falls short.  It 
cannot explain why the ICC was established without explicit US support.  Neorealism 
could however, explain the position of the US government.   
Neoliberal institutionalism seems to fare slightly better in attempting to explain 
state cooperation on the matter of the ICC.  This theoretic strand also ascribes causal 
primacy to states as the key actors within the international realm.  The theory also holds 
much of the same assumptions as neorealism in regards to the context of the international 
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realm as well.  The key difference between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism is 
that in the later theoretic strand institutions are seen as fora which enable states to 
cooperate and build mutual trust.  Within this theoretical strand, institutions themselves 
serve as avenues for cooperation.  At issue, however, is that states are still thought to be 
unitary actors, which means that other than the institutional venue, it is very difficult to 
explain why certain states changed position with respect to certain policy preferences.  
This theory would not be able to explain why the UK, for example, changed its policy 
with respect to the independent Prosecutor in 1997.   
Moving from the international realm to the domestic political realm, historical 
institutionalism seems also to offer a key insight which resonates quite well with the 
research conducted.  This insight is not sufficient however as it fails in a key respect.  
Historical institutionalism – with its emphasis on established institutional practices and 
norms – may be able to explain why certain liberal democratic states supported the 
establishment of the Court with an independent Prosecutor.  The historically contingent 
institution – with all its procedural, ‘rule of law’ and practical elements – can provide a 
satisfactory explanation.  Yet this theoretical strand does not seem to be able to explain 
why the US, heralded as the bastion of liberal democracy and the rule of law, decided to 
oppose the Court.  The age-old existence of certain types of domestic institutions does 
not, in other words, provide a satisfactory explanation. 
What is left as analytical currencies are actors and their formulation of 
preferences, more specifically preferences with respect to state sovereignty.  Liberal 
pluralism, with its causal emphasis on domestic actors and domestic preference formation 
reflected in the actions of governments – which themselves are represented by the victors 
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of domestic political processes and debates – seems to be able to provide the most 
plausible causal story.  At the time of the Rome conference – as well as before and after 
the negotiations – certain domestic groups represented key governments in the 
negotiation process.  These groups, for the most part, all believed that an ICC with an 
independent Prosecutor is the best plausible solution to end impunity in conflict.  At the 
same time, however, these groups advocated a formulation of state sovereignty – an 
expanded notion of states sovereignty and security, namely human security – which was 
able to accommodate, and fit well, with the establishment of a Court with an independent 
Prosecutor.  Liberal constructivism, with its emphasis on ideas – such as ‘human 
security’ and ‘ethical foreign policy’ – is best able to explain the formulation of state 
interests and the corresponding actions of key states in this process as well.  At the same 
time, ideas underpinning a more inward looking and traditionally ‘statist’ foreign policy 
of the US, and, at least initially, Japan, informed these states’ policy preferences and 
actions with respect to the Court.   
Lastly, this work also contains practical contributions as well.  Perhaps the main 
practical contribution of this work is that it sheds light on the fact that accession to the 
RS, or joining the Court in general, is a function of a favourable domestic political and 
legal climate.  Currently there are 124 states which are members of the Court.  In order to 
raise this number and continuously strive towards universal acceptance and ‘jurisdiction’ 
the Court and civil society groups must seek favourable domestic political and legal 
conditions while encouraging states to join the Court.  In a general sense, the key once 
again is domestic policy formation and formulation.        
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The theoretical investigation of domestic political and legal conditions and 
contexts which may, or may not, lend themselves to treaty ratification then is one of the 
key areas of further research which should be attempted.  With the advent of 
globalization, states are more compelled to enter into international agreements bilaterally 
and within multilateral fora as well.  Certain states are more likely to enter into 
international agreements and some others are less likely to do so.  Some states prefer 
bilateral agreements over multilateral agreements.  Concerted research is more than 
warranted in attempting to understand under what conditions – international and domestic 
– are states more likely to enter into, and bind themselves to, international agreements 
and under what conditions would states back away from entering into such agreements.  
It is also of crucial importance to understand how these decisions are made, by whom, 
and under what circumstances are the proponents victorious.  In a broader sense, then, 
further research is warranted to uncover the connection between domestic political actors 
and the relevance of international law within international relations.  More often than not, 
discussions regarding international law lend themselves to discussions encompassing 
dynamics and bargaining within the international realm.  Less attention is placed on the 
domestic factors of the effectiveness of international law and international legal regimes 
in general.  Much knowledge will be gained by unearthing the often neglected 
connections between the domestic and the international – as well as global – elements of 
international law.   
In closing, the focus on the domestic sources of foreign policy is key to 
understanding the establishment of the ICC with an independent Prosecutor.  An 
exclusive focus on international processes and negotiations only provides a partial 
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explanation.  In more specific terms, the investigation of the ratification processes in 
individual states – although attempted in this work – is still very much wanting.  These 
processes are critical to understanding international negotiation outcomes.  As the 
research above shows, a different set of actors in power in key domestic legislatures 
could have in fact brought about a very different outcome.  With respect to the ICC in 
particular, at the time of writing, there are 124 states that have ratified the RS.  This 
number, although very encouraging – signifies a shortfall with respect to a key idea 
striven for by those involved in the negotiations and their supporters: universal 
jurisdiction.  Apart from the legal understanding of this notion, the more states ratify the 
RS, the closer the global community will come to universal acceptance and perhaps even 
jurisdiction of the Court.  Exploring the processes of ratification in the 122 states 
mentioned above can most certainly pave the way for future ratifications elsewhere as 
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APPENDIX I – STATES IN FAVOUR OF AN INDEPENDENT 
PROSECUTOR 
 
                                                     
113
 All the data appearing in this table was acquired from Bassiouni, M. Cherif.  The Legislative History of the 
International Criminal Court: An Article-by-Article Evolution of the Statute from 1994 – 1998. Volume 2.  Ardsley, 
New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2005.   
State113 Independence  Information 
Pre-Trial 
Chamber Politicization Safeguards 
Andorra                  
Angola                   
Argentina         X     
Armenia               
Australia        X   XX 
Austria      X         
Belgium     X X X   X 
Benin                   
Bosnia and H.          Present 
Bolivia             General Assembly     
Botswana               
Brazil             X X   NO 
Burkina Faso      XX X   
Burundi                 
Canada                Already present 
Chile           Reliable sources     Sufficient 
Columbia         X     
Congo               X     
Costa Rica         X     
Croatia                    
Czech R.       X X       
Denmark          X   NO 
Djibouti          X     
Equador                
Estonia                  
Finland               X 
France           X     
Gabon               X 
Germany            X   
Ghana                   
Greece          X   NO 
Guinea            X     
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State Independence  Information 
Pre-Trial 
Chamber Politicization Safeguards 
Guinea-
Biseau       
Holy See   
Hungary     
Ireland       XX X X     
Italy               XX Possibly     
Ivory Coast      X     
Jamaica              
Jordan          Credible sources     X 
Kuwait               X 
Lesotho     X XX X   X 
Liechtenstein    
From reliable 
sources       
Lithuania            No 
Madagascar  X   X     
Mali                  
Malta      X       
Only as a 
compromise 
Morocco          X No control   
Mexico          X     
Mozambique          Sufficient 
Namibia       X       
Netherlands    X     NO 
Nicaragua             
Norway       X XX   Sufficient 
New Zealand          X 
Peru             X   No 
Poland           X 
Portugal      X   X   
Already 
present 
ROK            X       
Romania         X     
San Marino       X     
Senegal      X No XX     
Sierra Leone    X     XX 
Slovenia    X     Sufficient 
Solomon Isl.         
Already 
present 
South Africa   X X     
Spain                    
























Sweden        X   X 
Switzerland    X     
Tanzania         X     
Thailand       X       
Togo           X     X 
Trinidad & 
T.  X   X     
Uganda               
UK            X   X     
Ukraine        X     
TOTAL:    
77 (8) (15) (31) (0) (7) 
 
Guide to APPENDIX I:  
The categories of comments made by state delegations appears on the top row of each page.  The 
‘X’ denotes the position argued by a particular state.  Double ‘X’ mean that the same state spoke 
on the particular issue on one additional occasion.  The category of arguments made are the need 
for an independent prosecutor for an independent court, information provision from any source, 
the need for a pre-trial chamber, the issue of politicization if not independent, and the need for 
additional safeguards, other than the oversight of the pre-trial chamber.  Please note that the table 
does not account for variation in the positions states took throughout the conference.      
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APPENDIX II – STATES NOT IN FAVOUR OF AN INDEPENDENT PROSECUTOR  
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 All the data appearing in this table was acquired from Bassiouni, M. Cherif.  The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: An Article-by-




Refer.  UNSC 
Political 







Afghanistan    nf                   X 
Algeria            nf     X X     X     XX 
Azerbaijan      fp       X             
Bahrain           nf         Limited X         
Bangladesh    pf             Enhanced       
Cameroon      nf                   
China             nf                   
Cuba              nf X                   
Egypt            nf X                 X 
Ethiopia      pf X                   
India             f X     X             
Indo              pf       X             
Iran               nf                     
Iraq               nf X   X               
Israel            f   X XX         Weaken X   
Japan            f X X                 
Kenya           nf X X                 




*For explanations on the contents of this table, please refer to the ‘Guide to Appendix II’ on page 281.   
 
 
Libya            nf XX                   
Nigeria          pf                   
Oman            nf   X  X     X       
Oman                                
Pakistan        pf XX     X       X     
Qatar              nf                   
Russia            pf XX XX X               
Slovakia        p                     
Sri Lanka      pf       X             
Sudan            nf   GA                 
Tunisia         nf X                   
Turkey         pf X   XX X           X 
UAE            nf X                   
Uruguay         f X X             
More risks than 
benefits   
USA              f X X X   X           
Venezuela     f X X                 
Vietnam        nf                     
Yemen          nf X                   
TOTAL: 36 (19) (8) (6) (8) (2) (1) (2) (1) (1) (4) 
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Guide to Appendix II 
 The categories of comments made by state delegations appears on the top row of each page.  The ‘X’s denote the position argued by a particular 
state.  Double ‘X’ mean that the same state spoke on the particular issue on one additional occasion.  The category of comments are state referral, 
UNSC referral, political influence if independent, issues of complementarity, information provision, the need for a judicial oversight, the need for 
a pre-trial chamber, need for an independent prosecutor other than fully independent, the need for additional safeguards, and the issue of not being 
effective if independent..  The totals are tabulated below the last state listed in the table.  Please note that the table does not account for variation in 
the positions states took throughout the conference.      
Guide to the abbreviations:  
 
‘nf’ – ‘Not Free’ 
 
‘pf’ – ‘Partially Free’ 
 
‘f’ – ‘Free’ 
 
The above outlined classifications are those used by ‘Freedom House’, and are the aggregate ratings on countries’ civil and political rights 
indicators.  For more information in regards to this methodology, please see ‘Methodology’ in Methodology. On-line. Freedom House.   




APPENDIX III – STATES COMMENTING ON THE FIRST DRAFT 
OF THE ILC IN 1994 
 
Guide to Appendix III:  
States commenting on the issue of the Prosecutor may be found on the top row of the table.  The 
extent of the comments were if the Prosecutor should be independent, if states should be able to 
refer cases to the Court, if the UNSC should be able to refer cases to the Court, and what 
importance is given to a judicial review of a case pursued by an independent Prosecutor.  
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 Comments of Governments on the Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Court, International Law Commission, United Nations General Assembly Records, Forty-sixth 
session, Additions 1 – 8, A/CN.4/458, 1 May – 22 July 1994.   
 
State115 Independent  State UNSC Judicial Review 
Australia Yes     Only if not proceeding with an investigation 
Belarus       
Court should oversee the work of the 
Prosecutor 
Nordics Yes       
Switzerland   Yes Yes    
New 
Zealand 
Yes, but only  
if no state 
referral       
UK Yes   
Only 
referral    





independence        
Yugoslavia Yes Yes Yes   
Japan Yes       
Czech 
Republic      Yes   
Austria  Yes       
Hungary  Yes       
US Yes   




Proceed if there is a 'good faith' reason that the 
indictment will stand. Operate only on an ‘ad 
hoc’ basis.  
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SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS 
 Extensive field research experience in international criminal justice scholarly and 
institutional research 
 Experience teaching at the second year level at King’s University College, at 
Western University, and at a third year level at the University of Waterloo 
 Completed the inaugural Professional Training Course on the Prevention of Mass 
Atrocities; Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Concordia 
University, Montreal, PQ, Canada 
 Training in the use of the statistical software ‘STATA’, and social network 
analysis research methods at the Methods School of the European Consortium for 




Courses Taught:  
“Business and Government” – Political Science 2211E; Department of Political 
Science, King’s University College, Western University, London, Ontario; Fall/Winter 
2012 and 2013, Fall/Winter 2013 and 2014 
 Teaches a two hour lecture once per week, and holds one tutorial per week for 49 
students 
 Lectures on such topics as the Canadian state and the Canadian economy, liberal 
and socialist conceptions of the role of the state in the economy, Canadian labour 
and Canadian capital, the Canadian economy in the North American context, 
global trade relations, development and inequality, and introduction to Canada’s 
Arctic policy.  
 Received a score of 5.89 out of 7 on the overall course evaluation in 2012/2013 
 Received a score of 6.03 out of 7 on the overall course evaluation in 2013/2014 
(*This score was higher than the departmental average.)  
 
“Public Administration” – Political Science 2246E; Department of Political Science, 
King’s University College, Western University, London, Ontario; Winter, 2014 and 
Fall/Winter 2014-15. 




 Lectures on such topics as the powers of the Prime Minister, organizational 
design and management, public finance, human resource issues, government and 
managerial reforms, and challenges to accountability  
 
“Globalization” – Political Science 387; Department of Political Science, Faculty of 
Arts, University of Waterloo; Fall 2009 and Fall 2011 
 Taught a three hour lecture once per week for 36 students 
 Lectured on such topics as the history, definitions, explanation, and debates of 
globalization; the state and nation; security; international law and humanitarian 
intervention; the environment; terrorism; non-state actors; inequality and 
contestation; and the politics of development.  
 Received a score of 4.2 out of 5 on the overall course evaluation in 2009 
 Received a score of 4.36 out of 5 on the overall course evaluation in 2011  
 
Teaching Assistant Experience:  
 
“Introduction to International Relations” – Political Science 2231E; Department of 
Political Science, King’ University College, Western University; Fall and Winter 2013 / 
2014 
 Lead tutorials for 40 students  
 Marked the class essays  
 Assigned a participation mark for each student, and held weekly office hours 
 Lecture on certain topics such as multilevel analysis and the International 
Criminal Court 
 
“Introduction to Comparative Politics: Developed and Developing States” – Political 
Science 2245E; Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Science, University of 
Western Ontario; Fall 2007 – Fall 2010 
 Lead tutorials for approximately 25 – 50 students  
 Marked the class essays and the final exams 
 Assigned a participation mark for each student, and held weekly office hours 
 
“International Human Rights” - Political Science 3382E; Department of Political 
Science, Faculty of Social Science, University of Western Ontario; Fall 2006 
 Marked the class essay and the midterm exams 
 Assigned a participation mark for each student 
 Held weekly office hours 
 
 
“Globalization” - Political Science 110; Department of Political Science, University of 
Waterloo; Winter 2004 
 Led three tutorial sessions for students enrolled in Political Science 110 
 Corrected and marked the class essays, the midterm and the final exams  




“Introduction to Political Ideas” - Political Science 100; Department of Political 
Science, University of Waterloo; Fall 2003 
 Led three tutorial sessions  
 Corrected and marked the class essays  
 Held office hours three times per week for those students who needed extra help 
 
“Introduction to Philosophy” – Philosophy 100; Department of Philosophy, St. 
Jerome’s University, University of Waterloo; Fall, 2002 
 Entrusted with marking and correcting the midterm and the final exams  
 
“Introduction to Croatian” – Croatian 100; Department of Slavic and Germanic 
Languages, University of Waterloo; Fall, 1999 
 Entrusted with administering a language laboratory for the students once per week 
 
Guest Lectures:  
 
“Multilateral Diplomacy and Assembly of States Parties Meeting of the 
International Criminal Court”; guest lecture to 4th year undergraduate students 
enrolled in PS 4457F/9712A Special Topics: Diplomacy and International Negotiations , 
October 29th, 2013, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada, Fall 2013. 
 
 “New Beginnings in a Time of Global Economic Volatility: The International 
Criminal Court at 10”, presented as a part of the Department of Political Science 
Speaker Series 2011-2012, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, Winter, 
2012. 
 
Topic: “Explaining the establishment of the International Criminal Court”; guest 
lecture in a 4th year course on international relations theory, Department of Political 
Science, Wilfrid Laurier University, Spring, 2012 
 
Topic: “Religion, State Collapse and Security.”  
Introduction to Comparative Politics, Political Science 2245E, University of Western 
Ontario; Winter 2010 
 
Topic: “Ethnic Conflict and the Second Economy of Zaire,”  
Introduction to Comparative Politics, Political Science 2245E, University of Western 
Ontario; Winter 2009 
  
Topic: “Human Rights and Foreign Policy,”  




Training in quantitative research methods, and applied social network analysis; 
Methods School of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) at the 




Professional Training Course on the Prevention of Mass Atrocities; Montreal 
Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Concordia University, Montreal, PQ; 
June 12 – 14th, 2013 
 
Doctor of Philosophy Candidate – Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social 
Science, University of Western Ontario; Fall 2006 – Present  
 Dissertation Topic: “Why states established an independent Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court?” 
 Supervisors: Dr. Adam Harmes, Dr. Bruce Morrison and Dr. Radoslav Dimitrov 
 Relevant Courses: International Relations, Comparative Politics, Politics of 
Religion, Transitional Justice, Methodology in Political Science  
 
Master of Arts – Political Science, University of Waterloo; Spring, 2006 
 Master’s Research Paper Topic: The Relationship between the State of Serbia 
and Montenegro and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia. 
 Supervisors: Dr. Andrew Cooper and Dr. Brian Orend 
 Relevant Courses: Methodology, Qualitative Research Methods, Conflict and 
Conflict Resolution, Ethnic Conflict, International Political Economy, and 
Canadian Public Policy 
 
Bachelor of Arts – Honours Political Science and Applied Studies, Philosophy Minor; 




Policy-Related Publications:  
Sarkany, Laszlo, and Asim Ali. "Kenyatta's Challenge to the ICC." Canadian 
International Council. N.p., 22 Mar 2012. Web. 30 Apr 2013. 
<http://opencanada.org/author/aali/>.  
Publications in the Media: 
 
Sarkany, Laszlo, and Asim A. Ali. "Pakistan and the IC[C]." The News, February 24, 
2012. http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=94372&Cat=9 
 
Sarkany, Laszlo, and Asim Ali. "ICC and Syria." The Express Tribune, March 16, 2012. 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/350491/icc-and-syria/ (accessed March 24, 2012). 
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS  
 
“The Political Economy of Compliance: The International Criminal Court and Foreign 
Direct Investment,” Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San 




“Teaching International Relations Concepts to Kinaesthetic Learners: Widening Teaching 
Methodology in the IR Classroom via Recreational Activities and Games" – Annual 
meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada; 
June 2012  
 
“Does the work of the Prosecutor encourage state ratifications?” – Annual meeting of the 
International Studies Association, San Diego, USA; April, 2012  
 
“The Independent Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and the Continued 
Success of the Global Ratification Campaign,” – annual meeting of the Canadian 
Political Science Association, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada; May, 2011  
 
“The Independent Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: From Rome to 
Kampala and Beyond,” presented at the annual conference of the International Studies 
Association, Montreal, Canada; March, 2011  
 
“Historical Institutionalism and International Relations Theory: The Case of the United 
States' Objections to the International Criminal Court,” presented at the Northeastern 
Political Science Association Conference, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA; 
November, 2009 
 
“Historical Institutionalism and the United States' Objections to the International 
Criminal Court: The Importance of the Post-Cold War Temporal Context,” presented at 
the 17th Annual Illinois State University Conference for Students of Political Science, 
Bloomington/Normal, Illinois, USA; March, 2009 
 
AWARDS, FELLOWSHIPS, PRIZES, GRANTS 
 
Nominee – Graduate Student Teaching Award, Spring, 2010; Faculty of Graduate 
Studies, University of Western Ontario  
 
Recipient ($19,500 per annum) – Western Graduate Research Scholarship (WGRS) and 
Graduate Teaching Assistantship; Fall 2006 – Fall 2010 
 
Recipient ($13,900) – University of Waterloo Graduate Teaching and Research 
Assistantship, University of Waterloo; Fall 2003 – Fall 2004 
 
Research Grant ($500) – King’s University College at The University of Western 
Ontario; Fall 2014.  
 
Travel Grant ($300) to attend the International Studies Association annual conference in 




Travel Grant ($194) provided by the Social Science and Humanities Research 
Council (SSHRC) to attend the Canadian Political Science Association annual 
conference at the University of Alberta, June, 2012.  
 
Travel Grant ($300) to attend the International Studies Association annual conference in 
San Diego, California, Spring 2012  
 
Travel Grant ($300) to attend the International Studies Association annual conference in 
Montreal, March, 2011; Department of Political Science, The University of Western 
Ontario  
 
Travel Grant ($300) to attend the North Eastern Political Science Association Annual 
Meeting in Philadelphia, PA, Fall, 2009 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:  
 
Representative of the NGO ‘No Peace Without Justice’ at the 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th 
Assembly of State Parties meeting of the International Criminal Court at the United 
Nations Headquarters in New York, in December, 2011 and December 2014, and in The 




Part-Time Faculty Representative; Department of Political Science, King’s University 
College, Western University, Fall 2013.  
 
Political Science Representative, Society of Graduate Students, University of Western 
Ontario, Summer 2009 
 
Chair Selection Committee, Graduate Student Representative (Alternate), 














Director of Referee Development, South-West District Soccer Association, Fall 2014 - 
Present 
 
Secretary of the South West Soccer Referees’ Association, Fall 2005 – Present 
 
Vice-President of the South West Soccer Referees’ Association, Fall 2008 
 
Community Awards:  
 
Recipient of the ‘YMCA Canada Peace Award’ – ‘Strong Leader’ category; The 
YMCAs of Cambridge and Kitchener-Waterloo; Fall 2010 
 
Recipient of the ‘YMCA Canada Peace Award’ – ‘Strong Leader’ category; The 
YMCAs of Cambridge and Kitchener-Waterloo; Fall 2003 
 
Recipient of the 15 Year Service Award; The YMCAs of Cambridge and Kitchener-
Waterloo; Winter, 2011 
 





International Studies Association; Member since fall of 2010 




Spoken Languages: English, Hungarian, Serbo-Croatian 
 
Written Languages: English, Hungarian, Serbo-Croatian – Latin and Cyrillic Scripts 
 
HOBBIES, INTERESTS, LEISURE ACTIVITIES, TRAVEL 
 Attended a conference for journalists from the Vishegrad Countries (Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary) regarding the International Criminal 
Court in 2005.  The conference was sponsored by the Foreign Ministries of 
Switzerland and Norway 
 Attended a youth leadership conference in Prague, Czech Republic in the winter 
of 2002/2003 
 Resided in Sweden and Hungary for approximately 1.5 years in each location at 
the beginning of the 1990s 
 Travelled extensively in Europe 





Dr. Adam Harmes, CD; Graduate Chair 
  
 
Dr. Bruce Morrison  
  
 
Dr. Radoslav Dimitrov  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
